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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the relationship between doctrines and rhetoric of sustainable
development (SD) and their compatibility with robust notions of migrant justice. I use migrantworkers-built Masdar City, Abu Dhabi’s “eco-smart city,” as an entry point to examine this
relationship. Drawing on Amartya Sen, I rely on a critical capabilities-based environmental justice
lens that focuses on the full range of opportunities migrants have at home, in their destination
country, and anywhere in between. While this lens offers a means-ends distinction and a pluralistic
notion of justice, it must be further specified and supplemented by explicit accounts of structural
constraints. The focus, therefore, is on movement and supportive capabilities and this account is
further supplemented by Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and Critical
Development Studies that build on post-colonial and post-structural critiques of SD.
This multi-lingual project relies on interviews of Pakistani returning migrant workers and
government officials; civil society members based in the Gulf region; and Masdar City’s studentresidents as well as ethnographic reflection notes taken in the UAE and Pakistan. These data
supplement a range of international and domestic laws on labour migration; legal and policy
instruments on sustainable development; case law; international organization reports; UAE and
Pakistani government documents; and publicly available information published by Masdar.
The multi-scalar analysis that follows reveals how the international migration regime creates
multiple statuses, affording insufficient protection to migrants in an irregular situation. This is
further compounded by how the Emirati labour migration regime allocates certain workers to
sectors based on race, gender, class, etc. Even the ways it is subverted incentivize and reinforce
irregularity and precarity for the most vulnerable. Ultimately, I argue that while irregularity and
precarity are mentioned in the Sustainable Development Goals that seek to “leave no one behind,”
sustainable development’s eco-modernist logic and unidimensional view of economic-centred
growth waters down its social content. In eco-cities such as Masdar, the status quo is sustained
while marginalized and racialized migrant workers building eco-cities are erased in post-oil
futures. This project’s focus on an oil-rich monarchy contributes to the growing literature on
environmental justice in the global South and focus on capabilities adds to theoretical debates on
the “justice” in environmental justice.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
“They showed us a moon…that if we go there, our life would be set.”
- Sahil, Pakistani returning migrant who worked in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
In the scorching summer heat, I sat on a bench next to the iconic wind tower of Masdar
City (Masdar), Abu Dhabi’s multi-billion-dollar eco-city that was launched in 2006.1 This wind
tower (Barjeel in Arabic) is a traditional passive ventilation system designed to capture the
desert’s breezes and cool the air by as much as 20 degrees Celsius. However, like most things in
this project that had aimed to be the world’s first “carbon neutral,” “zero-waste city,” it is an
experiment in progress that now stands somewhat deserted. Sitting next to the tower and giant
yellow letters that read “happiness,” the only other person I could see outside was a worker
sweeping the floors. I tried making conversation with him but noticed a few men sitting a bit
further by a café, watching our interaction. The moment I took a few steps back, one of them
approached the worker and asked him what I had wanted. We exchanged quick apologetic
smiles, and I walked back inside to the air-conditioned “Knowledge Centre,” which houses what
used to be Masdar Institute’s library.
While I could not speak to this worker, I was reminded of a conversation I had earlier that
summer of 2018 in Karachi, Pakistan, where I formally interviewed returning migrant workers.
Sahil, a site engineer who had worked in Abu Dhabi for a few months, had not been paid his
salary throughout his stay there. Sahil’s employer had also confiscated his passport despite it
being illegal to do so.2 Without his passport, he described how he always felt afraid to leave the

1

Federico Cugurullo, “Urban eco-modernisation and the policy context of new eco-city projects: Where
Masdar City fails and why” (2016) 53:11 Urban Studies 2417–2433.
2
Confiscation and withholding of travel documents are included in the ILO indicators for forced labour
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industrial area where he worked and lived or speak to anyone about his working conditions.
When I asked him what had brought him to Abu Dhabi in the first place, he responded, “They
showed us a moon…that if we’d go there, our life would be set.”
Throughout my fieldwork in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), I reflected on my
conversation with Sahil and the many different ‘moons’ Pakistani returning migrant workers
spoke of when I asked them what had led to work in the UAE. Sometimes in blue overalls,
orange vests, and hard hats, sometimes climbing make-shift ladders on buildings, catching a
water break under a flyover, the only visible people in the UAE outside in the heat were migrant
workers like the caretaker in Masdar and Sahil in Karachi. Yet walking through Masdar’s
“visitor’s deck,” there was no representation of the predominantly South Asian men who make
up more than 50 percent of the UAE’s population and more than 80 percent of its workforce.3
As a Pakistani who grew up in the Gulf region, I was hardly surprised. During my
undergraduate studies in the UAE between 2009-2013, I watched the oil-rich monarchy slowly
starting to market itself as a hub for renewable energy, aiming to diversify its economy.
Meanwhile, migrant workers who helped build UAE’s famous skyline, artificial islands, and
“sustainable” development projects continued to toil in appalling conditions. Stories reporting
the stark contrast between the “fantasy cities of pleasure”4 and exploitation of low-skilled

3

In contrast to other countries in the Gulf region which have population registries like Kuwait and Oman,
the United Arab Emirates does not yet publish population figures and demographic characteristics of the
resident population in real time. This number is an estimate that is based on demographic data available
on Gulf Labour Markets and Migration’s website: BQ Magazine, UAE: Estimates of population residing
in the UAE by country of citizenship (selected countries, 2014) (Gulf Labour Markets and Migration,
2015) available online: https://gulfmigration.org/uae-estimates-of-population-residing-in-the-uae-bycountry-of-citizenship-selected-countries-2014/; UAE, Dubai: Percentage distribution of employed
population (aged 15 and above) by nationality group and sex (2017), by Dubai Statistics Center (2018)
available online: https://gulfmigration.org/uae-dubai-percentage-distribution-of-employed-populationaged-15-and-above-by-nationality-group-and-sex-2017/
4
Federico Cugurullo, “How to Build a Sandcastle: An Analysis of the Genesis and Development of
Masdar City” (2013) 20:1 Journal of Urban Technology 23–37.

2

migrant workers and protests linked to high-profile international projects such as the construction
of the New York University Abu Dhabi campus, Guggenheim, and FIFA World Cup stadiums
attracted international attention.5 Could UAE’s aspiration to be a leader in a ‘post-oil future’
through projects like Masdar City provide an opportunity to reimagine other relationships,
tensions, dependencies, and hierarchies such as its reliance on and treatment of migrant workers?
Will Masdar City, “spaceship in the desert,”6 take migrant workers to the many moons that are
promised? Is there space for migrant justice in this post-oil future? These are the questions that
inspired this research project.
While anecdotes such as the one above often feature literature on migrant workers in the
Gulf and similar observations have animated much of the discussion, they tend to present a
homogenous view of migrant workers as victims, leaving out the institutional structures that
enable these conditions and present them as unique to the region. The glimpse above, for
instance, starts at the workplace (Masdar City) in the receiving state where the worker is unable
to speak freely and ends with a returning migrant worker’s quote. However, it does not include
the “labour camps” where workers live, the journey that brings migrant workers from South Asia
to the UAE, or the spaces where migrants can assert a sense of belonging. Nevertheless, it can
illustrate the challenges of speaking to migrant workers in Masdar City, my positionality as a
researcher, and the juxtaposition that invites us to consider possible futures for the migrant
workers building eco-cities.

5

See for eg. “UAE: Abuses at NYU, Louvre, Guggenheim Project”, Human Rights Watch (10 February
2015), online: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/10/uae-abuses-nyu-louvre-guggenheim-project>.
;Ariel Kaminer & Sean O’Driscoll, “Workers at N.Y.U.’s Abu Dhabi Site Faced Harsh Conditions”, The
New York Times (19 May 2014), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/nyregion/workers-atnyus-abu-dhabi-site-face-harsh-conditions.html>.
6
Gökçe Günel, Spaceship in the Desert: Energy, Climate Change, and Urban Design in Abu Dhabi
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2019).
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Indeed the “post-Paris enthusiasm”7 to build so-called sustainable, green energy
development projects is evident not only in places like Masdar City but also in legal and policy
circles. While international labour law attempts to incorporate sustainable development, it
remains at a crossroads; its regulatory structures remain “out of sync with the vast majority of the
workforce of the South.”8 Labour migration has become increasingly temporary in nature, and
non-traditional, precarious forms of work are proliferating.9 Meanwhile, in September 2015,
United Nations member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Through
its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, it promises to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable
development worldwide by 2030, pledging to “leave no one behind.”10 Not only do the SDGs
explicitly include migrant workers, but the latest internationalt instrument on migrant workers,
the United Nations (UN) Global Migration Compact, also endorses SD and is rooted in the
SDGs. Accordingly, labour standards are increasingly being framed in terms of SD.
I use Masdar, Abu Dhabi, as an entry point to investigate the relationship between this
“post-Paris” enthusiasm towards so-called sustainable development projects11 and the worsening

7

Dayna Nadine Scott & Adrian A Smith, “Sacrifice Zones in the Green Energy Economy: The New
Climate Refugees” (2016) 26 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 371–382.
8
Adelle Blackett, “Development, the movement of persons, and labour law: trade and aid vs. reasonable
labour market access” in Tonia Novitz, David Mangan, & British Academy, The role of labour standards
in development: from theory to sustainable practice?, British Academy original paperbacks (Oxford:
Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2011). at p 143
9
Ibid; Novitz, Tonia. "Supply Chains and Temporary Migrant Labour: The Relevance of Trade and
Sustainability Frameworks." In Diamond Ashiagbor, ed, Re-Imagining Labour Law for Development:
Informal Work in the Global North and South (Hart Publishing, 2019). At p 191–212.; Judy Fudge,
“Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of International Rights for Migrant
Workers” (2012) 34 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 95–132.
10
United Nations General Assembly Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015
A/RES/70/1 21 October 2015 https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
11
Mike Hodson & Simon Marvin, “Urbanism in the anthropocene: Ecological urbanism or premium
ecological enclaves?” (2010) 14:3 City 298–313. ;Peter Newman, “Sustainable cities of the future: The
behavior change driver” (2010) 11 Sustain Dev Pol 7.; Julie Sze, Fantasy islands: Chinese dreams and
ecological fears in an age of climate crisis (Oakland, California : University of California Press, 2015).;
Cugurullo, “How to Build a Sandcastle”, supra note 4. Other approved projects for eco-cities include as
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conditions for migrant workers that these projects rely on and perpetuate. Borrowing from
environmental justice scholars such as Julie Sze, this project aims to be multi-scalar, i.e., take
different spatial and temporal scales into account in building a complete analytical picture.12
Given the limits of methodological nationalism13 and migration scholars’ tendency to focus on
domestic policies, this project considers both international and domestic regimes14 that regulate
migrant workers. 15 Situating the discussion of migrant workers in the UAE within broader
debates in international law and policy allows us to challenge some of the region's stereotypes
and the “exceptionalism” that features literature on the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf.16
Accordingly, the following research questions frame the rest of the dissertation: (a) how and for
whom do the international and Emirati regimes regulating migrants hinder and expand
movement and supportive capabilities? (b) what does Masdar’s story tell us about whether the
SD concept is furthering migrant workers’ capabilities?

cited by Federico Cugurullo: Zira Island (Azerbaijan), Logrono Montecorvo eco city (Spain), Tianjin,
Xinjin Water City, Caofeidian, Wanzhuang (China), Babcock Ranch (Florida), Greensburg (Kansas),
Whitehill-Bordon, Imerys, North West Bicester, Owenstown, Rackheath eco-towns (UK), Incheon,
Songdo (South Korea), Rawabi (Palestine), Punggol (Singapore), Blue City (Oman)
12
Sze, supra note 11.
13
This can be referred to as the conflation of national interests with the purpose of social sciences
wherein migrants are often treated as objects of politics and not political actors and there is a tendency to
study how to manage migrants most effectively in state interests. Andreas Wimmer & Nina Glick
Schiller, “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social
sciences” (2002) 2:4 Global Networks 301–334..; Però, Davide & John Solomos. “Introduction: Migrant
Politics and Mobilization: Exclusion, Engagements, Incorporation” (2010) 33:1 Ethnic and Racial Studies
1.
14
When speaking of regime, I am referring to Krasner’s definition of them as “principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”
Krasner, Stephen D. (1982) ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables’, International Organization , 36, 185– 205. Some commentators such as T. A. Aleinkikoff
argue the calling the “global governance of migration” a regime “would overstate the level of legal
development.” International Legal Norms on Migration in International Migration Law at p. 474
15
Dermot Feenan, ed, Exploring the “Socio” of Socio-Legal Studies, Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies
(Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013).
16
Ayelet Shachar, Selecting By Merit: The Brave New World of Stratified Mobility (Oxford University
Press).
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Broadly, I am interested in how SD and migrant justice “converge and diverge”17 and
how international migration, labour, and environmental law interact.18 The urgency to cope with
issues related to climate change and migration warrant a redrawing of disciplinary boundaries.
Indeed it has been argued that a distinct legal field organized around the concept of a ‘just
transition’ to a lower carbon economy could bring together some of these different strands.19 I
suggest that by putting migrant workers in the center of the debate, we can better understand how
to protect other disadvantaged groups that are often on the losing end of sustainable development
– a holistic concept that was designed to address the tensions it now manifests. Theoretically, I
am interested in whether a critical capabilities-based environmental justice lens can be
formulated and exploring what insights this lens can offer.
This chapter will first start by introducing some of the relevant concepts and terminology.
It will then connect sustainable development to migration. This will be followed by a discussion
on why a critical capabilities-based environmental justice lens that focuses on migrant workers’
capabilities is useful and how this project employs it. I propose using movement and supportive
capabilities as an evaluative lens and supplement this with theoretical insights from
environmental justice, critical development scholarship, and a principle that favours worse-off
agents. The chapter will conclude with a description of research methods and a few
clarifications.

Chantal Thomast, “Convergences and Divergences in International Legal Norms on Migrant Labor” 32
39.
18
Chantal Thomas, “Convergences and Divergences in International Legal Norms on Migrant Labor
Labor Law and Development: Perspectives on Labor Regulation in Africa and the African Diaspora”
(2010) 32:2 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 405–442.;Sara L Seck, “Transnational Labour Law and the
Environment: Beyond the Bounded Autonomous Worker” (2018) 33:02 Canadian Journal of Law and
Society / Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 137–157.
19
David J Doorey, “Just Transitions Law: Putting Labour Law to Work on Climate Change” (2017) 30:2
Journal of Environmental Law and Practice; Scarborough 201–239.
17

6

1.1 Migrant Workers
This project relies on the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ (Migrant Workers' Convention) definition of
migrant workers as a starting point. 20 A migrant worker is defined as "a person who is to be
engaged or has been engaged in remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national."21
The literature on migration has often challenged “categorical fetishism” whereby
categories such as “migrant workers” and “refugees” exist “as empty vessels into which people
can be placed in some neutral ordering process.”22 Definitions of categories such as migrant
workers, refugees, internally displaced persons are sometimes considered “policy related
labels”23 and are challenging to apply to discrete groups of migrants in practice; there are myriad

20

United Nations, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families’ (Migrant Workers' Convention), GA Res 45/158, UNHCHR, 45th sess,
A/RES.45.158 (18 December 1990)
21
Ibid.
22
Heaven Crawley & Dimitris Skleparis, “Refugees, migrants, neither, both: categorical fetishism and the
politics of bounding in Europe’s ‘migration crisis’” (2017) 44 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1–
17..; Daiva Stasiulis, Zaheera Jinnah & Blair Rutherford, “Migration, Intersectionality and Social Justice”
(2020) 2020:14 Studies in Social Justice 1–21.
23
G Scalettaris, “Refugee Studies and the international refugee regime: a reflection on a desirable
separation” (2007) 26:3 Refugee Survey Quarterly 36–50.; Rieko Karatani, “How History Separated
Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins” (2005) 17 Int’l J Refugee L 517–
541. Katarani argues that the artificial distinction between ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ emerged from
conflicts between the way United States and the International Labor Organization (ILO) and United
Nations (UN) wanted to deal with Second World War European displacement. While the ILO-UN plan
favored a single international organization, the US pushed for an institution with specific functions with
the goal to protect national migration and refugee policies from international influence. The latter
recommendation was accepted and what emerged was a fragmented international framework; the ILO
was forced to concentrate on its traditional role to focus on migrant workers. This in part explains the
wide gap between the rights and international protection of the different categories. While refugees are
entitled to protection through a consolidated international regime based on the 1951 Geneva Convention
and a UN agency specifically mandated to protect their rights, there is no such regime for other categories

7

of reasons that can motivate one to move, and the same person may fit into different legal
categories either simultaneously or consecutively. A migrant in an irregular situation, for
example, can be simultaneously categorized as a migrant worker, an asylum seeker, or a victim
of trafficking. Indeed, as Zetter warns, the different labels are explicitly constructed to exclude
and disempower.24
While acknowledging these challenges, I use the term migrant workers as it is relatively
broader than its counterparts. Different categories can have very real impacts on the protection
afforded to them by international law. Migrant workers are also sometimes referred to as
‘economic migrants’ who move in search of economic opportunities and are arguably seen most
suspiciously by receiving states. I choose to focus on this group because it is assumed that these
migrants are moving in search of a better life, deciding with autonomy and political agency as a
matter of preference, even if it is due to extreme hardships in their home countries.25 Focusing
on migrant workers allows us to foreground the exercise of agency, as limited it may be, rather
than the absence of it due to fear of death or bodily harm, which is reductively traditionally
attributed to refugees.

of migrants. These groups are left to the discretion of host countries which have focused their attention on
better management and control of movement rather than protecting rights.
24
Roger Zetter, “Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity” (1991) 4:1 J
Refug Stud 39–62.
25
E Tendayi Achiume, “Migration as Decolonization” (2019) 71:6 Stan L Rev 1509–1574.
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Figure 1.126
Migrant workers and their families make up for ninety percent of the people who live
outside their country of origin. According to the International Labor Organization, in 2017, there
were about 164 million migrant workers worldwide, of which around 42% are female.27 The
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC also referred to as the Gulf), a political and economic union of
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is one of the
primary destinations for migrant workers where they represent the majority of the labour force.28
The UAE has the highest proportion of migrant workers, accounting for more than 80 percent of
its population. The majority work in construction, and a significant proportion are from
Pakistan.29 The focus, therefore, of this project is on Pakistani migrant workers involved in

26

BQ Magazine, UAE: Estimates of population residing in the UAE by country of citizenship (selected
countries, 2014) (Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, 2015) available online:
https://gulfmigration.org/uae-estimates-of-population-residing-in-the-uae-by-country-of-citizenshipselected-countries-2014/
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construction and other “3-D” jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and difficult.30 These workers are
especially vulnerable because their employment sector involves flexible labour, low skills, and
low wages.31 I chose to focus on Pakistani migrant workers, given Pakistan’s history of partitionrelated migration32 and that it hosts one of the largest numbers of forcibly displaced persons.33

1.2 Precarious Work
Labour law scholars have studied migrant workers or temporary labour migration using
many different lenses, including precarious work, informal work, forced labour, informal work,
vulnerability, decent work, and good jobs. This project uses precarious work as the focus for
several reasons. Precarious work is a defining feature of contemporary work in both the Global
South and the North to the extent that its growth since the 1970s has been referred to as ‘the
precariat.’34 While scholarship on precarious work has dominated high-income countries, it is a
concept that has been a focus in both policy and academic circles. Often used in conjunction with
some other terms such as contingent, atypical, and non-standard forms of work, precarious work
has become “the most prominent label globally.” Rob Lambert and Andrew Herod trace it back
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to Dorothy Day’s article in 1952.35 Arne L. Kalleberg’s early definition of “precarious work” as
“employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the worker” is
a good starting point because it emphasizes its main features as ‘uncertainty, insecurity, and
instability.’36
In comparison, mindful of the role of social location and context, Leah Vosko defines
precarious work as:
Precarious forms of work involve those that limit social benefits and statutory
entitlements, job insecurity, low wages, and high risk of ill-health. It is shaped by
employment status (i.e., self-employment or wage work), form of employment (i.e.
temporary or permanent, part-time, or full-time) and dimensions of labour market
insecurity as well as social context (such as occupation, industry and geography) and
social location (such as gender, race and political economic conditions).37
Rodgers’ popular multidimensional model introduces multiple dimensions of insecurity. Adding
to Rodgers’ approach, Kountaris has further developed a conceptual framework where the five
key legal determinants of precarious work are: (1) immigration status precariousness; (2)
employment status precariousness; (3) temporal precariousness; (4) income precariousness; and
(5) organizational control precariousness.38
Precarious work features “high exposures to working conditions with harmful health
consequences.”39 Since precarious workers are more likely to be in lower-skilled ‘flexible’ jobs
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where their immigration status may be linked to their employees, they are less able to challenge
these conditions through collective bargaining or other protections that labour or employment
law can offer. Precarious workers have limited “control over their professional and personal
lives, leading to psychosocial stress,” and are also less able to maintain stable families and
households.40
Another discourse often used in tandem with precarious work is ‘vulnerability.’ Like
precarious work, vulnerability also started with narrower definitions that broadened and is
understood as a continuum rather than merely low wages, union representation, and short
employment contracts. Unlike precarious work, however, vulnerability features a predictive
element that attempts to “capture the potential of poor employment outcomes.”41
The danger of relying too heavily on “modern slavery” and “forced labour” is that while
they are undoubtedly grave concerns, the rhetoric and machinery adopted to tackle them often
gets linked to migration control which, like human trafficking, moves the policing from the
workplace to the borders. As Mark Freedland and Cathryn Costello note in their book Migrants
at Work, “the concern to single out and stamp out ‘modern slavery’ can mask, or even support,
the legitimization of less extreme but still very real forms of exploitation of both migrant and
local workers alike.”42 Furthermore, trade unions often treat migrant workers primarily as
workers and not migrant workers with “particular and overlapping forms of oppression.”43
Precarious work allows us to consider these overlapping forms in a better way than forced
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labor’s focus on “coercion, control and deception” and without falling into the predictive trap of
vulnerability.44 Lastly, following Guy Standing, there is considerable attention on how the
“precariat”45 or “transnational precariat”46 exists simultaneously in different parts of the world.
More recently, the growing literature on precariousness highlights the increasing legal
stratification of immigration status that “travel along downward trajectories that – even for
permanent residents and certain citizens – can result in legal precarity and loss of status.”47

1.3 Sustainable Development
Before articulating how migration and sustainable development connect, it may be
worthwhile to define and introduce sustainable development briefly. Many critics claim that SD is
“an imaginary fantasy, literally a utopia”48 that was “deliberately” and “constructively”49 left
ambiguous.50 However, as Dobson argues, the "search for a unitary and precise meaning of
sustainable development is misguided." Sustainable development is, like other political terms such
as justice and liberty, bound to be ‘contestable.’51 While it has been included in multiple treaties

44

McCann & Fudge, “Unacceptable forms of work”, supra note 71.
Standing, supra note 34.
46
Nancy Fraser, “Injustice at Intersecting Scales: On ‘Social Exclusion’ and the ‘Global Poor’” (2010)
13:3 European Journal of Social Theory 363–371.
47
Antje Ellermann, “Discrimination in migration and citizenship” (2020) 46:12 Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 2463–2479..
48
Erik Swyngedouw & Maria Kaika, “Urban Political Ecology. Great Promises, Deadlock... and New
Beginnings?” (2014) 60:3 dag 459–481.;
49
“Constructive ambiguity” is often attributed to Henry Kissinger. See Geoff R Berridge, Lorna Lloyd,
and Alan James, The Palgrave MacMillan Dictionary of Diplomacy (3rd ed, Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003), p. 51
50
Frances C Moore, “Toppling the Tripod: Sustainable Development, Constructive Ambiguity and the
Environmental Challenge” (2011) 5 141–150.; “The great race” The Economist (6 July 2002), online:
<https://www.economist.com/special-report/2002/07/06/the-great-race>. (last accessed on 22 March
2021).
51
Andrew Dobson, Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice
(Oxford University Press, 1999).
45

13

and gained support, it remains a “woolly concept, which lends it to many different interpretations.”
In fact, its vagueness and ‘interpretative flexibility’ appeals to a broad range of actors, including
international organizations, policymakers, private organizations, and even some social
movements.
Most scholars use the World Commission on Environment Development’s (WCED)
Brundtland Commission Report (Our Common Future) that first popularized the term in 1987 as
a starting point to define the concept. Sustainable development is "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs"52 Reiterated in Principle 3 of Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, this is known as intergenerational justice (also known as intergenerational equity).
The dominant approach to this concept is articulated notably by Edith Brown Weiss, who relies on
legal trusteeship, viewing “Earth and its resources…as a trust, passed to us by our ancestors, to be
enjoyed and passed on to our descendants for their use.”53
Sustainable development also includes intragenerational justice concerns,54 calling for
justice within each generation.55 It has evolved into a concept with three pillars (economic,
environmental and social) which aims to be a holistic approach that integrates concerns for the
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environment, economy, and human well-being.56 Nevertheless, SD’s definition is as contentious
as its legal nature. Indeed in the oft-quoted Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros case, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) did not endorse former ICJ Judge Weeramantry’s separate opinion, which argued
SD is ‘a principle of international law'.57 Although SD’s position in international law remains
ambiguous, it is the guiding concept for Agenda 2030.58
While it has evolved into a concept with three pillars (environmental, economic, and
social)59 and has gone through countless attempts to be integrated and holistic, SD is criticized for
compromising environmental protection and social aspects. In practice, it most often takes the
shape of weak or shallow sustainability that puts the least weight on social dimensions.60 While
these dimensions are generally understood to be compatible and mutually supportive, the social
pillar tends to be “missing”61; there is a whole body of literature dedicated to finding how to better
operationalize the social dimension through indicators.62 Numerous scholars have made this
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argument, centralizing justice instead.63 As will be discussed later, a critical approach as one
inspired by environmental justice scholarship that highlights how unequal environmental practices
disproportionately affect vulnerable communities like migrant workers can foreground these social
dimensions.64

1.4 Connecting Sustainable Development and Migration
While SD is criticized for being a ‘woolly’ concept that puts little emphasis on social
dimensions, there are several ways the environment (conceived either as SD or environmental
protection) and migration are interconnected.
Firstly, debates on the migration-development nexus (the complex interlinkages between
the two) have been ongoing from the turn of the last century and coincided with the emergence
of “developmentalism.”65 The vast scholarship on the migration-development nexus has been
revisited and reviewed by many scholars.66 There has been a focus on whether there is a “linear”
link between the two. While initially migration was seen as a “problem,” it was later seen as a
process that could be “managed” and a “tool” to help promote development through remittances,

63

Sharachchandra Lele, “Sustainable Development Goal 6: watering down justice concerns” (2017) 4:4
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water e1224.
64

David N Pellow, Resisting global toxics: transnational movements for environmental justice, Urban
and industrial environments (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007). at p. 4; Timothy G Ehresman &
Chukwumerije Okereke, “Environmental justice and conceptions of the green economy” (2015)
15:1 Int Environ Agreements 13–27.
65
Adrian A Smith, “Migration, development and security within racialised global capitalism: refusing the
balance game” (2016) 37:11 Third World Quarterly 2119–2138.
66
See for eg. Nina Glick Schiller, “Migration and Development: Theorising Changing Conditions” in
Tanja Bastia & Ronald Skeldon, Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development (Routledge, 2020)
Google-Books-ID: B3_QDwAAQBAJ..; AKM Ahsan Ullah & Md Shahidul Haque, “Introduction:
Migration—Development Debate” in AKM Ahsan Ullah & Md Shahidul Haque, eds, The Migration
Myth in Policy and Practice: Dreams, Development and Despair (Singapore: Springer, 2020) 1.

16

skilled migration, and the diaspora.67 Since Nyberg–Sørensen’s influential article on the
migration-development nexus, there are, as of 2017, “36 migration nexuses, and counting.”68
However, as Castles pointed out a decade ago, “socio-economic change and human mobility are
constantly interactive processes, so to ask whether migration or development comes first is
nonsensical.”69 Echoing Ronald Skeldon, Peter Sutherland, Former UN Secretary General’s
Special Representative on migration issues, argued migration is development.70 The debate has
been characterized as a ‘pendulum,’71 swinging back and forth from pessimists to optimists. The
migration-development ‘mantra’ and its debates have been criticized for reinforcing
methodological nationalism, paying insufficient attention to “historic and current dialectics
among global trade, capital accumulation, multiple displacement of people” and failure to
explore the “historic and ongoing unequal financial and corporate interconnection that have
enriched colonial centers by impoverishing colonies and postcolonial states.”72 Migrant agency is
promoted as the mechanism for maintaining these interconnections.73
Migration-development debates have also been criticized for using binaries such as
developing-developed, periphery-core, north-south. Attempts to unsettle these binaries, either
through empirical differences and variations amongst the different migration poles, point to the
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diversities of development and migration trajectories.74 Here, Sandra Mezzadra and Brett
Neilson’s work, drawing on Marxism, is helpful for thinking beyond these binaries. They argue
that European borders exist to include and exclude some migrants selectively. Some transit zones
are simultaneously zones of inclusion and exclusion where these processes can produce the
category of irregular migrants. 75 Marianne H Marchand also notes that postcolonial theory and
post-development debates have not sufficiently entered migration studies, notwithstanding a few
exceptions.76 She analyses how migrants have been constructed as potential agents of codevelopment and experts in the last decade or so in gendered ways that often silence local
knowledge and voices. This migrant is seen as the co-developer who is part of what Escobar
described as the construction of development as a discursive formation, an “apparatus” that links
knowledge production to techniques of power.77 Raghuram agrees and writes this has led to
processes that make visible certain forms of migration and particular forms of development
while others become “invisibilised.” She argues that it can produce migrant subjectivities in a
way that the “mobile governable subject of migration-development…is both required to move to
strategize their human capital but also to act morally for the collective good of a distant
place/community.”78 This version is problematic because it makes the migrant responsible for
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redistribution and making sacrifices to ameliorate years of development failures. Most of the
literature adopts developmentalism which universalizes modernity and its teleology; migrants are
invited to participate in development if and when they legitimize the development discourse.79
Apart from migrant-development debates, there are many ways migration and
environment (whether understood more broadly or as SD) are connected. Not only do labour and
environmental law connect through occupational safety and hazards80 , but labour law, itself, can
be seen as a component of the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ pillars of SD. Labour standards are, as
aforementioned, increasingly being framed in terms of SD and sustainability.81 Migration, too,
can be seen as a component of both social, economic, and environmental pillars. As
environmental justice scholars have argued, there is ample evidence that migrant workers in
industries as wide-ranging as construction, agriculture, services, and technology are subject to a
disproportionate burden of environmental harms and risks. From its inception, the environmental
justice movement included migrant worker issues (as will be discussed in further detail in
Section 1.10).
Furthermore, climate change adaptation and mitigation measures also impact migrant
workers. Eco-cities like Masdar City tend to rely on temporary migrant workers for their
construction. Since these projects are usually isolated geographically, and construction tends to be
seasonal and mobile, temporary migrant workers are easier to handle and more profitable to
developers than long-term, direct employees.82 Another example is from the European Union’s
79
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resource recovery industry, where migrant workers tend to do the “dirty” work.83 Even in the
“green economy,” they are more likely to take “3-D” jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and difficult.
Furthermore, migrant workers concentrate either at the bottom or at the top of the “labour ladder”;
eco-cities in the Gulf region such as Masdar also rely on highly-skilled professionals. As Saskia
Sassen notes, these highly-skilled professionals often also rely on low-skilled workers to be able
to continue working in global cities like Abu Dhabi and Dubai.84
Thirdly, there are a number of empirical connections between migration and the
environment, particularly climate change. It is argued that climate change’s threat to traditional
livelihoods and other impacts for the ‘climate vulnerable’ in small low-lying islands and other
developing countries make migration a necessity, and migrant workers are often among the most
severely affected by climate-related risks.85 By 2050, climate change is expected to displace as
many as one billion people.86 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change deemed migration
as climate change’s single greatest impact as early as 1990.
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Similarly, according to the

International Organization of Migration, in the mid-1990s, a range of environmental pressures
forced up to 25 million people to leave their homes.88 In 2011, the ILO reported, “there is
increasing evidence of climate change becoming an additional driver of migration, both internal
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and across borders.”89 Environmental pressures and impacts associated with climate change, such
as land degradation, droughts, and natural disasters, particularly a loss of traditional livelihoods,
drive this migration.
A 2019 International Labor Organization report further notes that the rising incidence of
heat stress also acts as a push factor prompting workers to leave rural areas to cities or other
countries.90 It noted that the most vulnerable workers in developing and emerging countries, such
as migrant workers in the construction sector, are the hardest hit by heat stress.91 More specific to
the UAE context, a recent Guardian investigation found “thousands of migrant construction
workers employed on huge infrastructure and building projects ahead of next year’s Expo 2020
exhibition in Dubai are likely to have been exposed to dangerous levels of heat stress.”92
Another survey from 1991-2012 in rural Pakistan showed that there is a statistically
significant relationship between heat stress and long-term migration; heat stress forced people to
move due to its negative effects on both farm and non-farm incomes, and such migration was
more likely in poorer rural areas.93 Another case study in Punjab found that people migrated
mainly to improve their level of income and reduce their vulnerabilities with respect to heat
stress.94 However, it is important to note that this impact of heat-stress on out-migration is not
uniform across the Global South and depends on the initial income level of the country and its
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dependence on agriculture.95 To clarify, the point here is to highlight how migrant workers may
be uniquely impacted by climate change without claiming that the potential increase in migration
flow is ‘bad’ and contributing to the ‘moral panic’ that is sometimes associated with these
studies.
Moreover, both climate change mitigation (be it through the promotion of SD or other
means) and migration are issues that require international cooperation. Yet the countries whose
agreement matters the most in negotiations to ensure the effectiveness of the agreements (highest
emitters in the environmental context and migrant-receiving countries in the migration context)
are often least willing to sign agreements and benefit most from fewer legal obligations. This is
evident in climate change negotiations where the United States, China, and oil-producing Gulf
countries tend to undermine attempts towards more strict legal obligations that would impact their
economies and undermine their sovereignty. Similarly, ILO’s Migrant Workers Convention is
notorious for only being able to gain support from migrant-sending countries.
These interconnections are crystallized through ILO’s Decent Work Agenda that connected
labour issues to sustainable development in 2005.96 The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda has four ‘core
standards’: freedom from forced labour, freedom from child labour, freedom from discrimination
at work, and freedom to form and join a union and to bargain collectively. ILO’s Green Jobs
Initiative also brought together the UN Environment Program, International Trade Union
Confederation and International Organization of Employers and the ILO to promote “opportunity,
equity and a just transition to sustainable economies, and to mobilize governments, employers and
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workers to engage in dialogue on coherent policies and effective programs leading to a green
economy with green jobs and decent work for all.” This led to ILO’s adoption of the Global Jobs
Pact in 2008 that called for cooperation on transitioning to a low-carbon economy in the context
of the financial crisis. As Sharan Burrow, General Secretary of International Trade Union
Confederation, has noted, “Workers will be on the frontlines of the industrial transformation that
is a necessity for a zero-carbon future.”97ration
Lastly, in 2015, when the UN adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and
voted to formally adopt SDGs as a successor to MDGs, it made an explicit reference to decent
work and migrant workers. SDG 8, in particular, calls for promoting “sustained, inclusive and
sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.” SDG8.8
makes an explicit reference to migrant workers. Of the 17 SDG’s that are to guide policymaking
until 2030, there are a number of other goals that are relevant to migration and migrant
workers.98
Despite these intersections, there are potential tensions between migration and SD. Firstly,
environmental law and labour law exist in, what Seck calls, different silos; not only do they have
different histories and objectives but also have different purposes that may conflict. Environmental
law that has laid the foundation for SD and labour law have existed as distinct fields. While
environmental law emerged as a field in the 1970s, labour law dates back to the Second World
War. Not only do they each have their respective colonial pasts, but they also have different, oftentimes conflicting goals.99 For instance, labour law is concerned with preserving more and better
jobs, while environmental law is concerned with protecting the environment from the impacts of
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consumerism and economic development. This economic activity may, in fact, be a byproduct of
the job creation that labour law is concerned with, while ‘greening’ has been seen as a threat to
workers, particularly those employed in extractive industries.
It is no surprise, then, that environmental movements and labour movements are often at
opposing sides in policy debates, and scholars from the fields rarely interact.100 This is further
exemplified in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development’s (also known as the
Rio Conference) failure to include labour issues in its discussion of the three pillars of sustainable
development. Similarly, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change made no reference to
labour issues and only mentioned migrants in its preamble, while the World Summit on Sustainable
Development only briefly mentioned it in its declaration.101 However, recently the 2015 Paris
Agreement on climate change mentions both decent work and migrants, albeit in its preamble. It
remains to be seen whether SDGs’ inclusion of migrant workers and decent work will evolve the
relationship between these tensions.

1.5 Theoretical Framework: Core characteristics of the CA
Having discussed the connection and tensions between migration and SD, this section
introduces the theoretical framework to evaluate the regimes regulating migrant workers and SD
as practiced in Masdar City. The critical capabilities approach102 used here employs capabilities as
the evaluative space but supplements it with other theoretical insights that are discussed in Section

100

Doorey, “Just Transitions Law”, supra note 19. But see e.g. Adrian Smith & Dayna Nadine Scott,
“Law, Labour and Landscape in a Just Transition” in Usha Natarajan & Julia Dehm, eds, Locating
Nature: Making and Unmaking International Law (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming).
101
Peter Poschen, Decent Work, Green Jobs and the Sustainable Economy : Solutions for Climate
Change and Sustainable Development (Routledge, 2015).
102
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2009).

24

1.9, including environmental justice, critical development theory on SD, an account of collective
capability agency, and a principle that favours worse-off agents. However, before discussing these
specifications in further detail, this section will discuss the core characteristics of capabilitiesbased approaches in general and why they are useful in the context of migrant workers and ecocities.
The past few decades have seen increasing popularity and interest in the capabilities
approach (CA) as a broad normative evaluative framework for justice, development, and wellbeing.103 While the roots can be traced back to philosophers such as Aristotle, Marx, and Kant,
Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen introduced the CA in the 1980s.104 Since Sen and Martha
Nussbaum’s foundational work in the 1980s, the literature on CA ballooned and has gained support
from not only political philosophers, normative economists, international organizations, but also
environmental justice scholars and, more recently, labour lawyers.105 While CA is an underspecified, open-ended framework that has many applications, its main normative contribution is
its focus on an alternative metric of justice: capabilities (what people are able to do and be) and
functionings (actual achievements). While capabilities are ‘beings’ and ‘doings,’ functionings are
the corresponding achievements. Capabilities are understood as real opportunities or option
freedoms that have been cleared of any obstacles. They are substantive opportunities to ‘do’ and
‘be,’ ranging from simple concepts such as being well-nourished to more complex capabilities
such as having a valuable job and being able to connect with nature.
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These capabilities and functionings are the core characteristics of all capability theories
and applications. CA argues that the evaluative space or “informational basis” for thinking about
how just an arrangement is, a country’s level of development, or the well-being or quality of life
should focus on human well-being, which is understood in terms of people’s capabilities and
functionings. It is, therefore, grounded in a critique of “resourcism,” which focuses on people’s
holdings of external goods (as Rawlsian primary goods approach does), and utilitarianism which
focuses on subjective accounts of well-being (as Benthamite focus on utilities does). In other
words, for CA scholars, a law, policy, or arrangement should be evaluated according to people’s
range of substantive opportunities and actual achievements.106
Along with capabilities and functionings, prominent CA scholar Ingrid Robeyns presents
a modular view of CA that highlights a number of other core characteristics of all CA theories
and applications. These include (1) capabilities and functionings which are conceived as valueneutral and form the evaluative space; (2) conversion factors107 which refer to one’s nonmonetary limitations which determine whether people are able to convert resources into
capabilities; (3) a means-ends distinction which stresses on starting analysis from the ends rather
than means; (4) value pluralism which allows for other elements to be considered of ultimate
value (such as procedural fairness, ecological sustainability) and also views human beings to
value multiple things; (5) ethical individualism which claims each person counts as a moral equal
and is of primary moral importance. The CA, therefore, is not an explanatory theory and better
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seen as a “thin” framework that can rely on ‘thicker’ theories that specify accounts of human
diversity, structural constraints, and agency.108
As prominent CA scholar Ingrid Robeyns clarifies, CA is an under-specified, open-ended
framework that ought to be distinguished from its many applications. CA is often erroneously
conflated with these applications and specific distinct capabilities theories such as Nussbaum’s
contribution or Sen’s theory of development as freedom.109 CA is also used interchangeably with
human development and the popular human development index, which Sen and Mahbub-ul-Haq
played a role in developing. However, while CA and human development are historically and
theoretically related, they have different purposes and intellectual roots.110 CA’s focus on
capabilities as substantive opportunities for people to pursue lives they value is explicitly more
demanding than human development’s roots in the basic needs approach.111 Sen prefers the CA
because the basic needs approach narrowly focuses on commodities and views human beings as
passive.112 Nevertheless, the point here is to, from the outset, distinguish CA from its many
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applications that have gained popularity and stress that this project relies on CA for its evaluative
space.

1.7: Is a capabilities-based approach an appropriate evaluative lens in the context of migrant
workers and SD?
There are several advantages of using a critical capabilities lens in this context, namely (1) the
means-ends distinction’s ability to divert attention from a focus on economic growth alone and
help justify certain social and labour rights as ends (2) CA’s ability to study precarity (3) CA’s
internal pluralism which allows it to embrace multiple elements of justice (4) CA’s ability to go
beyond human rights.
Firstly, understanding capabilities as ends, not only a means to well-being, allows us to ask
the right questions and can help justify pursuing labour and social rights as ends on their own. This
means-ends distinction points us to consider people’s actual abilities to convert resources to things
they value.113 In other words, rather than asking how wages or formal rights are distributed, the
CA considers how precarious immigration status, for instance, can severely limit migrant workers’
ability to use and exercise their resources and rights. A focus on capabilities creates an evaluative
space that broadens the informational basis and takes into account human diversity which is
particularly relevant in the case of migrant workers considering the different routes and
circumstances and their respective abilities to convert resources to a life they value.114115 CA’s
argument against resourcism, i.e., a focus on resources or ‘primary goods,’ is also better able to
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address the dominant approach of viewing migrant workers as economic agents and optimism
around the role of remittances for migrant workers and migrant-sending countries.116 Thus, being
able to move freely is not important because it is instrumental towards one’s goals or others’ goals
(a country’s development or progress towards sustainable development, for instance). It has,
instead, an “ultimate value” that is seen as a “final end.” This distinction between means and ends,
therefore, goes beyond viewing migration as a trade-off between rights and development seen as
merely economic benefits.117
A number of labour lawyers have found CA’s means-distinction helpful. Brian Langille,
who has written extensively on CA and labour law, including a recent edited book “The Capability
Approach to Labour Law,” argues that the CA rejects the usual “sequencing” of economic
dimensions before social and political dimensions and presentation of social justice and economic
development as a zero-sum game. Human freedom becomes the goal and necessary precondition
for just and durable economies and societies. Similarly, Simon Deakin argues that the CA can be
used as a methodological approach and a distinct ontological perspective that allows us to escape
the narrow constraints of neoclassical economic analysis of labour law.118 Its emphasis on creating
conditions for human freedom and insistence on going beyond economic growth to assess human
well-being allow it to reinforce the idea that labour law can play a role in sustainable development.
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Clair Gammage, too, finds Sen’s insistence to look beyond distribution based on welfare and
resources helpful because concentrating only on incomes ignores the fact that people have different
opportunities to convert incomes into being and doings they may value. She finds CA useful to
invert the international trading system’s normative foundation in a way that puts a greater focus
on human freedoms and capabilities, which are treated as an end.
Judy Fudge, on the other hand, posits that the concept of capabilities allows labour lawyers
to debate which social and labour rights are fundamental on their own as ends. It responds to
concerns that tensions between social rights and the market are inherent by connecting the
normative ground of ‘social rights (human freedoms)’ to ‘the welfare goal (market efficiency)’
through a metric. While Langille’s argument, which goes a step further to propose the CA as the
normative basis to justify the whole field of labour law, is more contentious, Fudge is more mindful
of its limitations. She supplements Sen’s conception of capabilities with Elizabeth Anderson’s
democratic equality to argue for labour law that can include workers that fall outside the
employment relationship model. She concludes that “although the capabilities approach typically
is located within a liberal framework, it offers valuable resources for a critique of the liberal
conception of justice…it is both possible and desirable to supplement Sen's account in order to
appreciate the need for collective capabilities, to address private power within the market and the
household, and to adopt a relational understanding of the individual as dependent upon the
obligations of others for care.” For Fudge, Langille’s view of fundamental labour rights and
prioritizing of core rights over social and substantive strands is based on a thin CA.
Secondly, CA is better suited to study ‘precarity.’ CA offers a better criterion of how good
one’s quality of life is or how just an arrangement because it explicitly criticizes utilitarian
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approaches that focus on people’s subjective pleasure, happiness, or preference-satisfaction.119 Sen
contends this preference-satisfaction is too malleable; people can adapt their perceptions, desires,
and expectations according to their circumstances and the laws and institutions under which they
live. He argues that people who experience severe deprivation, such as exploited immigrants, often
tend not to see a direct way out of their situations.120 This explicit reference to the problem of
adaptive preferences is particularly relevant to migrant workers who are often in a ‘gridlock,’ given
the burden of recruitment fees, their visa status is tied to their employer, and the difficulties of
changing or challenging their employers.121 Sen uses the example of the “happy slave” to criticize
Benthamite utilitarianism and rational choice theory, arguing that instead of malleable
“happiness,” capabilities should be seen as ends.122
Thirdly, CA’s internal pluralism is better able to theorize justice with more sophistication
and nuance. A pluralistic understanding of justice in terms of capabilities allows us to consider not
only distributive elements of justice but also procedural and ‘recognitional’ issues of justice.123
This internal pluralism, as argued by environmental justice scholar David Schlosberg, is better
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able to reflect how environmental justice activists articulate their justice claims in practice and
makes connections between a range of concerns (such as cultural disrespect and economic
inequality) that are integrally linked.124 The CA is also better able to incorporate the role of the
environment compared to its counterparts and is attentive to how certain environmental impacts
are not compensable.125 In doing so, it is able to capture the interconnectedness between migration
and sustainable development.
Similarly, Supriya Routh finds CA’s pluralism and flexibility appealing to address a range
of different forms of work. In response to Guy Davidov, who argues that CA does not offer the
only justification for labour laws, Routh argues that while CA has “normative force,” it should be
seen as an approach and not a complete theory. Its flexibility allows the approach to be “capacious
enough to account for minimum wages and other pluralistic concerns of labour law,” and it “helps
conceptualize a coherent idea on regulation of work in its societal complexity (i.e., catering to the
empirical reality of the increasingly complex world of work) without assuming a now out-dated
institutional framework of industrial employment or other behavioural patterns of workers and
their collectives.”126 Routh, draws on Sen, Browne, Deakin, Wilson, and Hepple and like Fudge
uses Anderson’s democratic equality, to argue for a CA framework that can “formulate the new
labour law in informal economic activity settings.”127 He argues that the normative goal for new
labour law must be enhancing equality of capability of all workers.
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Moreover, the CA is useful because it can incorporate and, at times, go further than human
rights frameworks. The relationship between capabilities and human rights has attracted significant
debate between capability scholars. On the one hand, Nussbaum equates capabilities with human
rights, while Sen is wary of the law’s overreach and views human rights as ethical assertions rather
than legally secured moral demands.128 While both accounts have been criticized129, the concept
of capabilities has allowed scholars to justify going beyond formal rights and support a positive
account of freedom. Bethany Hastie, for instance, finds Nussbaum’s CA useful in the context of
migrant workers and access to justice to understand that codified legal rights may not always
translate to the “practical ability to substantively realize those rights in practice,” arguing that
employer-specific work permits produce a power imbalance that restricts the realization of formal
rights in the workplace.130 Routh argues that in contrast to a rights-based approach that can be too
fixed, using CA as a normative goal for labour law allows for new and innovative labour
guarantees (or social conditions of freedom) which have to be context-specific.131
Virginia Mantouvalou, on the other hand, argues that unlike using a normative framework
based on human rights alone, a capabilities account that is centred on human flourishing requires
meaningful work and not only an end to workers’ exploitation. She writes, “this requirement is
more demanding than the duties imposed by human rights, which are primarily about identifying
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and addressing moral wrongs.”132 She argues that the right to work understood on the basis of CA
is a right to employability, which imposes duties such as those related to educating and training.
Furthermore, grounded in CA, the right to work can “support a right for caregivers to care for
dependents without risking destitution.” Individuals must have opportunities for meaningful work
but also opportunities to work for an employer that respects human rights. Ultimately she argues,
“Working terms and conditions that undermine human capabilities are incompatible with the right
to work.”133 Similarly, Timothy Weidel has argued for the inclusion of a capability for meaningful
labour to Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities.134
In summary, the CA may be useful for a number of reasons that environmental justice, law
and development, and labour lawyers have found convincing. Its focus on capabilities, means-ends
distinction, ability to study precarity, and ability to incorporate human rights make it a viable
option to pursue. For the purposes of this project, it is most useful for providing an evaluative
space as capabilities, i.e., substantive opportunities to live a life one values. To clarify, it is not
being used as the only normative foundation for law and future reforms. Using capabilities as the
evaluative space allows my analysis to focus on the range of substantive opportunities migrants
have that ought to be looked at comprehensively when evaluating the existing regime regulating
migrant workers and SD’s ability to accommodate justice for migrant workers. Therefore, through
the analysis of the international regime and UAE’s kafala system, I ask: to what extent do these
systems enhance migrants’ capabilities or actual opportunities?
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1.8 CA’s further critiques and clarifications
There are also a number of critiques and clarifications Sen makes that are worth noting
here. One of the key critiques Sen makes of Rawlsian “original position” and use of social contract
theory is that it limits the involvement to only members of a polity within nation-states. Sen opts
for an “open-impartiality” where he considers participation in deciding justice principles to include
“citizens of a state and others beyond,” noting that “there are few non-neighbours left in the world
today.”135 This is connected to Sen’s view of the role of direct participatory democracy as a tool
to scrutinize the role of government and markets, expand the informal bases of policies and apply
political pressure. This approach, as Menkel-Meadow et al. explain, would “mandate a
decentralized process of democratic deliberation” which would take account of both “people’s
situated subjective experiences” and those from outside a community “depending on the scope of
territoriality.”136 This is different from Nussbaum’s sufficientarian proposal of specifying a list of
ten basic capabilities that ought to be constitutionally protected.
Sen also criticizes social contract theorists’ use of “transcendental institutionalism,”
arguing that diagnosing injustice does not require imagining a perfectly just society. He thinks that
most of these theorists (apart from Kant and Rawls) are concerned with just rules and institutions,
ignore the actual behaviour of people and their interactions. This critique is helpful since it opts
instead for a comparative approach that focuses on actual feasible alternatives and can be traced
back to the works of Smith, Wollstonecraft, Mill, Marx, and Condorcet.
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Another distinction Sen makes is between niti and nyaya or the distinction between the
arrangement-focused versus realization-focused views of justice. In this view, the reforms are
assessed in terms of actual removal of injustices; we cannot only depend on arrangement-focused
views of justice that are based on institutions and idealized behavioural norms. Sen is, however,
not a no-nonsense consequentialist, arguing instead for a comprehensive outcome where one’s
agency and process are also described. Sen further differentiates between process and substantive
aspects, noting that capabilities only consider the latter. Therefore, for Sen, it is important to go
beyond a focus on capabilities and to be able to consider both aspects. The distinction between niti
and nyaya also allows me to emphasize not only institutions but also a comprehensive set of
outcomes. This is, as Cesar Arjona et al. contend, is similar to the distinction between law in the
books and law in action. The latter is preferred because it leaves room to consider consequences
but also takes into account processes, duties and responsibilities. This points to the inclusion of an
anthropological element in the theory of justice where it is concerned about what it is like to be a
human being.137
While Sen is opposed to neoliberalism, human development approaches that have emerged
from CA implicitly accept neoliberal views on development without challenging the neoliberal
positioning of the global economy.138 Preibisch, Dodd, and Su criticize this way of co-opting the
discourse of the CA and selectively applying tenets.139 They point how even though the
aforementioned UNDP report uses the language of capabilities, it reinforces the general optimism
around remittances and their ability to contribute to the development of both countries of origin
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and destination. It also views mobility as a freedom fundamental to development, which can be
problematic because it may support temporary migration programs that aim to reduce barriers to
human mobility and make it easier for migrant-sending countries to cooperate without paying
adequate attention to the countries’ particular institutional capacities and regulatory gaps.140
Similarly, migration scholar Hein de Haas has also argued for a capabilities-based
understanding of migration, arguing in favour of an “aspirations-capabilities” framework.
However, his version not only assumes development will lead to an increase in “life aspirations,”
but these aspirations (which are tied to preferences) are also conflated with capabilities.141
Furthermore, he relies on Isiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom, which
is perfectionist and teleological. Sen has clarified Berlin’s distinction does not capture his view. In
Sen’s view, one’s positive freedom is one’s “ability to do the things in question, taking everything
into account including external and internal restraints. Here a violation of negative freedom must
also be one of positive freedom but not vice versa.”142
In other words, the dominant way the language of capabilities is being employed by
policymakers, particularly in the context of migration-development nexus, is problematic because
the approach is only partially applied.143 However, it is argued that given the language of
capabilities is already popular amongst policymakers, a thicker application of the approach may
still be worthwhile to explore. Preibisch, Dodd, and Su conclude that greater attention is needed
to apply the approach in a way that does not compromise its integrity and protects migrants’
140
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intrinsic rights.144 This project attempts to contribute towards that goal in the context of migrant
workers and eco-development in the Gulf.
Furthermore, Sen’s idea of justice is cosmopolitan in so far as it argues to go beyond
assessing the interests to merely citizens, particularly when we consider challenges such as “global
warming” or international economic crises. Sen writes, “Global justice cannot but embrace
identities that go well beyond citizenship.”145 When speaking of identities, Sen purports that people
are members of different groups (class, gender, race, ethnicity, etc.); focusing on one aspect is
limiting and denies individuals’ respective loyalties. Sen’s critique on the rational choice theory,
which views people as making their choice because of their ‘commitment’ rather than their
personal advantage, too, as Adelman and Paliwala note, comes close to relational theory.146 Sen
criticizes the narrow self-interest view of rationality that dominates mainstream economic and
urges to give room to other characteristics that may shape behaviour such as sympathy,
gratefulness, sacrifice, and camaraderie.147

1.9 CA and SD
CA has also been used in the context of SD. In an article titled “The Ends and Means of
Sustainability,” Sen criticizes the 1987 Brundtland Report, which first popularized the term and
defined SD as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Sen argues a focus on merely needs and
especially “the essential needs of the world’s poor” ignores important aspects of life that people
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may value. Instead, a freedom-oriented approach to sustainability would be better able to
encompass a more rich picture of human life and include both substantive and procedural aspects
of how results come about. It would also allow us to focus on what is a better conception of the
end of development (freedom) rather than the means to an end (needs).148 Sen is wary of who
may decide these needs and insists that the “value of environment cannot be divorced from the
lives of living creatures.”149 Sen’s view of SD is useful because it views humans (and the poor)
as agents and not merely limited to needs. His definition of SD does not prioritize economic
growth and limits expanding freedom when possible without compromising future generations’
freedoms.150 Within Sen’s definition of SD, migrant workers’ movement and supportive
capabilities, as well as related labour standards, can be seen as falling within the social
dimension of SD that ought to be seen as ends themselves. Unlike the “sequencing” of economic
dimensions before social and political counterparts, CA rejects presenting social justice and
economic development as a zero-sum game.151 CA’s means-ends distinction, therefore, shifts
focus from economic dimensions of SD to an expansion of capabilities and functionings.
Furthermore, CA is better able to incorporate the role of the environment compared to its
counterparts and is attentive to how certain environmental impacts are not compensable.152 This
is an argument made by a number of scholars who are using capabilities-based approaches in the
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context of environmental justice, climate justice, and sustainable development.153 Breena
Holland, for instance, argues that the CA is better able to account for the role of environment
compared to Rawlsian approaches. According to Holland, Rawls’ earlier work treats
environmental problems as externalities and environmental benefits as indivisible goods, which
allows for solutions such as using appropriate taxes and subsidies that reflect the true cost of
these goods. Viewing environmental goods as indivisible implies that they are not subject to
unequal distribution and hence not a matter of justice; they are not a matter of basic justice in
the same sense income and wealth are. This way of viewing environmental goods fails to
consider how inequitable distribution of the goods poses obstacles to social justice.154 Holland,
therefore, builds on Nussbaum’s CA and adds that the environment ought to be considered as a
“meta-capability,155 which is able to capture how capabilities depend on the environment and
153
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how some environmental harms are not compensable. While this is not the focus of this project,
it has been argued that the CA is already “conceived in a protoecological way”156 and has been
extended to non-human and non-sentient beings and used to argued that the non-human world is
worthy of recognition as an end in itself.
More recently, capabilities-based environmental justice scholarship notes the importance
of differentiating between luxury and subsistence emissions (emissions of those seeking basic
needs versus those of the rich), attributed to Henry Shue’s work on climate justice. Schlosberg
argues that luxury emissions of some have already inflicted harm on the poor by undermining the
basic needs in a “climate-changed world.” Schlosberg notes Holland’s more recent proposal that
there should be not only a “floor” for subsistence but also a “ceiling” to limit luxury emissions
that may be damaging. This ceiling can “define the extent to which a society ought to limit the
harmful effects of capability protections”157 and is based on the understanding that “there is not
unlimited amount of individual opportunity or freedom that earth’s ecological systems can
sustain over time.”158 Schlosberg notes that, in practice, this can mean policies that minimize the
harm to the least well-off by, for example, combining a carbon price with welfare and pension
payments for those on government assistance.159 In evaluating eco-city projects such as Masdar
City, therefore, we would need to attentive to whether there is this distinction and if the harm to
the least well-off is being minimized.
In summary, a capabilities-based understanding of SD offers a broad normative
framework centred on one’s real opportunities to lead lives one values; its main strengths are its
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internal pluralism and ability to re-hierarchize social and environmental dimensions over
economic dimensions of SD with an ability to differentiate between luxury and subsistence
emissions.

1.10 Operationalizing the CA for Migration and SD intersection
Most CA theorists agree that the approach is an incomplete theory of justice that must be
supplemented with others to provide a fuller account. Robeyns cautions on the limitations of the
CA and has recently formulated, as aforementioned, a modular view of the approach that
differentiates certain aspects that are core and others that are optional depending on the purpose
of the research project (Table 2.5).160 The purpose of this project is not to provide a tidy theory
that can simultaneously address the concerns of migrant workers and tensions between justice for
migrant workers and SD but to use capabilities as an evaluative lens and assess what insights are
gained from applying it in this context. In doing so, there are a number of specifications that
ought to be made, as introduced in Section 1.7. The following discussion will describe these
specifications and theoretical insights that the project will rely on that supplement using
capabilities as a lens.

Table 2.5 The modular view of the capability approach161
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The A-module: the non-optional core
A1: Functionings and capabilities as core concepts
A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
A3: Conversion factors
A4: The distinction between means and ends
A5: Functionings and/or capabilities form the evaluative space
A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
A7: Value pluralism
A8: Valuing each person as an end
The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
B1: The purpose of the capability theory
B2: The selection of dimensions
B3: An account of human diversity
B4: An account of agency
B5: An account of structural constraints
B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
The C-modules: contingent modules
C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
C2: Weighing dimensions
C3: Methods for empirical analysis
C4: Additional normative principles and concerns

As Robeyns’ modular view of CA suggests, there are several specifications (in the B and
C-modules) that ought to be made for each capability theory and application depending on the
purpose of the project.162 Firstly, there needs to be an explicit account of human diversity, which
determines the importance one puts on gender, ethnicity, race, social class and influences what
options lie open to a person and how their aspirations are shaped. This, I argue, is similar to the
role of structural constraints that shape people’s capabilities. Structural constraints, according to
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Robeyns, differ from conversion factors because they impact capabilities as a whole and can
include capabilities that do not require resources directly.163
This project’s account of human diversity and structural constraints is tied to environmental
justice. It builds on environmental justice scholarship that highlights how environmental benefits
and burdens adversely impact marginalized communities and challenge the very idea of
“environment.” Environmental justice is understood as “social praxis” which emerged at “a
crossroads of social movements, public policy, and academic research…[integrating] theory and
practice in a mutually informing dialogue.”164 While the environmental justice movement
originated in the US in the 1960s, its language is also being adopted by grassroots movements in
the Global South. It is useful for dispelling the myth that environmental protection is a luxury for
the South and its poor. As noted by Carmen Gonzalez in her commentary on international waste
trade, environmental protection is, in fact, “far being from being a luxury” and “is necessary to
preserve the health, safety, and well-being of the Southern poor.”165 This is an important feature
of environmental justice because it challenges the notion that the poor are “too busy surviving” to
care about environmental protection.166
Secondly, since its inception, the movement has highlighted the relationship between
environmental justice and workers (including specifically migrant workers’) issues. This is

163

Ibid.
Julie Sze & Jonathan K London, “Environmental Justice at the Crossroads” (2008) 2:4 Sociology
Compass 1331–1354. at 1332.
165
Carmen G Gonzalez, “Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade”
(2000) 78 Denv U L Rev 979.; Carmen G Gonzalez, “Food Justice: An Environmental Justice Critique of
the Global Food System” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International Environmental Law and the Global
South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 401.
166
Dayna Nadine Scott, “What is Environmental Justice?” (2014). ; Patrick Novotny, Where we live,
work, and play: the environmental justice movement and the struggle for a new environmentalism,
Praeger series in transformational politics and political science (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000).
164

44

reflected in the inclusion of worker rights in the Principles of Environmental Justice167 (the
founding document of the environmental justice movement) and how labour unions and their
leaders have made the connections between worker issues and environmental justice.168
Building on these characteristics of environmental justice literature and numerous other
fields such as Critical Race Theory, Political Ecology, and Gender and Feminist Studies,
prominent environmental justice scholar David Pellow has more recently proposed Critical
Environmental Justice Studies as a framework that goes even further and analyzes the
Israel/Palestine conflict, the U.S. prison system, and the Black Lives Matter as environmental
justice struggles. Pellow argues these examples depict the state’s power over the human and morethan-human world and, therefore, calls for analysis and actions that move beyond the structures
such as the state and “bold” transformative change.169 He is able to do so using a rather radical
framework which (1) recognizes that multiple social categories of difference (such as race,
religion, gender, class) are intertwined in environmental injustice, i.e., inequalities such as sexism,
racism, ableism, heteropatriarchy are in fact intersecting axes of domination that are mutually
reinforcing, (2) recognizes that environmental injustice may simultaneously function through
multiple spatial and temporal scales (global and local, past and future), (3) calls for
antiauthoritarian approaches for analysis and actions that move beyond the human, state and
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capital, and (4) calls for transformative change that recognizes the inseparability of the human and
more-than-human world.170 In short, critical environmental justice is most useful in bringing
attention to how multiple social categories of difference create environmental injustice and are
intersecting axes of domination that are mutually reinforcing. Pellow’s work is also useful to show
how “the harms suffered by ecosystems today are closely linked to and mirror the harms
experienced by the most marginalized human beings across the planet.”171
Recent scholarship continues to study workers, specifically, migrant workers in the context
of environmental justice, ranging from Latino migrant farmworkers still fighting exposure to
pesticides172, largely immigrant Vietnamese female-identifying workers in nail salons173 and the
plastics industry,174 to immigrant workers in the Silicon Valley175 and textile industry176 who
traditionally had no union representation, and rural migrant workers in China’s new ecocities.177178
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For an account of structural constraints that shape people’s capabilities, this project also
relies on the critiques made by prominent critical development and TWAIL scholars. Critical
development scholarship scrutinizes the ‘myth’ of the post-WWII development project and other
‘remedies’ such as sustainable development. Relying primarily on post-structuralism and
Foucauldian analysis, this scholarship emphasizes how development is a construct of Western
hegemony. For Arturo Escobar, one of the most provocative post-development scholars:
“Sustainable development (SD) was riddled with tensions and contradictions from the
outset. Many pointed out the impossibility of harmonizing the goals of development with
the needs of nature within any known economic framework, as the Brundtland report and
Agenda 21 – bravely perhaps but implausibly – purported to do. At present, it is clear that
SD amounts to no more than ‘reducing unsustainability’ (Ehrenfeld, 2008). Flawed from
the start, the SD movement can be said to have arrived to its natural end.”179
The SDGs and projects like Masdar are, however, testaments that SD is still a prominent
component of the development machinery. TWAIL accounts, on the other hand, are able to
historicize the evolution of SD and highlight how a unidimensional view of economic-centred
growth and development has been maintained.
While I am using TWAIL and critical development theory’s critique of sustainable
development as an account of structural constraints, I rely on the capabilities approach for its
evaluative space. Although certain strands of critical development scholarship have criticized
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Sen’s contributions (categorizing it as alternative development rather than an alternative to
development), these accounts often reduce Sen’s ideas to merely human development. His
contributions towards his “idea of justice,” as the discussion above has shown, are broader than
the application of capabilities in the context of HDI and the UN’s use of human development. In
fact, Sen’s “idea of justice” is built on plurality and does not have an explicitly prescriptive
element or a unifocal idea of equality. Sen does not prescribe a unifocal focus on equality of
capabilities, given the fact that they are substantive opportunities but do not reflect the
procedural aspects of freedom. Even post-development scholarship on pluriverses that espouse
local community-based alternative epistemologies (such as buen vivir and swaraj) can fit within
Sen’s capabilities approach that leaves the decision-making of just institutions to communities.
Sen, in fact, emphasizes the need to critically scrutinize what post-development scholars call the
“world capitalist system.” He observes that public good problems such as those dealing with the
environment “will almost certainly call for institutions that take us beyond the capitalist market
economy.”180 A critical capabilities lens, therefore, can benefit from critiques made by critical
development scholarship and still use ‘capabilities’ as an evaluative metric between feasible
alternatives.
Any application of CA, as Robeyns suggests, must also be explicit about its account of
agency.181 This project uses Razia Sharif’s work on what she calls “collective agency capability”
that builds on Sen’s instrumental freedoms with insights from critical theorists such as Gramsci
and Foucault and a case history of the Shahbag Movement, responding to critics that point to
Sen’s individualistic focus that does not emphasize the role of structure. She develops each of
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Sen’s instrumental freedoms (italicized in the quote below) from their “normal state” to one with
collective agency capability informed by critical theory and her case study. For each instrumental
freedom, she writes:
a shift must occur to allow collective agency capability: political empowerment needs to
occur with a shift from biopower to biopolitics; economic emancipation occurs through a
shift from capitalism to a just economy; social network capital develops from having an
alienated society to one that is highly networked with organic solidarity; for security
there is a shift from an unsafe suspicious environment to one of feeling safe and secure
and trusting others; and for transparency the shift is from a closed, uninformed public to
one where communications are open and transparent and easy to access.182 (emphasis
added)
I suggest that Sharif’s work on collective agency capability is able to address the concerns of
CA’s focus on the individual and an account that may be useful for migrant workers as a group,
particularly her inclusion of security and transparency.
A critical capability approach must also be one that balances the tensions between
migration and emigration. It is, therefore, supplemented with Lea Ypi’s contribution towards a
global theory of justice in migration.183 She argues that such a theory must be able to address the
tensions between justice in immigration (incoming freedom of movement) and justice in
emigration (outgoing freedom of movement). The former would have to deal with concerns that,
for instance, incoming migrants may impact the host state’s ability to provide social subsidies to
its worse-off citizens. The latter would have to consider the potential impact of ‘brain drain’ on
the welfare of the remaining citizens in sending states. A theory of justice in migration, therefore,
ought to consider two things: restrictions on freedom of movement that are allowed and not
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allowed, and how to distribute benefits and responsibilities between migrants, citizens of host
societies, and citizens of sending societies.184
Ypi argues that egalitarian principles that are simultaneously and equally trying to
accommodate the claims of both justice in immigration and emigration conjure a world where
there is no movement of people across borders, ‘a closed borders utopia’ that is unjust to migrants.
She explains how the only point of convergence between the two (justice in immigration and
justice in emigration) is the case of political refugees, where restrictions on freedom of movement
of political refugees are objectionable for both communitarians and individualists. She points that
one way forward is to start with the case of political refugees and consider economic migrants as
analogous. When the sending state is unable to provide the most ‘basic needs’ to its citizens, and
there is little they can do to improve their ‘economic conditions,’ then the bond with political
institutions has been undermined in the same way as it is for political refugees.185 Like Chandran
Kukathas, who points that transfers of wealth are not sufficient when suffering is rooted in the
breakdown of institutions, Ypi argues since the lack of functioning domestic institutions may
undermine any assistance or development aid, there is a ‘clear obligation related to freedom of
movement.’ Ypi argues that one way to decide who ought to enjoy unrestricted freedom of
movement could be based on the following principle:
the less able worse-off agents are to take responsibility for their economic development,
the more they should be favoured. The right principle would therefore attempt to combine
urgency and ascription of responsibility: urgent claims for which people cannot take
responsibility (past and future) should be favoured over those for which they can.186
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In other words, this would translate to invert the preference of “high-skilled” workers, or
those considered as “desirable” over “low-skilled,” “undesirable” workers. In line with the CA, I
propose to switch “economic development” to capabilities so the focus is on whether or not people
are able to lead valuable lives rather than assuming economic development will lead to the former.
Ypi’s contribution, thus, is still no less ‘ideal’ than those who argue for open borders and not meant
as a fundamental challenge to open borders arguments such as those pursued by Joseph Carens.187
She clarifies that while open borders may resolve the problem of inter-state migration, they would
not resolve the concerns related to freedom of movement because they do not remedy “the
spatially-related socio-economic inequalities” that make borders problematic in the first place.188
Ypi also urges that debates on the political theory of immigration ought not only to be
explored along identity lines but also how class boundaries play a role. She argues that borders
have always been open for some and closed for others, as well as barriers to integration and civic
participation. The super-rich and hypermobile have more access to mobility than their
counterparts. When focusing on class, the more appropriate way is to think of the obstacles that
both poor migrants and poor citizens have to encounter, focusing on a common source of
oppression for both worse-off citizens and immigrants.189
In sum, a critical capabilities-based approach is one that operates in the space of
capabilities, i.e., people’s actual opportunities to live lives they have “reason to value” but is one
that is supplemented with insights from EJ scholarship, critical development theory on SD, an
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account of collective capability agency and a principle that favours worse-off agents who are less
able to lead valuable lives.

1.11 Methods and Fieldwork: interviews, partial-ranking method,
participant observation & ethnographic reflections
Inspired by environmental justice scholars who stress the importance of “telling our own
stories,” and Sen’s criticism on paternalistic methods of determining elements of justice, in-depth
interviews of returning Pakistani migrant workers, their advocates, Pakistani government officials,
and residents of Masdar city have informed this study. These interviews are used not to document
reality nor will these representations be simply understood as lived experiences; rather, the
narratives will be seen as “creative constructions or interpretations of the past generated in specific
contexts of the present.”190 These interviews aim to supplement the analysis to understand how
and the legal regimes, SD, and migrant justice diverge on the ground.
The following is a description of the qualitative research, the bulk of which was
conducted during fieldwork in Karachi, Pakistan, as well as Abu Dhabi and Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, in the summer of 2018. There were multiple goals that I was hoping to achieve through
fieldwork. Most importantly, I was hoping to get first-hand accounts of returning Pakistani
migrant workers who have worked in Masdar or Abu Dhabi’s construction industry. I also
wanted to understand the claims of migrant worker rights advocates and relevant civil society
organizations in the UAE and the Gulf broadly, as well as how government agencies in Pakistan
articulated the problems facing migrant workers in the UAE. Lastly, I wanted to visit the site that
serves as an entry point, namely, Masdar City, Abu Dhabi.
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There were 30 interviewees and all the participants were interviewed voluntarily with no
incentives and were reached either directly through personal networks, social media, and
contacts made leading up to the fieldwork or the snowballing method. There were three sets of
interviews: returning migrant workers, Pakistani government officials, and migrant workers’
rights advocates in the Gulf. In addition to these interviews, I conducted multiple more informal
interviews and took ethnographic reflection notes throughout my fieldwork in Karachi, Abu
Dhabi, and Dubai (See Table 1 and 2 for descriptions of interview types and interviewees).

Table 1: Interviews in Pakistan
Returning Migrant Workers in Pakistan

Interview Type
Formal 60-120
minute recorded

Interviewee
description
Returning Migrant
Worker Interviewee 1
Returning Migrant
Worker Interviewee 2
Returning Migrant
Worker Interviewee 3

Industry

Occupation/Skill Level

Years
lived
in
UAE

Construction

Civil Engineer

1

Construction

Handyman/Technician/Automechanic 3

Telecommunication Installer/ pipe-fitter /fabricator

>20

Migrant Workers Leaving Pakistan to work in the Gulf
Briefing/Information
Session Attendee 1
Briefing/Information
Session Attendee 2
Informal shorter
conversations at
the briefing

Private
Transportation
Services

Briefing/Information
Session Attendee 5

Construction
Private
Transportation
Services
Private
Transportation
Services
Private
Transportation
Services

Returning Migrant
Worker on Flight

Livestock/
agriculture

Briefing/Information
Session Attendee 3
Briefing/Information
Session Attendee 4

Personal Driver
Labourer

Personal Driver

Personal Driver

Personal Driver
Camel Driver/Farmer
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Pakistani government officials
Interview Type
Interviewee description
Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Employee
Formal 60-120
minute recorded Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Employee - Airport Representative
interviews
Migrant Resource Centre Employee
Migrant Workers’ Rights Advocates in the Gulf
Formal 60-120
Migrant Workers Protection Society Employee
minute recorded Anti-human Trafficking Organization Founder
interviews
Migrant-rights.org Employee

Table 2: Interviews conducted in the UAE and Canada
Masdar Residents
Interview Type
60-120 minute
informal interviews
– written notes

Interviewee
description

Nationality

Relationship to Masdar Institute/City

Resident-worker 1

Jordan(?)

Resident-worker 2

Pakistan

Alumna and ex-resident
Alum, ex-resident and current employee
working in the facilities

Resident-worker 3

UAE

Alum and ex-resident

Resident-worker 4

UAE

Current Graduate student and resident

Resident-worker 5

Montenegro

Current Graduate student and resident

Others
Interview Type

Shorter Informal
interviews – written
notes

Interviewee
Description
Sustainability City
Resident
Sustainability City
Representative
Sustainability City
Representative

Nationality
American
Unknown
Unknown

Worker 1 in Masdar

India

Worker 2 in Masdar
Worker 1 in
Sustainability City
Worker 2 in
Sustainability City

Bangladesh

Interviewee 1

Pakistan

Interviewee 2

Egypt

Pakistan
Bangladesh

Interviews in Canada
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Informal recorded
group interview (60
minutes)

Interviewee 3

India

While in Karachi from June to the end of August, I was able to conduct three in-depth 60120 minute interviews with returning migrant workers who have worked in Abu Dhabi in Urdu
and English. While the interviewees were not associated with the construction of Masdar City,
their varying skill-level and years lived in Abu Dhabi allowed a more representative group of
interviewees. One interviewee held an engineering position in Abu Dhabi and had recently left
his job. Another interviewee had worked as a ‘low-skilled’ technician and had been to Abu
Dhabi twice for separate jobs. Lastly, I had the opportunity to interview a worker who had retired
from working for a national telecommunication company in different roles but primarily as an
‘installer.’ While he was the only interviewee in this group who was not directly related to the
construction sector, he had lived in Abu Dhabi for more than 20 years and offered valuable
insights.
While in Karachi, I was also able to interview three Pakistani government officials
working for organizations that deal with Pakistani migrant workers. This included the Deputy
Director of Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) and another OPF employee who worked at
the OPF desk at the Karachi airport. In addition, I interviewed an employee from the Migrant
Resource Center, Islamabad. These interviews were helpful in discerning what some Pakistani
government officials viewed as issues for migrant workers seeking work in the Gulf and for
discerning their attitudes towards prospective migrant workers.
Furthermore, I also conducted Whatsapp/Skype interviews with three migrant workers’
rights advocates. This included an employee from the Migrant Workers Protection Society,
which is one of the few NGOs that works on protecting the rights of migrant workers in the
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GCC. In addition, I spoke to the founder of an organization that does anti-human trafficking
work in Abu Dhabi. Lastly, I also spoke to an employee from Migrant-Rights.org, a GCC-based
advocacy organization. They spoke about their experience interviewing in Nepal, India, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.
In addition to the aforementioned recorded interviews, I also conducted a number of more
informal interviews. While in Karachi, I attended the “Pre-departure briefing to Emigrants”
given by the Protector of Emigrants office. In addition, to attending these sessions on two
separate occasions and taking notes on the briefings, I also interviewed 6 of the attendees. These
conversations were helpful in getting a sense of where prospective migrant workers were from,
why and where they were going, how they were recruited, and what their expected salaries were.
While in the United Arab Emirates for ten days, I was able to make multiple visits to
Masdar City, Abu Dhabi. In addition to taking reflection notes while travelling to the city and
observing workers and residents, I was able to speak to 5 current or previous residents who were
also graduate students of Masdar Institute. This group of interviewees included three
international students and two Emirati students (one of the students was now an employee for
Masdar). These student-residents showed me around the campus and city and were eager to tell
me about their experience living in Masdar and reflections on why the Masdar Institute and
Masdar City failed. The notes I took during these conversations were helpful in getting insights
on their conceptions of sustainable development, the aspirations of Masdar, and how workers
building these projects fit into their stories.
These conversations led me to another newly built eco-themed development project (that
was more populated) in the UAE called Sustainable City, Dubai. I dedicated the last day of my
fieldwork trip to visiting this city. There, I was able to get (and record parts of) a guided tour. I
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also took notes on conversations I had with a few employees and a resident of the city. This
detour was helpful to see how another eco-city in the UAE is framing both SD and its residents.
Lastly, I was also able to conduct an informal recorded group interview of some migrant
workers who worked and lived in the United Arab Emirates and had moved to Canada. These
were helpful for insights on working in free zones.

1.12 Interviews
The first part of my interviews with returning workers was open-ended, borrowing from
Geraldine Pratt’s participatory methodology and activist research, which stresses the importance
of allowing the following questions to be informed by prior answers.191 These questions were
open-ended; they asked migrant workers why they chose the UAE, how they got there, what their
daily lives were and are like, how they described the places and conditions where they worked,
lived, and played in, why they left, what they liked and disliked about working in the UAE, what
they hoped to achieve, and whether they considered going back to the UAE or the Gulf to do
similar work.
The second part of the interviews included Sabina Alkire’s participatory partial ranking
method192, where interviewees were asked to rank the following capabilities translated in Urdu:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Being able to support family193
Being able to live a healthy life
Being well-fed
Safety at work
Wages
Ability to organize
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7. Ability to scrutinize authorities
8. Accommodation facilities
9. Being able to connect with nature
10. Ability to move freely inside and outside UAE
11. Career development
12. Being able to connect with people
This list was derived with the help of a literature review conducted prior to the fieldwork and
inspired by Ingrid Robeyns’ method of choosing relevant capabilities.194 All three times, the
interviewees did not seem too eager to do this partial ranking exercise and often ranked two or
more capabilities together. It was often difficult to explain the capabilities. In other words, while
I intended to incorporate Sabina Alkire’s partial ranking method, which would have highlighted
the capabilities to focus on, I found this method only helpful when supplemented with first-hand
accounts through which I was able to discern qualitatively what migrant workers put most
emphasis on when describing their motivations and aspirations.195 Following, Alkire however,
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the partial-ranking exercise allowed me to engage with the interviewees and reflect on what they
valued. This exercise was helpful in pushing the interviewees to reiterate what the top three most
important concerns for them were and talk about aspects of their experiences that may have been
missed during the interview (particularly being able to connect with nature). The results of this
partial-ranking taken together with the first part of the interviews indicated at least a common
theme. All three migrant workers ranked “ability to support family” and “ability to freely move
inside and outside UAE” in their top three valued capabilities. Therefore, the following analysis
focuses on movement and supportive capabilities.

1.13 Clarifications
I decided to focus on returning migrant workers, their advocates, and Pakistani government
officials for a number of reasons. Firstly, while interviewing workers working on the sites would
be ideal for a case study, given the risk that it would put the workers in, relying on returning
migrant workers was more practical and presented fewer ethical challenges. My conversations
with Nicholas McGeehan196 (who has written on migrant workers in the UAE both for Human
Right Watch and independently) indicated the difficulties in getting access to labour camps for
research. I preferred not to do formal interviews with migrant workers in the labour camps
considering the risks involved in speaking about working conditions in UAE’s political climate.

even for an activity that had significant economic returns, namely, goat rearing.” (at p. 248) However,
arbitrarily deciding defining basic capabilities such as health, education is insufficient. Alkire’s
methodology allows a systematically identifying valued impacts. Alkire’s study is also important given it
shows how marginalized informal workers’ working conditions and living standards can be improved
through not only access to financial resources but also participation, mobilization and social organization.
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Secondly, returning migrant workers have been subjects for earlier political economic accounts
and more recent anthropological work on migrant workers.197 However, it was also difficult to find
returning Pakistani migrant workers associated with the construction of Masdar City; returning
migrant workers who had worked in Masdar City were hard to track down in Pakistan not only
because of the lack of government records but also because the project was incomplete.
Given the sensitive nature of the topic, I prioritized mitigating the risks that some
participants would face. Participants were informed in plain language of the nature and scope of
the project so they can make an informed decision on whether they want to participate in the
research; they were informed that they are free to withdraw their consent to participate in the
research at any time. I used written voluntary consent forms for all key informants whenever
feasible. In all other cases, I relied on verbal consent.
These risks were mitigated through strictly regulating conditions of privacy and
confidentiality. While I intended to conduct one-on-one interviews, given the social norms in
Pakistan, I realized that most of the interviewed men felt more comfortable when there was one
other person in the room, often another family member. I conducted interviews in places that are
convenient for the participants for 45-90 minutes, depending on the participants’ willingness and
feasibility. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. All interviews remained anonymous, and
original research data is stored securely and destroyed in a timely manner after the study to protect
it from third parties. In addition, this dissertation uses pseudonyms for all interviewees, and some
details that may help identify interviewees have also been changed to ensure anonymity.
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Lastly, while bulk of the fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2018, this project also
relies on follow-up interviews and ongoing conversations with some interlocutors that were
conducted primarily online. It is also important to note that, although not formally included, but
my lived experience while growing up as a Pakistani in Saudi Arabia, studying in the United Arab
Emirates from 2009-2013, studying in Canada from 2015-2021 (particularly my affiliation with a
Canadian institution) and visiting Pakistan every year throughout, has not only shaped my
understanding of migration in the Gulf and beyond but also afforded me the network that I could
rely on and also sustained engagement with the multiple sites that are the focus.

1.14 Other Data Sources
The aforementioned interviews supplement a number of other primary and secondary data
sources. These include a range of international and domestic laws on labour migration as well
some relevant case law, bilateral agreements and regional instruments, with a particular emphasis
on the most relevant international instruments: the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) adopted in 1990,198
and the ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No. 97) of 1949,199 and the ILO
Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143) of 1975200 and the Global Compact for
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Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration of 2018.201 This project also focuses on the most relevant
domestic laws on labour migration and citizenship as well as most recent reforms in the UAE such
as the Wage Protection System, changes in family sponsorship, golden visas and free zone
regulations.
Furthermore, it includes legal and policy instruments on sustainable development including
Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals indicators and targets. In addition, it also relies
on Masdar City’s master plans, Employment Regulations, photographs, social media accounts,
sustainability reports and other publicly available information published by Masdar. Furthermore,
it relied on both local news articles and gray literature on developments in the United Arab
Emirates and the Gulf which included government documents such as UAE’s development
agendas, Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 and Abu Dhabi’s Department of Municipalities and Transport
documents.

1.15 Movement and Supportive Capabilities
I propose a focus on movement and supportive capabilities as well as their corresponding
functionings to evaluate and analyze the international and Emirati regimes regulating migrant
workers and SD projects such as Masdar City. These specific capabilities are chosen because all
migrant workers interviewed ranked the “ability to move freely inside and outside UAE” and
“being able to support your family” as their top 3 valued capabilities from the list that was
derived from a literature review. The purpose is not to present these as the only valuable
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capabilities or claim them as valuable for all migrant workers but to narrow down the focus of
the analysis and to see what insights can be gained from a potential capability application.
Movement capabilities are still able to capture many aspects of mobility, and freedom of
movement is broadly defined as “the freedom to traverse space and to make a place for oneself in
the world.”202 This would allow us to consider aspects such as migrant workers’ ability to enter
the receiving country, move within the receiving country, return to the country of origin but also
the receiving country again. Similarly, supportive capabilities are conceived broadly to be able to
capture aspects such as wages, remittances, meaningful labour, lifelong learning opportunities,
opportunities for vocational training, ability to switch employers, and family reunification.
Framing these aspects under supportive capabilities is able to highlight the relational aspects of
the CA and move beyond a focus on an income-centric focus on simply wages and remittances. I
use the term supportive capabilities to include aspects of supporting oneself but also one’s
families (understood broadly), as the latter was stressed as an important motivation for
interviewed migrant workers.
While some of the other capabilities in the list presented in the interviews are related to
movement and supportive capabilities (for instance, being able to organize can have an impact
on one’s ability to pursue meaningful labour), the focus on movement and supportive capabilities
allows us to foreground migrant workers’ opportunities to move and support their families. Since
capabilities can range widely from “being able to nourish oneself” to “being able to form a
conception of the good,” specifying capabilities (albeit broadly) is significant. While movement
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and supportive capabilities are framed capaciously, they do not include a number of other
capabilities such as “being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life”
and “being able to connect with nature.’
Furthermore, movement and supportive capabilities, as well as their corresponding
funcitonings, are seen as important. Recall that all capability applications have both functionings
and capabilities as the core concepts that form the evaluative space. While capabilities are
understood as substantive opportunities to ‘do’ and ‘be,’ functionings are conceived as actual
achievements. In other words, when evaluating regimes and Masdar city, this project asks not
only whether migrant workers entered the UAE but also the range of substantive opportunities
afforded to migrant workers. While it is more difficult to discern opportunities than actual
achievements, since the purpose here is not to make empirical interpersonal comparisons, a focus
on a range of opportunities as well as functionings is both feasible and helpful. Focusing on a
mixture of both allows us to avoid a paternalist approach that forces people into a particular
account of good lives. However, given the importance Sen places on an outcome-oriented view
and the fact that capabilities do not capture the process aspect of freedom, funcitonings cannot be
overlooked entirely.203 Lastly, echoing Robeyns, movement and supportive capabilities, as well
as their corresponding functionings, are conceived as value-neutral. This allows for the
possibility that some capabilities and functionings can be conceived as positive but can become
negative in some circumstances.
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CHAPTER 2
Locating Migrant Justice in International Migration Law Between Plurality,
Differentiation, and Softness
"No problem can be solved outside the boundary of law."
- Briefing Officer, Protectorate of Emigrant Office, Karachi
Walking into the Protectorate of Emigrant Office in Karachi, the first thing I noticed was
the line of motorbikes outside the building. There was a continuous flow of men working for
recruiting agencies rushing in and out, folders in one hand, bike helmets in the other. I walked by
a group of them taking a smoke break through the security and was directed upstairs where I was
told I could speak to "Madam," the Briefing Officer. She was the only other woman in the
building. Her office was in the same room where the briefings were held. There was a little
podium in the front and rows of chairs where about fifteen men sat, each with a paper (likely
Foreign Service Agreements) in their hands. As I waited outside Madam's office, watching two
stray kittens chasing each other next to the podium, her Secretary walked in, spraying air
freshener all around. The spraying silenced the room.
I was finally invited into Madam's office. She was sitting behind piles of paperwork and
was finishing up a call with a pharmacy about adult diapers for presumably a parent. It was clear
that the office was understaffed, and she was overworked. Recruitment agency workers kept
rushing into her office with paperwork for her to sign. Even in these circumstances, she kindly
allowed me to sit through the briefing. The hour-long briefing was telling for multiple reasons: it
had more information on personal hygiene than the rights that migrant workers are entitled to or
organizations that can help. The purpose of these briefing sessions is to, according to the
Emigration & Overseas Employment Government of Pakistan website, "[brief on] all necessary
aspects regarding health, legal-rights etc. and [guide the emigrant] to get his passport and
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documents."204 It is mandatory for Pakistani emigrants with work visas to get their passports
stamped by the Protectorate of Emigrants, and this briefing is the last step before they can
embark on their journeys.205 Getting the passport stamped allows the Pakistani government to
keep a record of emigrants, and the fees paid by emigrants are meant to serve as "life
insurance."206
"So what does the Protectorate mean?" the Briefing Officer asked around the room, "It
means that they have to protect these six things: your work, your salary, your accommodation,
food, medical, transportation, and overtime…2,500 (Pakistani rupees) in 5 years may not even
mean that much so make sure you think of that too… 2,000 fees for [Overseas Pakistanis
Foundation]…to make sure if there is a road accident, etc.…to make sure the dead body can
come back home."
The briefing continued, "Lastly, when you go to another country, make sure you take care
of your clothes, your hygiene. Us Pakistanis don't take care of that. Take a waistcoat with your
shalwar kameez.207 We get complaints about how people complaining about body odour. The
Pakistani quarters are always easy to spot because of the smell." This emphasis on hygiene
continued even when an attendee asked a question about being discriminated by a clerk in
another government office. After noting that" every department has a different jurisdiction," the
Briefing Officer responded "And lastly what did I say? Clothes must be clean. If your clothes are
clean, then you'll automatically get treated differently." Looking around the room full of
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confused faces, I noticed there were no posters with information on the migrant workers' rights
or organizations that could help. According to the briefing, the only thing that was going to
protect migrants apart from practicing good hygiene was this protectorate stamp and their
relationship with the kafeel or arbab.208 The only time rights were mentioned in the briefing were
in relation to knowing what the fees associated with this protectorate stamp were. What may
explain this absence of rights and international law in the briefing hall? Is the international legal
regime governing migrant workers equally silent on migrant workers' rights? What are this
regime's main features?
This chapter aims to see whether we can locate protection of movement and supportive
capabilities within international migration law and describe the main features of the different
regimes that compose international migration law. It lays out a broad overview of the
international legal regime that regulates migrant workers with a particular emphasis on Pakistani
migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates to distill key features. Given the discussion of
selecting relevant capabilities in Chapter 1, the focus will be on movement and supportive
capabilities as discussed in Section 1.1. This will allow us to look at the right to leave, the right
to enter, and the right to choose where to work yet go beyond a narrow doctrinal analysis.
'Rights' here are seen as ethical assertions. Echoing Sen's reading of Hart, they are "parents of
law" such that they may motivate legislation or other activities meant to advance them. For Sen,
human rights cannot be discarded simply due to imperfect obligations and lack of feasibility; as
such, the focus is not merely on the provision of legal rights but rather to see the content of these
assertions and their exclusions.209 An alternative question could ask whether these deliberations
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reflect impartial, practical public reasoning? The focus here, though, will be on the content and
results of the deliberations. In making these assertions, what kinds of freedoms do international
legal instruments deem significant for migrant workers? What kinds of freedoms and
opportunities are reserved for only documented, authorized migrants in a regular situation?
A few preliminary notes on international migration law will be followed by a review of
the most relevant instruments: the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) adopted in 1990,210 and the ILO
Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No. 97) of 1949,211 and the ILO Convention
concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and
Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143) of 1975212 and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly,
and Regular Migration of 2018.213 Can we locate the protection of movement and supportive
capabilities within these regimes and instruments? The discussion will highlight three main
features that shape the international human rights law and labour law regimes: 1) a plurality of
sources (and a resulting fragmentation), 2) an across-the-board differentiation between workers
according to their citizenship status, and 3) a trend towards softer normative mechanisms.
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2.1 Plurality in International Migration Law: A "giant unassembled juridical jigsaw puzzle."
Both the international and domestic regimes that aim to address migrant worker issues in
general and migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are marked by legal pluralism,
i.e., a situation where multiple legal systems "coexist in the same field."214 International
migration law (first coined as a term in 1927 by Louis Varlez) can be understood as including
norms across many overlapping fields such as international labour law, human rights law,
refugee law, trade law, criminal law, and the law of the sea.215 It may be defined as a "set of
international rules and principles governing the movement of persons between states and the
legal status of migrants within host countries. It gathers all relevant international legal norms that
apply to individuals who are leaving their own country, entering another one, and/or staying
therein."216 In the absence of a multilateral legal framework, the two main international
organizations – the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) — have limited institutional and regulatory capacity that allow states to
significantly influence their labour migration rules.217 Without any central norms or a
multilateral legal framework, the regulatory regime has been criticized for its lack of coherence:
international migration law has been compared to a "giant unassembled juridical jigsaw
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puzzle"218 and labelled as "deconstructivist architecture…of fragmentation based on dissonance
and asymmetry."219
This complexity is unsurprising due to state sovereignty and the existence of borders and
because migration is both a domestic and international concern. There are a number of tools
international lawyers can use to address this fragmentation and potential conflicts between
different regimes.220 However, echoing Blackett and Trebilcock, transnational labour law "can ill
afford to romanticize plural sources of law or their disruptive power."221 To center migrant
justice, all the different sources of law ought to ensure movement and supportive capabilities as
both means and ends. As explained in the introductory chapter, capabilities are different from
rights because they do not presuppose the role of the state, and they allow us to think of other
non-state actors (like trade unions) that can help convert the capabilities to outcomes. Labour
rights are not seen as only by-products or means to achieve economic growth but are ends by
themselves. A capabilities-based perspective, therefore, is more demanding than merely formally
protecting the right to move, right to work, etc. Supportive capabilities then entail not only the
right to work but also demand, for example, opportunities for meaningful work, opportunities to
be trained and educated, as well as a right to enjoy a private life.222 Beyond the scope of this
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chapter and outside of treaty law, there are also customary law principles223 that are binding to
all states, such as the principle of non-discrimination224, the prohibition of slavery, forced labour
and child labour, right to a fair trial, principle of non-refoulement, family reunion of children,
access to consular protection and so on and so forth. Regardless of their status as customary
international law, suffice to say at this point, they are argued to be weak principles.225226 The
discussion will not specifically deal with these customary norms; rather, it will provide a broad
introduction to the international regime that governs migrant workers.
While the focus here is on migrant workers, there are three other categories that this
discussion does not explicitly include: refugees, smuggled migrants, and trafficked migrants.
While it is acknowledged that categories often overlap, the purpose here is not to give an
overview of the rights afforded to all migrants nor to essentialize migrant workers relative to
other groups. Migrant workers are used as an example to view how the regime operates in both
overlapping yet fractured ways, differentiating rights in a way that further categorizes workers
and, in the process, inhibits migrant workers' capabilities.
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As critics of focusing merely on human trafficking and modern slavery argue, simply
tackling the worst forms of exploitation will not secure decent work conditions for migrant
workers, and the rhetoric has often been used to justify states' coercive power.227 Accordingly,
the following analysis will include a brief discussion of international refugee law and
Conventions on smuggled and trafficked persons but will focus more broadly on migrant
workers. It will look at the differentiated ways substantive opportunities to freely move and to
support families are distributed in international migration law's primary instruments that directly
pertain to migrant workers: ICRMW, ILO Convention No. 97, ILO Convention No. 143, Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The focus, therefore, will be on how migrant
workers' movement and supportive capabilities are dealt with in international human rights law
and labour law. After highlighting the ways these overlapping yet fractured regimes consistently
differentiate migrant workers, the discussion will point to a trend towards softer normative
mechanisms that try to fill the gaps. It will conclude by distilling what these features mean for
migrant workers' movement and supportive capabilities.

2.2 International Refugee Law and its Missed Opportunities
International law's normative commitment to territorial sovereignty228 is arguably one of
its most significant features, regardless of the many ways it is continuously challenged. For
instance, Sarah Dehm has recently argued that the assumption of the "state as the main container
227
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for authorizing and regulating human mobility" can be challenged by foregrounding various
other actors, sites, and modes of what she calls "transnational migration law-making."229 Most
discussions of migrant workers similarly start with acknowledging the role of sovereignty as
international law's basic axiom, built on Westphalian nation-states.230 International refugee law is
often the first example of how exceptions to this sovereign territorial control are made. The
Refugee Convention, for example, ensures refugees a right of entry and some political and
economic rights that may be applicable in the workplace.231 However, the Convention narrowly
defines refugees (granting refugee status based on persecution), and there is a reluctance to
broaden its scope to cover other groups such as migrants, environmental refugees, and stateless
persons.232 This reinforces the framing of refugees as "worthy" and other migrants as
"unworthy," essentially establishing a refugee and "economic" migrant binary.233 Similarly,
within refugee law, while the principle preventing states from sending an asylum-seeker to a
country where they may face persecution or a serious human rights violation (known as 'nonrefoulement') presents the most robust opportunity to ensure movement capabilities; its scope is
also limited.234 States are not obligated to facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers and actively
impose restrictions to limit it. The definition and non-refoulement debates aside, as Jaya Ramji-
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Nogales argues, while refugee law provides the right to move, it does not say anything about this
transit. She writes, "the obvious irony there is that these migrants must already have moved in
order to become eligible for the right to move." Another set of critiques is that refugee law
distracts attention from the systemic issues that play a significant role in driving migration, such
as income inequality.

2.3 International Human Rights Law: Universal or Differentiated?
Similarly, while international human rights law ensures some aspects of movement and
supportive capabilities, these protections are applied with different thresholds, further
categorizing migrant workers. In the second half of the century, human rights instruments and
the principle of non-discrimination brought new protections to migrant workers. It is generally
acknowledged that international human rights law applies to all migrants regardless of
nationality and legal status, with few exceptions.235 In other words, core civil, political,
economic, social, or cultural human rights that would have a bearing on supportive capabilities
(such as the prohibition of forced labour, child labour, equal remuneration, freedom of
association, right to collective bargaining) in principle apply to all persons but with a caveat.236 It
is conventionally argued that lawful restrictions can be made based on nationality or immigration
status if they are "reasonable, objective, and proportionate to pursue a legitimate aim."237 This
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means distinctions based on nationality and status are allowed if the measures are prescribed by
law, pursue a legitimate state objective that can be justifiable in a democratic society, and are
proportionate. These distinctions depend on each case's circumstances and the specific right(s) in
question; therefore, only a case-by-case assessment can distinguish lawful and unlawful
restrictions, giving states significant discretion in determining restrictions.
Apart from the general applicability of core human rights, the right to leave and return to
one's own country is directly relevant to movement capabilities. This right is restated in a wide
range of universal and regional human rights treaties and is understood to be binding as a matter
of customary international law.238 It was first endorsed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),239 which is considered the foundation document of human rights and customary
international law. The UDHR affirms that "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the border of each State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country."240 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) 241 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICERD),242 which came out of the UDHR - together known as the International Bill of Rights also reiterates the right to leave any country including one's own.243
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However, omitted in all these documents and international law is the symmetric right to
enter another country.244 Seyla Benhabib calls this an internal contradiction in universal human
rights and territorial sovereignty - a feature that exists across various international law
documents. In fact, international human rights instruments even reaffirm the state's authority to
determine who can enter and who can stay. For example, the ICCPR, which is referred to as one
of the most "far-reaching"245 treaties, explicitly protects the state's prerogative to decide who to
admit. The UN Human Rights Committee clarified in General Comment No. 15 that the
Covenant "does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or to reside in the territory of a State
party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory."246 This
strengthens states' authority to decide who to admit and inhibits migrant workers' movement
capabilities. While Article 12(4) 'prohibits arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter his own
country' (emphasis added) casts a broader net than it would have if the provision was based on
nationality, the concept of non-arbitrariness requires a case-by-case assessment that is harder to
make for temporary migrants.247
Even the ICRMW (also known as Migrant Workers Convention) safeguards this aspect of
state sovereignty and limits movement capabilities. In it, Article 35 states that: "Nothing in the
present part of the Convention shall be interpreted as implying the regularization of the situation
of migrant workers or members of their families who are non-documented or in an irregular
situation or any right to such regularization of their situation."248 However, this does not mean
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that states' right to deny territorial access to all aliens is absolute. As James Nafziger argues, the
proposition that this right is absolute has little historical or jurisprudential foundation, and "a
state has a qualified duty to admit aliens when they pose no serious danger to its public safety,
security, general welfare, or essential institutions."249 However, as we will see in Chapter 3,
states such as the UAE often broadly interpret migrants' potential threat to security.
Even if a non-citizen is lawfully within the territory, human rights instruments reaffirm
states' ability to influence non-citizens' movement capabilities. The ICCPR is noteworthy in this
regard because it reserves some rights to only non-citizens who are "lawfully present within the
territory of a state," namely, the right to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose
residence within the territory (Article 12) and due process guarantees on expulsion from the
territory to. And even if this is the case, "the combination of these two provisions," Chetail
argues, "graphically exhibits the specificities and the limits of the legal status of migrants under
contemporary international law: a non-citizen must be lawfully present within the territory of a
state to be able to benefit from the right to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose
residence; but, even if lawfully within the territory, he/she may still be deported from that
territory provided that some basic conditions and procedural guarantees are fulfilled."250
Similarly and as Section 2.4 will detail, the Migrant Workers' Convention also provides
differential rights between migrant workers based on whether they are considered in a regular or
an irregular situation.
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In addition to the ICCPR, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination 1969 (ICERD)251 and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women 1979 (CEDAW)252 contain provisions that may be relevant to
movement and supportive capabilities. These are potentially significant, especially in relation to
this work, considering they are some of the few human rights treaties that the UAE is a member
state to. The ICERD, for instance, ensures a wide array of rights ranging from "The rights to
work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection
against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration" to "the
right to form and join trade unions" and the "the right to marriage and choice of spouse."253 It
was clarified by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in General
Recommendation No 30 on Discrimination that, in principle, states are obligated to guarantee the
range of rights in Article 5 (where the aforementioned rights are listed) to all persons without
discrimination. It also includes an obligation to provide equal treatment between citizens and
non-citizens, with the exception of some political rights such as the right to vote.254
In addition to the aforementioned human rights treaties that deal with migrant workers'
rights, the international protection for migrant workers also includes a United Nations Charterbased system. This comprises of a system whereby individuals and organizations can bring
complaints to the UN Human Rights Council to address violations, special reporters and human
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rights independent experts that study human rights, and thirdly quadrennial period review reports
by the UN HRC on UN Member state reports which include recommendations by the HRC.255
The significance of the exceptions can be especially grave in countries like the GCC
countries, where access to citizenship is strictly protected. The UAE has not accepted the
optional obligations for individual complaints.256 Even in the few other states that have accepted
these obligations, only a few individuals have used these procedures.257 In 2018, however, Qatar
submitted an Application to the International Court of Justice against the UAE concerning its
treatment towards Qataris living in the UAE using the ICERD as its legal basis. This was in
response to a range of sanctions that the UAE imposed on Qatar, including the expulsion of
Qataris from the UAE sparked by rising tensions in Yemen.258 It is interesting to note that this is
the only time that such an application was made against the UAE, while the ICERD is ratified by
almost all sending countries and the UAE.

2.4 UN Migrant Workers Convention: Comprehensive yet Differentiated
Having discussed some of the core human rights instruments, this section will turn our
attention to one of the most relevant instruments that specifically address migrant workers: the
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Migrant Workers Convention259 which is considered the most comprehensive treaty in the field
of migration and human rights and is one of the 'core' human rights agreements.260 The history of
this document highlights the contentious nature of migrant worker issues. While the ILO alone
was mandated to ensure "protection of interests of workers when employed in countries other
than their own,"261 the ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provision) Convention, 1975 (no.
143) (which will be discussed more fully in Section 2.3) was met with mixed reactions. Sending
countries were skeptical of its emphasis on undocumented migration because it would suppress
illegal movement that otherwise reduced unemployment and generated income. Similarly,
receiving countries were wary that ILO Convention No. 143's provision on the free choice of
employment would undermine their guest worker programs.262
Morocco and Mexico, therefore, started to campaign for a UN Convention on human
rights for migrants and chaired the Open-ended Working Group that was established in 1979.
Sending countries were not only dissatisfied by former ILO treaties but were also skeptical of its
inclusion of unions and their inability to make reservations in ILO treaties.263 Mainstream
accounts of the ICRMW also note that the UN was preferred over the ILO because developing
countries were hoping to promote a new economic order in the aftermath of the 1970s oil crisis
and thought the UN forum would more easily help get an "automatic majority."264
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The drafting, however, was done primarily by a group of European states known as the
MESCA group (Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden), which later approached
the ILO to help with some draft articles.265 While it was expected at least this group would ratify,
destination countries were skeptical of the resulting document's level of detail, ambition, and
usefulness. Migrant Workers Convention exemplifies how reluctant states are to provide all
migrants' rights. It took more than ten years for the Convention to come into force in 2003, and
even then, the state parties included mostly sending countries and none of the major receiving
countries. The current number of state parties is 55 and includes neither UAE nor Pakistan. 266
The literature on ICRMW has long tried to explain why ratification has been difficult to
achieve, identifying a number of legal and political issues that may explain the low level of
ratifications as well as lack of campaigning of the ICRMW. Canada's objection, for instance,
stems from a number of reasons. A UNESCO-commissioned report noted that these include the
assertion that migration management lies within each nation-state's sovereignty, fundamental
rights of all persons are already guaranteed in Canada and that signing the ICRMW would
require Canada to review its temporary migration programmes.267 A similar UNESCO study on
obstacles to the ratification of the ICRMW in the European Economic Area noted that the
common fear is that the ICRMW would limit the states' sovereign right to decide who can enter
their territory and for how long they can remain, and that it provide a robust right of family
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reunification to all migrant workers in a regular situation. The political obstacles include the fact
that ICRMW prescribes rights the already exist in national laws and that it prescribes too many
rights to migrants in an irregular situation which may make tackling irregular migration and
"social integration" difficult.268 However, many sending countries, including Pakistan and India,
have also refused to ratify this agreement due to a lack of political will and the fact that labourout migration has only increased in the late 1980s.269 A 2003 UNESCO-study on the Asia Pacific
found that in non-ratifier sending countries, such as Indonesia and Bangladesh,270 the obstacles
were the costs associated with fulfilling their obligations, such as providing pre-departure
sessions and monitoring brokers and recruiters.271 However, even the states that ratify the
ICRMW do so, as Western, Lockhard, and Money recently argue, "to strengthen their
relationships with their emigrants and their citizens at home who advocate for emigrant
protections, not to protect the right of immigrants residing in their own country."272
However, ICRMW is celebrated by several commentators as one of the most significant
documents for migrants as it includes a number of rights for authorized migrant workers that
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have a bearing on movement and supportive capabilities.273 It includes the right to enter and
remain in one's state of origin274 and rights of liberty of movement275 and freedom of
association276, and it reiterates a number of other rights such as the right to life277, freedom from
slavery, and torture.278 For the most part, it reaffirms basic human rights norms that are already
in existing treaties.279 It does include provisions that are specific to migration, such as Article 17,
which makes an explicit reference to immigration detention and trial rights, and Article 21,
which prohibits passport confiscation.280 The ICRMW also has provisions that commit states to
collaborate to prevent "illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant workers in
an irregular situation."281
The ICRMW has nine parts and defines rights that apply to specific categories of migrant
workers and their families in the following sub-categories: frontier workers, seasonal workers,
seafarers, workers on an offshore installation, itinerant workers, project-tied workers, specifiedemployment workers, and self-employed workers. 282 It divides its rights according to whether or
not migrant workers are in a "regular" or "irregular" situation. Part III applies to all migrant
workers, and Part IV applies only to those who are documented or in a regular situation. The
omission of migration status in the Convention's non-discrimination provision is also
noteworthy.283 Part III, which applies to all migrant workers and their families, is generally a
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reiteration of human rights norms that exist elsewhere. This categorization was a result of a
compromise between the delegates who drafted the treaty after years of negotiation. At the time
it was drafted, the 35 Articles that apply to all migrant workers and family members were filling
a gap and clarifying that these provisions did apply to all non-citizens.284 The list of rights that
concern all migrants and their families includes a range, including, for instance, the right not to
have identity documents confiscated285, the right to education for migrants' children286, and the
right to respect for cultural identity.287
However, the differences between Part III for all migrants and Part IV that applies to only
documented migrant workers highlight how migrant workers experience differential treatment,
with significant impacts on their movement and supportive capabilities. For instance, like under
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only migrant workers and their families who are
documented or in a regular situation have the "right to liberty of movement in the territory of the
State of employment and freedom to choose their residence there."288 This also includes more
substantial rights such as the "right to form associations and trade unions," equality of treatment
with nationals,289 transfer of remittances290, expulsion procedures,291 and right to family
reunification.292 The fact that these rights are only reserved for documented workers undermines
movement and supportive capabilities for workers who are undocumented.

284

Stefanie Grant & Beth Lyon, “Indirect Success? The impact and use of the ICRMW in other UN fora”
(2018), online: <https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/chdap/>.
285
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 21
286
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 30
287
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 31
288
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 39.1
289
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 43
290
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 47
291
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 56
292
Migrant Workers’ Convention art. 44

84

A further exception is made in the ICRMW for "project-tied workers" who are defined as
"migrant worker[s] admitted to a State of employment for a defined period to work solely on a
specific project being carried out in that State by his or her employer."293 Article 61 of the
ICRMW stipulates that these workers and members of their families "shall be entitled to the
rights provided for in part IV except" certain provisions that include "equal treatment" with
nationals with regards to vocational guidance and placement services; vocational training and
retraining facilities and institutions; social housing schemes.294 More importantly, project-tied
migrant workers are also not entitled to "freely to choose their remunerated activity"295 and
equality of treatment with nationals in the exercise of the remunerated activity.296 Most
construction workers that are hired for specific projects tend to be on fixed-term contracts that
may fall within this category. In other words, even within the category of migrant workers and
their families who are documented or in a "regular" situation, there are further exceptions that
may limit their supportive capabilities. Migrant workers that fall within this category can be
denied access to meaningful work and vocational training available to citizen workers.
Furthermore, given that the ICRMW was drafted in the 1970s and rooted in the North-South
migration, its focus was on the traditional mobility of the industrial worker rather than other
groups.297
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Despite the proliferation of human rights instruments298 and norms, the human rights
project has been at the heart of many criticisms of international law.299 Not only are there ways
that movement and supportive capabilities are differentiated, but even when this is less so, the
law on the books does not reflect the law in practice. Not only have very few states accepted the
obligations for individual complaints available in international human rights instruments, but
these procedures are underutilized.300 Human rights law has been criticized for only focusing on
moral wrongs, formal equality, and negative obligations rather than substantive equality and
positive obligations. Furthermore, the predominantly individualized nature of human rights
complaints, framing of human rights, and lack of progress towards recognizing group rights is
also limiting compared to collective labour law remedies and the more collective framing of
labour rights.301 Samuel Moyn prominently argues that human rights law ignores distributive
equality altogether or at best only offers "a floor of protection against indigence."302 However, as
Sen criticizes, borrowing from Kant, the fact that these obligations are imperfect and that the
project is not feasible or accomplishable as a whole does not render it insignificant.303 What is
most important is that even within this context of imperfect obligations and international human
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rights law's normative commitment to individual rights, human rights instruments' differentiation
and exceptions show the lack of political will to ensure movement and substantive capabilities
universally and equally to nationals and non-nationals irrespective of status.

2.5 The ILO and International Labour Law: A Toothless tiger for "all men irrespective of race,
creed or sex"?
Similarly, international labour law, particularly under the ILO's approach, ensures movement and
supportive capabilities but applies them differentially while making significant exceptions. Born
in 1919 as a "daughter of the war," the ILO, in fact, predates the universal human rights
instruments. Although it has been nicknamed the "toothless tiger," its unique tripartite system is
significant despite criticisms.304 In other words, unlike other UN organizations that rely on
government representatives to make decisions, ILO's governance is marked by "deliberation and
the distribution of power in decision-making among three representative bodies – representing
the government, the employers and workers."305
Before discussing how specific ILO instruments distribute movement and supportive
capabilities, it might be useful to historicize ILO's relationship with migrant workers. Most
accounts start with the acknowledgment that the ILO has been concerned with migrant workers
since its very foundation in 1919. The Preamble of its Constitution explicitly stated its mandate
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as one focused on social justice but also specifically referred to the "protection of the interests of
workers when employed in countries other than their own." The Treaty of Versailles, which
established the 1919 ILO Constitution, sets out nine principles which include the oft-cited
principle, labour is not a commodity or article of commerce.306 What becomes apparent through
the history of ILO is that given that it was established against the backdrop of post-World War 1
turmoil and the political and social revolution that followed, from the beginning, it aimed to
challenge the destructive tendencies of unfettered capitalism; its mandate had always included
social objectives. ILO's "constitutional acquis [is] rooted in labour history's recognition that law's
normative character was indeterminate" and must center on social justice.307 Therefore, the 1944
Philadelphia Declaration applied to "all men irrespective of race, creed or sex," which later
influenced the United Nations Charter and UDHR.308 This Declaration became known as the
"second coming of the ILO" and served as the blueprint for the welfare state in the post-war
years, directly following Polanyi's book on Great Transformation, which deconstructed the myth
of self-regulating markets.309
While it was constructed around the idea of social justice as depicted in its Constitution,
its "universal" approach is challenged both in terms of the states and the kinds of workers it
included; there was a strong European and industrial bias. For instance, when its first Governing
Body met, 20 of the 24 members were European nations. The average ratio of European
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compared to non-European employees in ILO's permanent secretariat was 10:1.310 Colonial
labour (workers working under the colonial domination of European powers) was also never
included in the ILO Agenda. In addition, the 1930 Forced Labor Convention No. 29 included
exceptions where a transitional period of forced labour performed for "public purposes" and
other provisions on military service, court conviction, "minor communal services," and normal
"civic obligations of citizens" allowed colonial signatories to be exempted. Although the
Philadelphia Declaration is applauded for its universalist approach of protecting all workers
regardless of "race, creed, or sex" and its broadening of focus and role, Section 5 of the
Declaration was meant solely for colonial populations. It was meant to be applied dependent on
"the stage of social and economic development reach by each people," and provisions in colonial
territories were a "matter of concern to the whole civilized world." The universality in terms of
the application of its human rights claims was only gradually implemented in the colonies.311
The ILO thought it could ensure social cohesion within open market economies through
standard-setting and regulation of the state.312 The focus on universally applied standards has
been criticized even as the ILO celebrated its 100 years. As TWAIL scholars Obiora Chinedu
Okafor, Titilayo Adebola, and Basema Al-Alami write in their contribution for "ILO 100 – Law
for Social Justice,' these universal standards "in reality, work against the interests of Third World
peoples…[and]…same treatment does not always lead to equity."313

Ibid. at p 74
Nikita Lyutov, “The ILO System of International Labour Standards and Monitoring Procedures: Too
Complicated to Be Effective” (2014) 64:2 Zbornik PFZ 255–276.
312
Maul, supra note 309.
313
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Titilayo Adebola & Basema Al-Alami, “Viewing the International Labour
Organization’s Social Justice Praxis Through a Third World Approaches to International Law Lens: Some
Preliminary Insights” in Georges P Politakis, Tomi Kohiyama & Thomas Lieby, eds, ILO 100: Law for
Social Justice (2019). at p 120
310

311

89

The ILO is considered the transnational counterpart to the state responses to growing worker
discontent, particularly in the European countries – both of which were aiming to divert workers
from radical revolutions by including new regimes of labour rights and social justice through
constitutions domestically and transnationally (through the UDHR and The Philadelphia
Declaration). However, cold war tensions hindered ILO's ambitious goals, forcing the ILO to
flee Europe and seek refuge in Canada. The old imperialism and cold war tensions have been
replaced by neoliberal globalization, which the ILO has attempted to tackle.314
Against this backdrop of the normative foundations and early tensions of the ILO, the
following discussion will now consider ILO instruments that are relevant to migrant workers.
ILO's first two Recommendations contained provisions concerning migrant workers
recommending that "the recruiting of bodies of workers in one country with a view to their
employment in another country should be permitted only by mutual agreement between the
countries concerned and after consultation with employers and workers in each country."
Furthermore, the Reciprocity of Treatment Recommendation, 1919 (No. 2) stated that member
states should ensure that foreign workers and their families benefit from worker protection
legislation, "as well as to the right of lawful organization as enjoyed by its workers."315 These
provisions are noteworthy and elucidate that ILO's approach is generally committed to all
workers; all ILO Conventions and Recommendations apply to migrant workers.316 However,
there are pragmatic choices the ILO has had to make that follow the pattern of international
refugee and human rights law instruments discussed earlier.
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The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97) was adopted by the
International Labour Conference in 1949 to facilitate the movement of labour and ensure
equality of treatment for migrant workers. It includes a range of provisions that expand migrant
workers' movement and supportive capabilities irrespective of race, sex, religion, or nationality –
these provisions are found in similar terms in the ICRMW. They include prohibiting the removal
of migrant workers and their family in the event of incapacity to work (Article 8.1) and measures
to provide services to prevent misinformation on the process, aid transfer of earnings, and most
importantly, ensure equality of treatment. However, the trade-off to the wide array of rights has
meant that ILO Convention 97's provisions are limited to only workers who are permanent (or in
a regular situation), thus excluding undocumented workers as well as temporary workers.317
Following the ILO Convention No. 97, the International Labor Conference adopted the
ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary) Convention (No. 143) in 1975. Together these two are
among the first specific instruments aimed to tackle migrant worker issues. Unlike ILO
Convention No 97, ILO Convention 143 provides equal treatment to migrants in an irregular
situation in relation to rights arising out of past employment with regards to remuneration, social
security, and other benefits.318 However, its approach makes some exceptions too. The definition
of migrant for employment is narrower than in the Migrant Workers Convention's definition of a
migrant worker; it excludes undocumented workers, self-employed workers, frontier workers,
and members of the liberal arts.319
ILO Convention No 143's provisions referring to equality of treatment are applied
differently. For instance, Part II includes more liberal provisions such as equality of treatment
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with regards to working conditions and facilitating family reunification. This, however, does not
apply to all migrant workers and excludes, for instance, those who are exclusively in a state for
education or training purposes, as well as those who are there for specific temporary projects.320
These exceptions are significant especially given how migrant workers are likely to be in work
arrangements such as self-employment and temporary contracts tied to specific projects.321
Convention No. 143's provisions refer to equality of treatment between nationals and
migrant workers, but each has a different application threshold. Article 8, for instance, protects
migrant workers in the case of loss of employment but only applies to migrant workers who have
"resided legally." They are not considered in an irregular situation due to loss of employment and
are entitled to equality of treatment with nationals with respect to "security of employment,
provision of alternative employment, relief work and retraining." Article 14, which would
expand supportive capabilities by ensuring free choice of employment to migrant workers who
have resided lawfully in the territory for the purpose of employment for a certain period, only
applies to workers in a regular situation and those workers whose period of stay has not exceeded
two years. This provision was still opposed by many receiving countries for undermining
temporary migration.322 Similarly, Article 10 ensures protection of migrant workers against
discrimination, and the rest of Part II, which deals with equality of opportunity and treatment,
only applies to migrant workers who are "regularly admitted." The provisions that apply to all
migrant workers irrespective of their legal status include the human rights that are already in UN
human rights instruments and those set out in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
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and Rights at Work, 1998.323 The fundamental labour standards are still significant and can be
categorized as follows: freedom of association and right to collective bargaining; elimination of
all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation.324
What is evident from examining these ILO Conventions, therefore, is that even within the
category of migrant workers, different rights are afforded to different groups leaving out
especially workers in an irregular situation or those who are undocumented. These exceptions
and the way more liberal provisions are reserved for migrant workers in a regular situation and
those not tied to a specific project show how certain freedoms are only afforded to those
workers. Given that states generally have the prerogative to determine status and the absence of
the right to enter, this allows states a considerable influence to determine migrant workers'
movement and substantive capabilities. As Thomas observes, the differentiation that the ILO
makes in both ILO Convention No. 97 and Convention No. 143 show that the ILO has to be both
pragmatic to allow states the ability to determine who can enter their countries while also focus
on equalizing bargaining power across workers.325
Furthermore, the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No
111), which is one of the few Conventions ratified by the UAE, could be argued to protect
supportive capabilities by ensuring the right to non-discrimination in employment and
occupation.326 All provisions of the Convention No. 111 apply to all workers. There are at least
eight other Recommendations327 and Protocols that are also to varying degrees relevant to
323
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migrant workers. In addition, all Conventions and Recommendations, with the exception of those
specifically relating to other categories of workers, cover all workers, including migrant
workers.328 It is important to note that the UAE joined the ILO in 1972 and did not sign the
Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labor Convention 1930 and Protocol of 1995 to the Labour
Inspection Convention. As depicted in Table 2 below, there are 66 Conventions and Protocols
that it has not ratified, and the only Conventions it signed are from 1982 to 2001. Furthermore,
UAE has a poor record of submitting to the ILO supervisory body.329
Table 2: Human Rights Treaties and ILO Conventions the UAE is a state party to Against
Core/Fundamental Treaties
Human Right
Nine core Human
Treaties the UAE Rights Treaties
is a state party
to:

ILO Conventions the
UAE is a state party
to:

The Eight
Fundamental ILO
Conventions:

International
Convention on the
Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
1969
Convention on the
Elimination of All
Forms of
Discrimination
against Women,
1981

Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No.
29)

Freedom of Association
and Protection of the
Right to Organise
Convention, 1948 (No.
87)

Hours of Work
(Industry) Convention,
1919 (No. 1)

Right to Organise and
Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1949 (No.
98

International
Convention on the
Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination
1965
International
Covenant on Civil
and Political
Rights 1966
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Convention
against Torture
and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or
Degrading
Treatment or
Punishment, 1987
Convention on the
Rights of the
Child, 1990

Optional Protocol
to the Convention
on the Rights of
the Child on the
sale of children,
child prostitution
and child
pornography,
2002
Convention on the
Rights of Persons
with Disabilities,
2008

International
Covenant on
Economic, Social
and Cultural
Rights 1966

Equal Remuneration
Convention, 1951 (No.
100)

Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No.
29) (and its 2014
Protocol )

Convention on the
Elimination of All
Forms of
Discrimination
against Women
1979
Convention
against Torture
and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or
Degrading
Treatment or
Punishment 1984

Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105)

Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105)

Discrimination
(Employment and
Occupation)
Convention, 1958 (No.
111)

Minimum Age
Convention, 1973 (No.
138)

Convention on the Minimum Age
Rights of the Child Convention, 1973 (No.
1989
138) Minimum age
specified: 15 years

Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention,
1999 (No. 182)

International
Convention on the
Protection of the
Rights of All
Migrant Workers
and Members of
Their Families
1990
International
Convention for the
Protection of All
Persons from
Enforced
Disappearance
2006
Convention on the
Rights of Persons
with Disabilities
2006

Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention,
1999 (No. 182

Equal Remuneration
Convention, 1951 (N
100)

Labour Inspection
Convention, 1947 (No.
81)

Discrimination
(Employment and
Occupation)
Convention, 1958 (No.
111)

Night Work (Women)
Convention (Revised),
1948 (No. 89)
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However, the International Labour Conference adopted the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998, which emphasized the importance of the
eight core ILO conventions. It observed that even the states that had not ratified these
conventions were required "to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith"330 the principles
concerning the fundamental rights that were in these Conventions.331
Generally, ILO labour standards are grouped into nine different groups, each with
different status: up-to-date, instruments to be revised, instruments with interim status, request for
info, shelved conventions, replaced recommendations, outdated instruments, withdrawn
instruments, abrogated conventions. The monitoring system that controls the application of these
standards is complex, and there is no follow-up procedure in place to ensure recommendations
are implemented. The two main procedures are a regular system of supervision and a special
procedure for examining representations and complaints relating to the ratified Convention. Both
systems are criticized for merely "naming and shaming" and not having binding sanctions. In the
former system, ILO member states self-report on their compliance with conventions where an
independent body of experts submits observations and direct requests. This report is then
published annually.332
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The special system of control has a number of different procedures that allow employers
and workers to make representations against a state concerning its failure to comply with a
convention it is a party to. Even if the member state fails to respond and a special tripartite ad
hoc committee examines the representation, the Committee can only make a report to the
Governing body or refer it to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association. While they have
had to examine over 3000 cases, the recourse to this procedure has been irregular, and many
issues can remain unsettled.333
The most extreme of these measures to secure compliance to an international labour
standard of a member state is provided in the Art 33 of the ILO constitution. If the state fails to
implement the Governing Body's recommendation, then Governing Body may recommend any
action it may deem wise to secure compliance. This has only been used once regarding Myanmar
in 2000, and the examination took more than 40 years; there is no precedent of a case being
referred to the ICJ.334

2.6 ILO's special procedure: ITUC takes on UAE
At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to detail how ILO's procedure for examining
representations and complaints relating to ratified conventions has been applied in the UAE's
context. In 2014, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUCI made a representation
under Article 24 of the Constitution alleging the UAE was in violation of its non-observance of
the Forced Labor Convention 1930 no. 29. As Table 2.1 illustrates, this is one of the few
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fundamental ILO Conventions the UAE ratified in 1982.335 This step was taken after an
investigation by Observer on Abu Dhabi's Tourism Development and Investment Company's
treatment of migrant workers building Abu Dhabi's New York University's campus, Louvre, and
Guggenheim on Saadiyat Island.336 The ITUC claimed that not only does the UAE's legal
framework fail to protect migrant workers from forced labour, but the UAE also fails to
implement existing laws that would protect migrants workers from forced labour. It argued that
forced labour in the UAE results from factors including high recruitment fees, contract
substitution, passport confiscation by employers, the sponsorship system, and ineffective law
enforcement system and access to justice. The ITUC called for the following changes: abolishing
the sponsorship system; measures to ensure that migrant workers have the right to freely
associate in law and practice; measures to adequately enforce the legislation against perpetrators
of forced labour; and "rigorous, transparent and independent monitoring and implementation of
penalties for non-compliance of contractors."337
The UAE responded by pointing to a number of changes they had recently made to
address the factors that the ITUC noted as well as other measures the government has taken such
as signing a number of bilateral Memorandum of Understandings with migrant-sending countries
and a two-year technical assistance agreement with the ILO as well as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue.
With regards to abolishing the sponsorship system, which is often the focus of civil society
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organizations' criticisms, the UAE argued that "while the UAE employer is the "sponsor" of the
foreign national for the purpose of securing entry and lawful residency, this sponsorship does not
define or alter the terms of a relationship between employer and worker as captured in the
employment contract and governed by the Labour Code."338 In other words, the UAE
government claimed that it is the contract that determines the obligations of the worker and
employer. UAE also claimed that it had taken a number of measures to address some of the
concerns, namely, Ministerial Decree No. 1186 of 2010, Ministerial Decree No. 765 of 2015, and
Ministerial Decree No. 766 of 2015. These changes, UAE argued, address the inflexibility in the
system by, for instance, allowing workers to seek and accept new employment contracts after
having worked for their original employer for two years. The government pointed to Ministerial
Decrees in 2015 that stipulate conditions under which "fixed-term contracts of no more than two
years may be terminated" and conditions under which a worker can obtain a new work permit. 339
The Committee responded that while some of these changes were commendable and that
it will "proceed to examine the specific issues raised by the ITUC," more needed to be done,
particularly with regards to recruitment fees, contract substitution, access to justice, passport
confiscation, wage payment, switching employers, domestic workers, labour inspections and
protection of victims.340 The only strongly worded recommendation was with regards to
domestic workers, which the UAE's response failed to consider altogether. The Committee's
response hinged on providing information on a number of issues to ensure effective
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implementation depicts its narrow focus on verification rather than pushing for more substantive
changes. For instance, with respect to ITUC's demand to abolish the sponsorship system, the
Committee asked the UAE government to provide the number of approvals of sponsorship
transfers that had occurred before and after the Ministerial Decrees of 2015. While the case was
closed in March 2016, according to the most recent Observation on submission to competent
authorities adopted in 2019, "The Committee notes that the Government has once again failed to
respond to its previous comments."341 UAE government's lack of response further depicts the
limitation of ILO's complainant procedure's reliance on naming and shaming.

2.7 ILO's Tripartism: Persisting Issues around Representation
As mentioned earlier, ILO's tripartism is considered one of its most unique features and
was part of the proposed structure of the ILO from "day one."342 ILO's tripartism has come under
attack from both within the ILO and outside. Most recently, the sharpest conflict occurred in
2012 when Employers' groups criticized the ILO's Supervisory system, particularly the General
Survey on freedom of association, arguing that ILO's Convention No 87 on Freedom of
Association implicitly protects the right to strike.343 ILO's experience with tripartism, therefore,
has not been one without obstacles. While there have been moments of harmonious cooperation
and its advocates, applaud tripartism's role in facilitating social dialogue and garnering
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legitimacy for the ILO, persistent critiques around the representativeness of the structure are
significant and undermine its ability to promote supportive and movement capabilities.344 Not
only does tripartism excludes informal work, but even within the formal sector, declining
members on both labour's and employers' undermines representativeness.345 In addition, as Guy
Mundlak points, "race, gender, and other cleavages" as well as class ought to be considered to
make social dialogue whether or not done through tripartism.346 Some trade unions have also had
uneasy relationships with migrant workers. For instance, in West Germany and the Netherlands,
unions tried to ensure the employment of migrant workers was temporary, and in Austria, unions
explicitly aimed to "protect native workers."347 It is also important to consider the limitations of
tripartism in the absence of formal labour rights, such as the right to strike and form unions, as is
the case in the UAE.348

2.8 Bilateral Agreements: An Emptier Promise
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In addition to the aforementioned multilateral norms, standards, and mechanisms, the
ILO also considers bilateral agreements such as the memorandum of understandings as good
practice. A number of memorandum of understandings (MoU) have been signed between UAE
and migrant-sending countries. UAE, in fact, is one of the most active users of bilateral
agreements.349 These MoU's also reflect the stronghold of sovereignty and strengthen the control
orientation of domestic immigration policies.350 They are considered good practice and explicitly
mentioned in ILO Convention No. 97 and contained as a model in the non-binding ILO
Recommendation No. 86. Pakistan signed an MoU in June 2019 with the UAE government and
has signed 11 other MoU's with other receiving countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan,
Qatar, and China.351 These bilateral agreements often represent states' willingness to assert their
right to expel and admit non-nationals.352 In 2018, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United Arab
Emirates announced that a monthly 'minimum wage' of 800 DH (around 200 CAD) was set for
Pakistani employees.353 However, no legislation secures any minimum wage in the UAE.
According to a Gulf Today article, the MoU between Pakistan and the UAE stipulates that an
"employment job offer" will be signed by the employer and employee that will stipulate their
rights and obligations and provide a basis for the contract.354 Zulfikar Bukhari, Special Assistant
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to the Prime Minister on Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development, posted on his
Twitter account that the MoU will "ease [the] remittances process…[and]…evolve a mechanism
for early resolution of disputes with employers/providing legal assistance."
The general consensus amongst advocates is that these MoUs have little to no impact on
the protection of workers' rights and migration flows. They rarely refer to the Migrant Workers
Convention of the ILO Conventions No. 97 and No. 143, international labour standards, or
human rights in general. The power imbalance between receiving and sending countries relegate
them to mere expressions of goodwill; this is especially the case for MoUs signed between South
Asian countries and GCC countries. Bilateral agreements generally contain only general
provisions, and there is little to no publicity or transparency on the MoU's signed. There are no
concrete follow-up, enforcement, and monitoring provisions, nor is there a mechanism of dispute
settlement or access to justice. MoU's signed by Pakistan, in particular, are not publicly available
or made available upon request.355 Much like the Pakistani Ambassador's comments, the MoU's
become a political or diplomatic gesture with no serious enforcement.356
While some non-governmental organizations and sending countries' governments focus
some of their efforts on establishing MoU’s the results have not been promising. MoUs' political
value and potential to provide the basis for cooperation between countries cannot be overlooked;
scholars and civil society members advocating for MoU's argue they are better than no
agreement at all.357 However, MoU's have not been able to fulfill their promises. Even the
355
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Philippines that has a more comprehensive migration policy than Pakistan, has been unsuccessful
in negotiating more robust protection of its emigrants through its MoU with the UAE. A recent
paper by migration scholars Rachel Silvey and Rhacel Parrenas note that MoU signed between
the Philippines and the UAE features only "minimal standards of employment ….(e.g., eight
hours of work per day, one rest day per week)." And even these standards have "not been
consistently recognized by employers in the UAE.." In other words, it does not ensure the full
range of supportive capabilities. The MoU signed between the Philippines, and the UAE has
been criticized for only reiterating basic rights of migrant workers, such as information on pay
and working conditions. It also gives preeminent status to Arabic in dispute resolution, which is
overseen by the UAE Ministry of Labour.358 In other words, the MoU does not only reiterate
basic rights, but it can further reinforce inadequate access to justice. Furthermore, a report
prepared for the ILO's Labour Migration Branch by Piyasiri Wickramasekara reviewed 144
bilateral agreements and noted that agreements on South-South migration are weaker than SouthNorth migration. Gulf Cooperation Council countries' bilateral agreements, in particular, are seen
as mere diplomatic tools and less guided by international instruments' provisions.
Wickramasekara argues that "these agreements have been superimposed on long-standing
migration flows, with seemingly minimum changes to existing practices."359 Another study of
MoU's signed by India concluded that "the MoUs have not been successful in addressing the
protection and exploitation of low skilled workers from India in the countries concerned." With
little reference to international labour and human rights standards and limited implementation
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and without addressing the power imbalance between receiving and sending countries, bilateral
agreements provide limited protection, if any, to movement or supportive capabilities.

2.9 Switching to Softer Normative Mechanisms
The lack of political will to afford rights to migrant workers has led the ILO to change its
approach towards a greater reliance on 'soft law' measures. This includes ILO Multilateral
Framework on Labour Migration 2006, which stipulates non-binding principles for a rightsbased approach, including labour standards and other guidance.360 For the past 20 years, the ILO
has also been implementing its "Decent Work" Agenda. Literature and policies on labour
migration are replete with accounts on decent work, which was welcomed by Sen.361 Sen, who
worked with the ILO in the 1970s, applauded the initiative towards decent work for its
comprehensive coverage (inclusion of all workers) and goals.362
The concept of decent work was launched in 1999, when the Director-General of the
International Labor Conference articulated it as a new platform for the ILO.363 Its four pillars
were first articulated as fundamental principles and rights at work and international labour
standards; employment and income opportunities; social protection and social security; and
social dialogue and tripartism.364 Vosko calls it "an effort at mediating tensions inside the ILO
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between global capital, member states, trade unions and NGOs"365 During its major organization
review, ILO decided to broaden its constituency to include people who were often excluded
traditionally for being in the periphery or outside formal systems of labour and social
protections. Decent Work's goal is to promote decent and productive work in conditions of
freedom, equity, security, and human dignity. These objectives are meant for all workers
regardless of whether they are in formal and informal economies.366 The breadth of the decent
work agenda, its focus on employment and income opportunities as well social protection and
centring of human dignity, therefore, is complimentary to a capabilities-based perspective.
Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers in 1997. Not only
is this agreement non-binding, but a Committee was set to oversee the implementation of the
Declaration only ten years later. The ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour, a tripartite platform
where governments, workers, employers, and civil society organizations participate in discussing
and building consensus on the protection of migrant workers' issues, was established in 2008. In
addition, given the importance of the migration corridor between Asia, the Colombo Process
(Regional Consultative Process on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries
of Origin in Asia) and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue were set as two intergovernmental consultative
processes to address the labour migration between Asia and the GCC in 2003 and 2008.367 The
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ILO has also established a tripartite process which started with a tripartite interregional experts'
meeting in Nepal in 2014.368 In December 2016, the Bali Declaration was also adopted by ILO
member States from Asia and the Middle East, which emphasizes the need to "[redress]
employer-worker relationships that impede workers' freedom of movement, their right to
terminate employment or change employers, taking into account any contractual obligations that
may apply, and their right to return freely to their countries of origin."369
Another non-binding, state-led process that is relevant is the Global Forum on Migration
and Development (GFMD), which was established in 2007. It is an informal, non-binding,
voluntary, government-led process that was proposed during the first High-Level Dialogue on
International Migration and Development (HLD) held on 14-15 September 2006. It includes
stakeholders such as civil society organizations, trade unions, the private sector, migrants and
diaspora representatives, and local government authorities. Its objectives are to informally
discuss the migration-development nexus, share good practices, identity information, policy and
institution gaps, establish partnerships and cooperation, and structure the international priorities
and agenda.

February 2015), online: International Organization for Migration <https://www.iom.int/regionalconsultative-process-overseas-employement-and-contractual-labour-countries-origin-asia>. The Abu
Dhabi Dialogue has the 12 member states of the Colombo Process; and six countries of destination:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Malaysia. Like
Colombo Process it serves as a platform for state-led non-binding voluntary regional consultative process.
Both are known as “inter-State Consultation Mechanisms” that are “state-led, restricted, ongoing
information-sharing and policy dialogue forums” For more see Abu Dhabi Dialogue, “About Abu Dhabi
Dialogue”, online: Abu Dhabi Dialogue <http://abudhabidialogue.org.ae/about-abu-dhabi-dialogue>.
368
International labour conference 2016 general survey concerning migrant workers at page 25 ILO:
Realizing a fair migration agenda: Labour flows between Asia and the Arab States, op. cit., 2014.
369
The Bali Declaration Adopted at the 16th Asia and the Pacific Regional Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, on
9 December 2016 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION16th Asia and the Pacific Regional
MeetingBali, Indonesia, 6–9 December 2016APRM.16/D.6 Available online at:
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_537445.pdf

107

The current Office-in-Chair of the GDMD is the UAE which hosted the global summit in
January 2021 under the theme, "The Future of Human Mobility: Innovative Partnerships for
Sustainable Development."370 Nasser Bin Thani Al Hamli, Minister of Human Resources and
Emiratization, stated that "We are a tolerant, open nation, and we are proud of our role providing
opportunities to millions of people from around the world. Human mobility is deeply entwined
with our success as a nation, with foreign-born residents contributing to our development in
every area, from infrastructure to business, and from sports to art and culture." Both media
coverage from the UAE and The Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization framed the
hosting as an opportunity to "[cement] the UAE's reputation as a global leader in promoting
sound migration governance."371 "Our agenda as Chair" Nasser Bin Thani Al Hamli informs
"will feature topics that are new to the GFMD, including the impact of the future of work on
migration, and the programme will include six regional events over the course of this year."372
While there was expected to be significant cross-over between this and the Expo 2020. Due to
Covid-19, the GFMD was held online and the EXPO2020 was delayed to October 2021-March
2022.373

2.10 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
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This switch to a more soft law approach has been instrumental in building confidence
among states and creating a routine of intergovernmental dialogue within the UN. This
culminated with the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants48 in 2016,
which highlighted the need for a comprehensive approach to migration. Not only did the IOM
become a specialized UN agency in 2016 as "the global lead agency on migration,"374 but the
2016 NY Declaration also laid the foundation for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018.375
As Compacts – a new form of UN agreement that is non-binding – these agreements are
in the domain of soft law. They lay out goals and policy recommendations to promote more
effective cooperation on migrations and the protection of refugees, aiming to promote
governments to create more pathways towards legal labour migration and provide refugees
"complimentary pathways" to protection through labour mobility.376
Rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action
Agenda, the GCM was considered a landmark document by its proponents for trying to fill a gap
by putting forward international institutional norms that would deal with migration holistically
and comprehensively. While the GCM does not formally add any new obligations and reiterates
pre-existing international human rights obligations, it can be seen as an instrument that seeks to
consolidate and clarify these obligations. 377 The GCM is considered significant for being the
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first internationally negotiated agreement to cover such a wide range of migration issues,
offering what it calls a "360-degree vision of international migration".378 GCM lays out 23
objectives and a list of best practices that states can draw from.
Proponents argue that the GCM's text shows broad agreement on the need to respect the
human rights of all migrants regardless of their status. Debates on regular and irregular status
distinctions were heated in the negotiations; the resulting document affirms the importance of
fulfilling the human rights of all migrants regardless of their migration status and "across all
stages of the migration cycle."379 It includes migrants regardless of their status explicitly in a
number of actions: providing newly arrived migrants with information and legal guidance (19.d)
and establishing policies to provide migrants in a situation of vulnerability with necessary
support (23.b). Arguably most explicitly, migrants, regardless of their status, are included in the
objective regarding access to basic services. Here the best practice to promote education to
migrant children and youth and facilitate lifelong learning opportunities is significant with
regards to supportive capabilities (31.f). The GCM includes other best practices that would
prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status(23.h) and facilitate access to individual
assessments that would lead to a regular status (23.i). Such a preventative approach is significant
to ensuring migrant workers' movement capabilities. More recently, Kapiskewski points that
GCM's Objective 6, which promotes developing recruitment processes that "allow migrants to
change employers and modify the conditions or length of their stay with minimal administrative
burden," could help loosen the employee-kafeel relationship (which is further detailed in chapter
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3). Furthermore, its provisions on basic services such as healthcare and education, regardless of
status, are particularly relevant in the covid-19 pandemic context.380
Therefore, for many proponents, GCM's objectives and best practices may suggest that
there is a broader coverage of a range of movement and supportive capabilities through more
demanding objectives to include, for instance, "full inclusion and social cohesion"381 and
"dignified return and readmission."382 However, the level of detail that is used to describe
objective 20 on promoting the transfer of remittances is contrasted by objectives that are vaguely
worded, such as objective six on facilitating fair and ethical recruitment and decent work.383
Unsurprisingly, rather than favouring worse off agents, the GCM's considerations on facilitating
labour mobility are couched within "national priorities, local market needs, and skills supply."
Furthermore, the GCM has been criticized on other fronts. Firstly, although most MENA
countries, including UAE, signed the GCM, critics argue that since it exists in the domain of soft
law, its potential to address the challenges it seeks to do is curtailed by the existing legal
framework. It does not formally add to existing human rights obligations and mostly appeals to
the goodwill of states.384 While it has the potential to lead to norm development, its role is
limited to providing context for interpreting other legally binding instruments. Secondly, GCM's
recommendations ignore the fact that most government regimes require employers to try
recruiting local workers before being able to hire migrant workers.385 Further, while it has
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provisions on social-security rights, these are less relevant in UAE and GCC's context where
social-security administrations covering both nationals and migrants are insufficient.386
Thirdly, GCM's implementation is dependent on partnerships with non-state actors and
monitoring against human rights standards. Lastly, although 194 states voted in favour of the
GCM, it has had to submit to political will and tolerate some conditions of vulnerability like the
previously mentioned binding instruments. For instance, it does not recommend ending the
practice of tying workers to one employer, nor does it rule out using migration detention centers.
These have significant implications on migrants workers' opportunities to switch employers and
move freely. It can be argued, therefore, that even when softer mechanisms are opted, receiving
states lack the political will to go beyond pre-existing obligations, which insufficiently protect
movement and supportive capabilities.387

2.10 Conventions on Trafficked and Smuggled Migrants: Increased Criminalization and
Securitization of Migration
Compared to international agreements and norms on migrant workers, Conventions
regarding human smuggling and human trafficking are neither soft nor were they difficult to
ratify. They reflect a trend towards increased criminalization and securitization of migration and
states' reluctance to protect smuggled and trafficked migrants' movement and supportive
capabilities. The Palermo Protocols388 came into force, as Dauvergne remarks, "at lightning
386
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speed" between 2003-2005. These instruments of criminal law supplement the Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and are widely ratified by states, including the United
Arab Emirates.389
The Palermo Protocols have a control-oriented approach that assumes the smuggling and
trafficking of migrants can be prevented by tighter border controls. Critics such as Anne
Gallagher observe that restrictive immigration laws are, in fact, "more likely to fuel organized,
irregular migration," which can include smuggling and trafficking.390 Instead of including
provisions that would promote safe, legal pathways to migrate, the Palermo Protocols require
States Parties to criminalize trafficking and smuggling of migrants according to the Protocols'
definitions. These definitions are criticized for being too vague, making it difficult to discern the
Protocols' scope and distinguish between smuggling and trafficking. This vagueness affords
states considerable discretion in determining how to apply these rules in their domestic
contexts.391
For instance, while the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol), provides a definition of
"trafficking in persons," none of the key terms are defined. The fact that the Trafficking
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Protocol's definition refers to some forms of exploitation "at a minimum" allows states to add
other forms of exploitation in their domestic laws. Similarly, the UN Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children defines "smuggling of migrants"
vaguely, leaving the notion of "procurement" undefined.392 While smuggling and trafficking are
separate legal offences, the Palermo Protocols' vagueness around the distinction while
simultaneously asserting differentiation between smuggled and trafficked migrants has
significant implications. Not only does the distinction require an inquiry of the perpetrators'
intentions, but this blurring has been criticized for being unhelpful and even dangerous. Given
trafficked persons are conceived as victims while smuggled migrants are seen as complicit, the
latter is considered less deserving of protection. Pardis Mahdavi and Christine Sargent further
note how both international and domestic rhetoric around human trafficking focuses on sex
trafficking in "specifically gendered, raced, and classed ways," often rarely viewing men as
vulnerable to trafficking.393
In addition, while the Palermo Protocols provisions on criminalizing trafficking and
smuggling are strong, its framework of protection of smuggled and trafficked migrants is weak.
Article 16 that pertains to these protection uses vague and permissive language, which does not
go beyond the protection that already exists in human rights law. It does not, in other words,
stipulate specific provisions that could protect smuggled and trafficked migrants' supportive
capabilities.
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Moreover, while trafficked persons are non-criminalized, the Protocols refrain from
explicitly referring to immigration-related offences. This further elucidates how the
criminalization of smuggling and trafficking and the tightening of immigration controls are seen
as complimentary. This strengthens states' prerogative to determine who can enter their
territories and limiting migrants' movement capabilities.394
2.11 What can this Fragmentation, Differentiation, and Softness mean?
"So everything depends on what category you entered through. So, for instance (points to other
returning migrant worker interviewee) the category that he was in, he couldn't apply to another
job."
"Another job? I couldn't even apply for a driving license."
Pakistani Returning Migrant Workers, Karachi
As shown above, the international legal regime that regulates migrant workers has three
significant features: 1) a plurality of sources, with a resulting fragmentation, 2) an across-theboard differentiation between workers according to their citizenship status, and 3) a trend
towards softer normative mechanisms.
International human rights law deals mostly with movement capabilities where the right
to enter, the corollary to the right to leave, is not protected. The ILO has a complex web of
machinery that deals most significantly with protecting migrant workers' supportive capabilities
through labour standards, the Decent Work Agenda, as well as other soft law instruments. ILO's
limiting of certain rights to workers in a regular situation395 shows that it is willing to allow
states to determine the right to enter. In other words, it does not fully endorse movement
capabilities. In contrast to conventions on human smuggling and human trafficking, the trend has
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been to adopt softer mechanisms such as the ICRMW. Although these have potential, they still
reflect receiving states lack the political will to meaningfully go beyond pre-existing obligations,
which insufficiently protect movement and supportive capabilities.396
The plurality in sources of norms results in some overlapping; for instance, the ICRMW
reiterates a number of provisions in international human rights instruments which are also
reflected in a number of ILO Conventions. This overlapping may serve as further reinforcement
and may help solidify some migrant workers' justice claims. However, the reservation of almost
all specialized regimes' most liberal provisions to migrant workers in regularized situations
creates a hierarchy of statuses. This has a significant impact on migrant workers' movement and
supportive capabilities. The overlapping also reinforces the differentiation that multiple regimes
create, reinforcing the exclusion of migrants in an irregular situation or who are not authorized.
The multiple sources of law (be it the different regimes within international law or transnational,
regional, bilateral, soft, and hard law mechanisms) assist states in furthering their prerogative to
determine rules on labour migration, even in an allegedly post-Westphalian community.397
Echoing Freedland and Costello, the discussion above shows how this reinforced
differentiation and fragmentation creates multiple statuses. A precarious, 'ultra-flexible'
workforce is created, which fractures the application of domestic labour law. Freedland and
Costello further note that this fragmentation confines migrants' choices in a way that leads to
clustering in certain jobs and statuses such as self-employment and temporary employment. This
increases the employers' control of labour supply and offloads the responsibility of monitoring
migrant workers' status from states to the employer. This kind of "sectoral divisions and
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segmentation" restricts migrant workers' supportive and movement capabilities by limiting them
to their sector and lower-status segments. The literature has traditionally called this unfree
labour398 and pointed out that these state-driven activities "aim to sustain the alienage of
migrants, supervise their stay, and fulfil market demands."399
For Marxists, unfree labour is a useful analytic tool that refers to relations of production
where direct or legal compulsions are used to exploit labour power, while feminist political
economists prefer a continuum of unfreedom with differing degrees and modalities.400 The
concept originates from Marx's idea that the working class was a result of peasants being
dispossessed from the land. Free of the land and free of the demands by their superiors, they
could sell their labour power to different employers. However, as Marx emphasized, the tension
in capitalist social relations is that these workers are only free to the extent they can sell their
labour as a commodity and unfree to the extent that they are forced to do so to sustain
themselves.401 The international legal regime is one such modality that differentiates freedom
afforded to workers and widens the continuum. International migration law's creation of multiple
statuses is further solidified in domestic contexts contributing to this continuum. States, in fact,
play a significant role in producing unfreedom.402 The multiples statuses, more importantly,
undermine solidarity and institutions like trade unions. Borrowing from Razia Sharif's work on
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what she calls "collective agency capability,"403 this segmentation breaks the links that could
condense and undermines resistance from crystallizing around a shared identity. This is
exemplified by the uneasy relationship trade unions have had historically with migrant workers.
The fact that some of these protections often hinge on lawful residence within the
territories also highlights the deportability of migrant workers. The growing literature on
deportability shows that this deportation is, as Nathalie Peutz and Nicholas De Genova write,
"the expression of a complex sociopolitical regime that manifests and engenders dominant
notions of sovereignty, citizenship, public health, national identity, cultural homogeneity, racial
purity, and class privilege."404 This practice, they add, must be seen as a unified global response
to a mobile world where states compete with this perceived freedom of movement by reasserting
"spectral sovereignty vis-a-vis a volatile world of restless bodies whose human impulses, needs,
desires, and capabilities seem to ever-increasingly surpass and defy the capacities of the nationstate to define their subjectivities, command their loyalties, and contain their energies."405
Therefore, painting human mobility as illegal is one way that states can regulate both movement
and supportive capabilities.406 The trend towards fusing criminal law with immigration law in
domestic contexts is a case in point as reflected in states' readiness to ratify Conventions on
smuggling and trafficking.
The fact that both the human rights and labour law regimes reserve the more liberal
provisions, particularly those related to social protection (and that would impact supportive
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capabilities) to only migrant workers in a "regular situation" is significant in the context of the
GCC where employers tend to accept more workers without securing jobs. The protection of
movement capabilities is limited by differentiation according to status and without the right to
enter. The fact that the more liberal provisions that would enhance supportive capabilities are
consistently reserved only to authorized workers limits the overall protection of supportive
capabilities.
Indeed, as Dauvregne forcefully argues, migration law has transformed into the "last
bastion of sovereignty." This means that in many ways, there is considerable deference given to
states and how they share responsibilities with employers on regulating migrant workers. The
following chapter will, therefore, outline how UAE's kafala system further restricts migrant
workers' movement and supportive capabilities.
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CHAPTER 3
Beyond Kafala and towards capabilities?:
Labor Migration Regime in the UAE
“They fight death and all its elements
While smiling
O how I suffer from the long nights
Witnessing those motherless divers
Every time a month passes by, another follows
Until the eyes grow old.”407
-

Murshild bin Sa’d al-Bitali

“‘...these divers number some thousands of ruffians and semi-savages from a dozen different
countries without any-families present to restrain them; the danger of leniency is at once
apparent...”
- Political Agent Bahrain to Political Resident Bushire408
The pearling and slaving industries in what is today the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
were connected; the strenuous nature of pearl-diving created a demand for slaves.409 Pearldiving, as Ong writes, “was one of the most harrowing occupations ever practiced. The men
dived without protection and with the most primitive gear.” While she cautions against drawing
an exact comparison between the pearling industry’s use of indentured labour and the
contemporary kafala system, she notes the similarities. Both systems tie worker to the employer
through what, in theory, is a mutual understanding: the employer is to appropriate the
employee’s labour in exchange for providing for their needs.
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The pearling industry peaked between the 1870s and 1920s, reconstructed by the British
colonials who relied on Banyan merchants, set the price of the pearls and sold them within the
Indian Ocean’s commercial system.410 In the late 1920s, however, pearling began to decline due
to various factors, including a competing industry in Japan and overfishing of pearl banks.
Tensions were particularly high when a riot in May 1932 killed two divers and wounded five
divers in Manama, Bahrain.411 One thousand five hundred divers attacked a local police station
in response, demanding to free the pearl divers who led the strike. However, before the “danger
of leniency”412 could become a greater threat, a decline in the price of pearls due to the Great
Depression led to the industry’s eventual demise. The introductory quotes reflect the hardships
faced by the pearl-divers in contrast to how the British perceived them – the persistent anxieties
of the ruling elite over labour and natural resources. This chapter takes a closer look at similar
features that have shaped the UAE’s labour migration regime today. It aims to answer how and
for whom UAE’s labour migration regime enhances or inhibits movement and supportive
capabilities?
The previous Chapter argued that the international legal regime regulating migrant
workers is characterized by plurality, an across-the-board differentiation413 based on citizenship
status and a shift to softer norms that particularly constrain migrants in an irregular situation.
Given that states try to hold on to their prerogative to determine status and the absence of the
right to enter in international law, states have significant discretion to determine migrant
workers’ movement and substantive capabilities. This chapter seeks to discern how the UAE
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uses this prerogative to govern labour migration and distributes movement and supportive
capabilities to migrant workers.
The discussion begins with a summary of the historical context that the kafala system is
situated in, highlighting the role of the British influence on how certain migrant groups were
excluded while others were preferred primarily influenced by changing notions of threats to
national security. Against this backdrop, the Chapter will analyze the labour migration regime
that regulates migrant workers: the kafala or sponsorship system, complemented by stringent
citizenship rules, Emiratization and informal hierarchies. These formal and informal rules give
significant discretion to the kafeel and other non-state actors, significantly inhibiting migrant
workers’ movement and supportive capabilities, particularly “low-skilled” South Asian migrant
workers in the construction sector. This analysis will be followed by a discussion of how recent
reforms have been unable to address this dynamic. The latter part of the Chapter will analyze the
ways migrant workers have been able to circumvent the kafala system. However, here, too,
access to movement and supportive capabilities is variegated among migrant communities where
more formal legal routes are reserved for a narrow group of migrant workers while the majority
are left to consider routes that put them at risk of irregularity. It is argued, therefore, that the
kafala system has a propensity to create irregularity and precarity.
3.1 Preliminary Notes: variegated ways that movement and supportive capabilities are protected
or undermined
The literature on migrant workers in the Gulf has grown in the last 15-20 years across
disciplines ranging from Anthropology, Middle East Studies, International Studies, Urban
Studies, Sociology, Public Policy, Political Science, Economics and Architecture. Research in
the 1990s focused on urban development, ethnic diversity, globalization, identity and belonging,
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citizenship and the impact of migration in the Gulf (often in terms of remittances).414 More
recent research has featured more in-depth historical and ethnographic work that challenges the
exceptionalism of its predecessor. Following Neha Vora, Natalie Koch and Noora Lori, this
discussion seeks to tackle this exceptionalism and challenges binaries such as citizen/non-citizen,
inclusive/exclusive and democratic/autocratic.415 Vora and Koch also observe that the kafala has
become “black boxed” in a way that reinforces Gulf exceptionalism.416 This fixation on the
kafala system reifies the citizen/non-citizen binary in a way “presumes exclusion and
economically-motivated migration as the centre of non-citizen lives in the Gulf, fixing in place a
prototypical Gulf migrant (the South Asian construction worker) and his always-already
condition of exploitation.”417 In other words, it limits scholars from critically examining the
varied ways the kafala system is practiced and shapes migrant workers’ lived experiences. It
presumes exclusion which comes to define migrants and furthers Gulf exceptionalism in a way
that does not allow scholars to ask critical questions.418
By focusing on both how the migration governance in the UAE excludes certain migrant
workers and includes others, we are able to see the variegated ways that movement and
supportive capabilities are protected or undermined. Accordingly, the following discussion will
analyze the components of the kafala system and other norms that regulate migrant workers in
the UAE. Rather than treating regimes as either inclusive or exclusive, following Lori, this
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discussion will consider regimes as existing on an inclusive/exclusive spectrum whereby policies
can change over time for different groups according to shifting political prerogatives, views of
national security and which groups are more likely to contribute to the country’s economy.419
As migration scholars have highlighted, contemporary migration has historical
antecedents.420 Mainstream accounts depict UAE’s story as a “rag to riches” tale with three main
characters: Arab “tribes,” the British colonists, and the discovery of oil. These accounts tend to
link all migration and the accompanying demographic changes to the oil boom in the 1970s.421
However, recent scholarship tells a more complex story of migration that dispels the myth that an
ethnically homogenous, primordial Arab community existed before the British defeated the tribal
chiefs (shayukh) in the early nineteenth century and the discovery of oil.422 Some historical
background will help contextualize the current labour migration regime in the UAE by showing
how South Asian migration to the UAE predates the discovery of oil and the British influence on
rules governing migrants.

3.2 Geographical and Historical background: the role of British Presence, pluralism, migration
trends and oil companies
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The UAE is a constitutional federation located in the Southeast of the Arabian Peninsula,
bordering Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Formed in 1971, it consists of seven Emirates: Abu
Dhabi (the capital), Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Um Al Quwain and Ras Al Khaimah
(which joined a year later).423 Until the eighteenth century, Oman extended from Qatar to the
Indian Ocean, including what is today the UAE. Given its location and coasts, it was seen as a
way to secure sea routes and aid trade between Europe and Asia; in the early sixteenth century,
Portuguese colonists secured access through military forts, torn down by the British the
seventeenth century. The British, especially after the East India Company in 1600, dominated the
region despite attempts by two major tribal coalitions: the Qawasim and the Bani Yas
federation.424 The British succeeded in crushing their rebellion and forced the shayukh to adopt
the General Treaty of Peace in 1821. A series of other treaties culminated in a truce in 1853,
giving the name the Trucial States. Until their withdrawal in 1971, the British controlled the
UAE’s foreign relations and granted the shayukh autonomy regarding their populations.425
The British presence in the region significantly determined the way migrants or
“foreigners” were differentiated from their counterparts. The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890
provided the basis for the British to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in lower Asia minor in
territories that were in treaty relations with the British. This included the Trucial States, which
were considered British Protectorates. The Act restricted local courts' jurisdiction to native
inhabitants, while foreigners involved in disputes would be tried in special British independent
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tribunals.426 By creating this separation and drawing boundaries of who would be considered a
foreigner, the Act is often considered one of the first instances where an explicit distinction
between a citizen and a migrant was made.427
The Trucial States Order in Council of 1946 (The Order) further formalized division of
authority between the British and the tribal shayukh. The Order permitted the shayukh to allow
foreigners and grant oil concessions only with British approval and consent. The British, in other
words, had control over who could enter or invest in the Trucial States. The Order divided
jurisdiction based on political categories and codified British jurisdiction over all “foreigners”
who were defined as “any person, or corporation, who is not a British or Trucial States subject.”
Individuals could claim to belong within British or local rulers’ jurisdictions strategically.428
Those claiming to fall within British jurisdiction could refuse to appear or accept local rulers’
courts' judgments. While British subjects could choose to appear in local rulers’ courts on civil
matters, they were prohibited from doing so on criminal matters. However, while technically all
foreigners fell within the British jurisdiction, little could be done if the rulers of the Trucial states
authorized entries and employment through letters of invitation that the immigration officials
could not refuse. The legislation applied in British courts was mostly based on Indian codes
without much modification. However, as Al-Muhairi observes, there were only a few cases tried
by British jurisdiction despite this. Regardless, this legal pluralism or “the coexistence of

426

P A Howell, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1833-1876: Its Origins, Structure and
Development (Cambridge University Press, 2009). At p 78.
427
Noora Anwar Lori, Unsettling State: Non-citizens, State Power and Citizenship in the United Arab
Emirates Johns Hopkins University, 2013) [unpublished].
428
Butti Sultan Butti Ali Al-Muhairi, “The Development of the Uae Legal System and Unification With
the Judicial System*” (1996) 11:2 Arab Law Quarterly 116–160.

126

different legal forms”429 contributed to the differential treatment between migrant communities
and the indigenous population.
Not only were there British and local rulers’ courts, but the latter at the end of the
nineteenth century were also marked by legal pluralism. Before 1960, the Emirati legal system
relied on tribal customary law combined with Sharia. Due to the inflow of migrant workers in the
territories, each local ruler established their Shari’a courts to settle disputes. While the
jurisdiction was based on Shari’a, these courts varied because the judges (who were appointed by
rulers) applied procedural rules as they deemed fit. The courts would focus on penal, family,
financial and property-related matters. Both Sunni Islamic jurisprudence fiqh and Shia
jurisprudence were relied on. More importantly, if the parties to the dispute found the decision to
not have met their interests, the ruler could refer the case to another Shari’a court in another
Emirate. The second judgment would be referred back to the Emirate ruler, but if the parties also
rejected this second judgment, the disputes could be referred to other jurisdictions such as Egypt,
Mecca, or Qatar.430
Apart from contributing to the pluralism that already featured in UAE’s early legal
system, British influence in the UAE also shaped South Asian migration trends in the region. As
aforementioned, while early scholarship on the Gulf links migration to the oil boom in the 1970s,
recent historians and anthropologists trace networks between the Gulf, South Asia and East
Africa that predate the discovery of oil.431 As a pearling hub and transshipment point, the UAE
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attracted migrants from these regions, making the UAE ethnically heterogeneous for centuries.432
Describing the different “conglomerations of colour, race, language and religion,” George
Curzon remarked, “surely a more curious study in polyglot or polychrome could not well be
conceived.”433 In the pre-oil period, most South Asians were merchants from Sindh, Kutch,
Gujarat that are between present-day Pakistan and India.434 This group included the Banyan
traders from South Asia mentioned in the introduction. These merchants, including those from
Sindh who migrated to India after the partition in 1947435, established a strong economic position
through trading and served as bankers and advisors to indigenous families. Britain’s relations in
the region were related to British India, which led to an administrative colonial population
including South Asian accountants. An entrepreneurial class of South Asians later joined these
clerks. Pakistanis were amongst the largest minorities that were present before the postindependence migration boom in 1971, including Persians, East Africans and Indians and the
Baloch.436
The British also shaped the differential treatment of migrants through the way oil
companies managed their employees and the use of contractual “nationality clauses.”437 During
the development of the oil industry, the way oil companies managed their employees through the
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“containerization of labour” influenced the differential treatment of migrants. Since the discovery
of oil in the 1950s and during the post-World War II era, the UAE was transformed from a small
underdeveloped economy based on pearling to the center of an emerging oil-based economy. This
phase coincided with the growth of anti-colonial leftist struggles in the Middle East and, hence,
was also marked by labour strikes and protests against British and American oil companies such
as British Petroleum and Standard Oil.438 As Adam Hanieh argues, many of the structures of
“exclusion” that determine the state’s relationship with migrant workers today originate from the
way these oil companies managed their employees – an important feature of which has been the
“containerization of labour”439 where migrant workers were placed in “labour camps” often far
from local residential communities to ensure the two groups remained separate.440 In addition, both
British and American oil companies linked wages to national origin. Robert Vitalis calls this the
“racial wage,” which was first established in the early 20th century in the oil industry and had, since
then, spread to other industries across the region.441
Furthermore, the British government used contractual nationality clauses to shape
migration patterns in a way that would minimize threats to security and their stronghold in the
region. First established in 1937, nationality clauses required oil companies to prefer British and
natives first, then British subjects (including South Asians). Meanwhile, “other Arabs” were seen

438

Ibid.
Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi & Adam Hanieh, Transit States: Labour, Migration and
Citizenship in the Gulf (Pluto Press, 2015).
440
Adam Hanieh, “States of Exclusion: Migrant Work in the Gulf Arab States” in Aziz Choudry and
Mondli Hlatshwayo, eds. Just work?:Migrant workers struggles today A A Choudry, Just work?: migrant
workers’ struggles today, Mondli Hlatshwayo, ed., Wildcat: workers’ movements and global capitalism
(London : Pluto Press, 2016). 43.
441
Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford University Press,
2007). s
439

129

as threats at various points, particularly as the Arab nationalist movements began to grow.442 The
British referred to Arabs from outside the Gulf as “undesirables,” particularly Palestinians and
Yemenis who were seen as culturally similar to the local Arabs and more likely to organize
strikes and mobilize against the ruling elite.443 The first labour strike in the UAE in May 1963
highlights the tension between Arab and South Asian workers instigated by the “racial wage”
and British suspicion towards Arab migrants. Workers in the oil fields of Abu Dhabi demanded
higher wages and equal wages for equal work; they protested that Indians and Northern Arabs
were paid higher wages and that Emirati men were not allowed to do certain jobs. The British
linked these strikes to a larger threat by connecting them to Arab nationalist movements.444
While initially, Arab workers such as Yemenis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Jordanians, Palestinians
and Syrians were welcomed due to their linguistic, cultural and religious similarities, the ruling
forces in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) started seeing this and their participation in
various leftist organizations as a threat to security.445
The most recent wave of migration is linked to the development of the oil industry, which
expanded in the 1970s and continues today. By the mid-1980s, a massive flow of South Asian
labour began to fill labour gaps, especially in infrastructural development. South Asian workers
were preferred because they were relatively inexpensive, educated and many of them spoke
English and often unaccompanied by families; they were regarded as manageable, docile and
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pliable or willing to be exploited.446 Given language barriers, unlike their Arab counterparts,
South Asian workers were less likely to be a political threat and “could be segregated from the
local population and “rotated” every few years.”447 During the first Gulf War in the 1990s,
therefore, around two million Arab workers were deported from the region and replaced by
South and East Asians. During this time, the UAE population doubled between 1986 and 2005
due to the flux of migrant workers. These workers played a vital role in the region’s urban
development boom in the 2000s, which has continued to be the international community’s
focus.448 Unlike the previous phases, while some of the contemporary migrant workers from
South Asia and Southeast Asia have been hired in middle-level management positions in
financial and tourism industries,449 most contemporary South Asian migrants are “unskilled”
workers.450
In summary, the historical context clarifies that South Asian labour migration to the
United Arab Emirates predates the discovery of oil. The historical antecedents to the
contemporary labour migration regime during both the rise of the pearling industry and the
development of the oil industry were shaped by the British presence in the region which
influenced the differentiation between migrant communities through contributing to pluralism
which already featured UAE’s early legal system and their relationship with the emerging oil
companies. In addition to the “racial wage,” migrant communities were either excluded or

446

Andrew M. Gardner “Chapter 6: Engulfed: Indian Guest Workers, Bahraini Citizens, and the Structural
Violence of the Kafala System” in De Genova & Peutz, supra note 404. p 202
447
Elizabeth Frantz (2017) “The Legal Production of Illegality: Obstacles and Opportunities to Protect
Undocumented Migrants” in Skilful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf, by Philippe Fargues &
Nasra M Shah (Gulf Research Center (GRC), 2017). at p 61
448
Hanieh, supra note 30, at 46.
449
Roper & Barria, supra note 445.
450
Ginu Zacharia Oommen, “South Asian migration to the GCC countries: Emerging trends and
challenges” in Prakash C Jain & Ginu Zacharia Oommen, South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries:
History, Policies, Development (Routledge, 2017) Google-Books-ID: YznbCgAAQBAJ.

131

preferred based on shifting notions of national security. Against this backdrop, the following
section will describe the basic features of the kafala system today.

3.3 Kafala’s basic features: “Jis ka visa, us ka kaam” (Your visa-provider/sponsor is your
employer)
Difficulties? All the difficulties are for people like us, for the outsiders. All the conditions are for
people like us who come from outside for work. This is only in Arab countries…whosever visa
you have, you can only work for them. You can’t work outside; otherwise, you will be deported.
- Returning Migrant Worker
The word kafala has two meanings: to guarantee and to take care of.451 The latter comes
from the original Arabic word ‘k-f-l,’ which can mean to provide for, be responsible for, or be
the legal guardian.452 In Islamic jurisprudence, kafala is defined as a guarantee in a way that the
kafeel (sponsor) and the worker are tied.453 While some accounts trace kafala back to cultural
and legal traditions related to hospitality towards visitors454, others link it to the system that
regulated indentured labour in the Gulf till the 1950s.455 Pearling divers’ families, as the
introduction mentioned, were given loans by boat captains; however, unable to pay their debt at
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the end of the season, divers would have to return to work for the same captain.456 Others also
connect some aspects of the kafala system to recruitment practices of the British protectorate and
oil companies that were established.457 The kafala system that we see today emerged in 1950,
while some accounts point to the 1960s and 1970s.458
Debates on the origins of kafala aside, this sponsorship program continues to regulate
most migrant workers in the GCC, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Arab
Republic.459 While it is applied differently in each country and more strictly enforced in the GCC
(particularly Gulf countries that have the highest proportion of migrant populations such as the
UAE), at its most basic level, kafala legally ties each worker with a sponsor (kafeel) who is
either a citizen or a company that is owned by citizen(s) during a contractually-fixed period
typically for one to three years. These companies can range from building and facility
management companies to recruitment and travel agencies.460 In free zones such as Masdar City
(which Section 3.12 will elaborate on), the free zone authority is the sponsor. Other migrant
workers who earn salaries set by respective governments can also sponsor family members or
domestic workers. Although the contracts tend to be short, as an ILO survey on the UAE and
Kuwait revealed, about a quarter of migrant workers are repeat migrants.461 Indeed the majority
of the interviewed migrant workers were either repeat migrants or planning to find employment
again either in the Gulf or elsewhere.
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While some workers can enter the country through tourist visas and extensions, the kafala
system is the primary way to get entry visas and residence permits.462 This is the only legal
provision through which migrants can stay and work in the Gulf. Migrant workers’ immigration
and legal residency status are connected to the kafeel. Residence in the country is presumed to be
based on individual contractual rights rather than a general right. Therefore, the kafala system is
heterogeneous and, like the international regime discussed in the previous Chapter, better
understood as a “diffuse set of transnational practices that are in the hands of many different
actors, including citizens and companies, but also non-citizen managers and employers,
middlemen in home countries” (emphasis added).463
While some aspects of the system are codified in labour law464, residency laws, and
contracts, there are also customs and other more informal rules that lay out the norms and
expectations governing the relationship between employees, employers (sponsors).465 The aim of
this system, like other guest worker programs, is to meet the demand for labour to build
infrastructure development projects while ensuring that workers remain temporary residents.
This allows the UAE government to insist that migrant workers in the country are temporary
contractual labourers rather than migrant workers, which has been the government’s traditional
response to human rights abuse claims.466
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Apart from temporariness, the result of this system is that the state is able to offload its
responsibility to protect migrant worker rights and capabilities to the kafeel. The legal burden is
shifted directly to the kafeel. Government authorities, therefore, monitor migrant workers
through the kafeel, who assumes the legal and economic responsibility for the worker during the
period of the contract. A number of these responsibilities are laid out in Federal Law No. 8 of
1980 Concerning the Regulation of Labour Relations. These include not only covering the visa
costs, responsibility for the expiry, renewal or cancelling of the contract but also providing
“means of medical care,”467 “complete cleanliness and ventilation,” as well as “proper light,
drinking water and toilets.”468
Furthermore, in remote areas, employers are required to provide workers with the
following: “appropriate means of transportation, proper residence, drinking water, adequate food,
first aid means, recreational and sports means.”469 Except for food, all these services are to be
paid for by the employer. Employers are also required to bear the costs of repatriating workers
unless the termination is attributable to the worker.470 In other words, the state privatizes some of
the costs associated with migration while offloading a wide range of responsibilities that could
help ensure some, albeit a narrow list of, movement and supportive capabilities of workers to
individual sponsors. The state, thus, attempts to insulate itself from being held accountable for
violations because the onus is on the sponsor, who generally is also the employer.471 For this
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reason, as Anh Longva notes about Kuwait, sponsors tend to view the kafala system as
“burdensome” rather than a means to control the migrant majority.472
However, a closer look at the list of kafeel’s responsibilities mentioned above reveals that
they mainly pertain to what can be described as basic minimum requirements of human life, such
as drinking water and sanitation. The list includes limited movement capabilities; appropriate
means of transportation are only required for workers in remote areas, and the cost of repatriating
workers is limited to workers whose termination is not attributed to them. While the inclusion of
“complete cleanliness and ventilation” and “recreation and sports means” allude to a wider range
of capabilities, including those relating to the environment, the list does not represent supportive
capabilities to the same degree473. Absent in these obligations is any discussion of remuneration,
transfer of remittances and family reunification. More significantly, the fact that these
entitlements are to be provided by the sponsor limits the migrant workers’ ability to choose
working and living conditions such as where to live and freedom of movement within the
country.
Even these limited responsibilities are, as has been recounted in numerous accounts, often
unfulfilled by sponsors. Migrant workers’ grievances continue to include inter alia restrictions
on free movement, wage theft, delayed payment of salaries, long working hours, insufficient
medical care, inadequate accommodation facilities (often crowded without access to clean water,
electricity) and unsafe working conditions.474 In other words, the offloading of responsibility to
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individual sponsors, in practice, seriously undermines migrant workers’ movement and
supportive capabilities.
This may be partially due to the individualization of the kafala system, which makes it
highly discretionary and difficult to regulate. The state's minimal role gives sponsors and a host
of other actors who operate in between (such as recruitment agencies, subcontractors, etc.) an
inordinate amount of control over migrant workers’ stay in the UAE. As Andrew Gardner and
other ethnographers have shown, there is extreme variability in workers’ experiences which
depends on the sponsor.475 Some sponsors operate more passively through arrangements with
other non-citizen business persons, merely facilitating the paperwork for migrant workers.476 The
kafeel can also be a labour supply company which means there can be two employers. Such
circumstances make it difficult to discern who is responsible for fulfilling obligations offloaded
to the kafeel; each actor simply passes the buck.
More broadly, inherent in kafala is a power imbalance between the employer and
employee that leaves the terms and conditions in the hands of the kafeel to decide. The kafeel is
authorized to exert tremendous control over migrant workers’ lives, given that the kafeel owns
the permit. Because immigration status depends on the contractual relationship between the
kafeel and migrant worker, migrant workers are more likely to accept conditions that differ from
what they were promised before departure. Indeed,” as Mahdavi argues, “collapsing employer
and sponsor into a single category may be the root of the problem.”477
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The role of recruitment agencies and the many “middlemen” in home countries adds a
further layer of challenges. As numerous accounts have shown, it is not simply the kafeel but
various actors, including recruitment agencies, other migrant workers, local branches of
multinational corporations, and subcontractors who are also responsible for the conditions faced
by migrant workers.478 While licensed recruitment agencies are prohibited from soliciting or
collecting recruitment fees479, migrant workers in the UAE reportedly pay 2,358 AED in
recruitment costs. This amount becomes difficult to pay back with salaries that are around 1,000
AED per year.480 Recruitment agents and various “middlemen” often provide misinformation to
prospective migrants about their contract, nature of work, and salary expectations etc. Some of
these recruitment agents even exercise control over migrant workers through threats to their
status or their families back home.481 With high recruitment costs and loans used to cover them
looming over their heads, migrant workers end up staying in the country even if they have to
endure harsh working and living conditions. As one of the interviewed CSO advocates reported,
some of these “organizations have more resources. They’re at the same level of sophistication.
High-rank and high-ranged….they come with alternatives and are always one step ahead of
law....”482
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The kafala system shares some features with other guest-worker schemes in the EU,
North America, as a number of comparative studies have shown.483 However, UAE’s
demographics make it distinct. Ninety-nine percent of the employees in the private sector are
migrant workers.484 As Gardner proposes, “Simply imagine, for a moment, that nine of every ten
people you encounter outside your door are resident foreigners with no purchase on belonging to
the national collectivity. Essentially, the Arab Gulf states present a social demography at the
frontier of an unprecedented era of global mobility.”485 This scale may partially be explained by
another distinguishing feature of the kafala system, which will be elaborated on in the following
section: the near impossibility of becoming a naturalized citizen for migrants.486 Together these
features lead to “an extremely large migrant population in the country, but one which is forced to
be in a state of permanent temporariness.”487
In summary, at its most basic level, the kafala system legally ties each worker with a
sponsor (kafeel) during a contractually-fixed period of time. This kafeel is both the sponsor and
the employer who assumes legal and economic responsibility for the worker for the duration of
the contract. The legal and economic responsibilities that would help ensure migrant workers’
movement and supportive capabilities, albeit to a limited degree, are offloaded to the kafeel. This
results in a heterogeneous and discretionary system whereby sponsors and other non-state actors
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(the many “middlemen”) have inordinate control over migrant workers’ stay, placing migrant
workers at the whim of these actors while carving a minimal role for the state.

3.4 Stringent citizenship rules and Nationalization of Employment
“For nationality, I tried a lot in Abu Dhabi. The media and British were pressurizing them to
grant nationality who had lived there for 30 years. So I took my kids and wife. I also took this
Arabic course. I tried very hard, but they didn’t even call us. Three times, I applied. It took
almost two thousand rupees for one person as fees.”
- Returning Migrant Worker Interview
The kafala system also consists of stringent citizenship rules, which complemented by a
policy to indigenize the workforce, further limit migrant workers’ movement capabilities,
particularly the ability to stay. The UAE’s citizenship rules do not allow jus soli and typically
use jus sanguinis as the primary mode of granting citizenship that is primarily patrilineal.488 In
other words, nationality or citizenship in the UAE cannot be acquired at birth by being born in
the territory of the State (jus soli), but can if one or both of the parents are nationals of that State
(jus sanguinis).489 Only in 2011, women who married non-Emirati nationals could transfer
citizenship to their children; there are still no provisions to allow them to transfer citizenship to
their non-Emirati partners. Furthermore, according to the UAE’s Constitution, naturalization is
possible essentially only for those “of Arab culture.”490 Federal Law No. 17 for 1972
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Concerning Nationality, Passports, and Amendments grants nationality to “any Arab individual
who enjoys full legal capacity, if he has continuously and lawfully resided in the member
Emirates for at least seven years directly before the date of submitting naturalization application,
provided that he has lawful source of income, is of good reputation and good conduct, and not
convicted for any offence involving moral turpitude or dishonesty.”491 This seven years
requirement for Arab migrants is contrasted by more stringent provisions for non-Arab migrants.
Non-Arab migrants may be granted citizenship provided they “enjoy full legal capacity”
and have continuously and legally lived in the UAE since or before 1940492, or for at least 30
years, of which 20 have been after 1972. Furthermore, they must have a “lawful source of
income,” and be “of a good reputation and good conduct, and not convicted for an offence
involving moral turpitude and dishonesty, and is proficient in Arab language.”493 Therefore,
Arab and non-Arab migrants' requirements are similarly tied to “lawful source of income” and
further limited by vaguely worded provisions that may be liberally interpreted. However, unlike
Arab migrants who may be granted nationality after seven years of residence, non-Arab migrants
must have lived in the UAE either before 1940 or for 30 years. Taken together, these provisions
make it nearly impossible for migrant workers to acquire citizenship. One of my interlocutors,
who had worked in various roles, including in construction for 31 years in the UAE between
1977 and 2006, recalled applying for Emirati nationality three times but was never called back.
The literature on citizenship in the UAE has noted how recent policies have made the
rules even more stringent. Even within the Emirati population, as Manal Jamal observes, there is
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a “tiered system” of economic, political and social rights.”494 In 2004, the UAE introduced
Emirates Identification Cards, which connect individuals to their biological lifetime data. An
Emirati passport is no longer enough to indicate you possess khulsat al-qaid, the “family book”
which traces nationals’ lineage in the UAE to at least 1925 or that the state granted citizenship.
Only those who possess khulsat al-qaid are entitled to full citizenship rights, while those with
only passports and the bidouns without passports are not guaranteed these rights.495 These rights
include not only the right to free public education and healthcare but also a list of state services
such as land, subsidized utilities.496 The rights, citizenship and permanent residency status that
citizens without the khulsat al-qaid are left for individual Emirates to decide and are by no
means guaranteed. Similarly, Noora Lori shows how outsourcing of passports from the Union of
Comoros has allowed the UAE to reclassify certain minorities into foreigners.
The resulting system is one where citizenship, permanent residency status and its
associated movement and supportive capabilities are tightly guarded. There are no real
opportunities to secure citizenship for migrant workers whose stay is entirely dependent on
short-term residency permits being renewed, making them “permanently deportable.” In fact,
both citizens whose nationality may be stripped for various reasons and are waiting for decisions
from government authorities and the aforementioned migrant workers are, in Lori’s words,
“suspended in a limbo.”497
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This guarding of citizenship is particularly relevant considering UAE’s concerted efforts
to nationalize or indigenize its workforce. Emiratization is a government policy that originated in
the 1990s and was designed to increase Emirati citizens' participation in the workforce and tackle
the private sector’s reliance on migrant workers and high unemployment among Emiratis. This
was done in a decade characterized by low oil prices and in all GCC countries that initiated their
respective labour nationalization policies that focused on the private sector.498 There are
officially three pillars of this policy: (1) to diversity from over-reliance on the hydrocarbon
sector, (2) to overhaul the education system to align skills taught with needs of the market and
(3) to implement direct labour market intervention, measures quotas and allocation of certain
positions to be staffed by Emiratis.499 This policy is formalized in Federal Labour Law No. 8,
which explicitly grants the right to work to only UAE nationals and gives preference to Arab
workers who are nationals of an Arab country over workers of other nationalities.500
Emiratization policies require private companies to hire UAE citizens in a number of
positions, such as human resource and personnel managers. It requires certain industries such as
banking to achieve a citizen-to-migrant ratio of at least 50 percent. In addition, as Toledo notes, a
recent law has also banned the firing of Emirati workers except under very specific conditions.501
Although this policy has not been effective in tackling unemployment amongst Emiratis, it
explains what is at stake when the citizenship rules are made. Emiratization’s limits on migrant
workers’ employment opportunities are significant given that their stay is dependent on being
able to find employment. Coupled with stringent citizenship rules, these policies limit migrant
498
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workers’ opportunities to prolong their stay in the country, which has implications for both
movement and supportive capabilities.

3.5 Informal rules that complement the kafala system: hierarchization of migrant communities
These rules are further complemented by several informal rules which place “lowskilled” South Asian and Southeast Asian migrant workers at the bottom and significantly limit
their movement and supportive capabilities. These informal rules have become institutions
through repetition rather than codification. Distinct from mere cultural practices, such informal
institutions can be defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created,
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.”502 These include an
informal hierarchy of workers determined by various markers and vectors of social location such
as race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, class, skill or education. As Gardner explains:
“There are also gender, national, regional, linguistic, and religious patterns to the
migratory conduits between South Asia and the Gulf: …various national and ethnic
groups that migrate find their into particular types of work. Pakistanis, Indians and
Bangladeshis are in construction while Filipinos are in the service sector while Sri Lanka
women work in domestic work, this can be explained by chain migration where or the
fact that most recruiters brokers serving one sector use their connections with workers
and workers use their network and knowledge to pave the way for other migrants.”
This phenomenon was corroborated in my fieldwork, where most migrant workers relied on
friends and family networks for work contracts and, at times, even visas. Furthermore,
employers and citizen-sponsors also rely on perceptions of certain nationalities to fit whatever
role they deem fit; the result is a racialized system. In addition to chain migration, this informal
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hierarchy is further solidified by both state and non-state actors that share understandings about
the value of labour according to race, nationality, gender, level of skill, etc.
In her recent book Offshore Citizens, Noora Lori outlines how these informal rules
provide bureaucracies to fill gaps and a script for how to deal with the diverse group of incoming
migrant workers. She notes how higher wages, for instance, are paid to European and American
migrant workers (who are colloquially referred to as “expatriates” rather than “labourers”) over
even nationals in the private sector. While there are no formal ways certain sectors are grouped
with certain nationalities, migrant workers are grouped by skill level and sectors. Informal rules
fill the gaps by associating certain skill levels with certain nationalities. As one of the returning
migrant workers interviewed who has moved from UAE to Canada remarked, “You have…at the
top, your locals and white people. Then working the middle-income jobs are other Arabs. And
even within that, there are differences. Then below that, you have your Indians, Pakistanis,
Filipinos, Bangladeshis.”503 Feeling “stuck” in his position, he decided to move out of the
UAE.504
Similarly, Manal Jamal observes that there are “the affluent Westerners on one end,
Arabs ranging in the middle (with the Lebanese, Palestinian. And Syrians sometimes at the top
of the employment and pay hierarchy of the Arab population) and the marginalized South Asian
and East Asian labourers at the opposite end of the continuum with virtually no rights.”505
Furthermore, Lori noted the difference in wages for domestic workers in the UAE according to
nationality. A domestic worker from the Philippines is paid a minimum of 1,500 AED, from
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India is paid 1,100, and from Nepal is paid 900 AED.506 Apart from resulting in different
salaries, these hierarchies’ associated discourses become a part of naturalized order in migrant
workers and citizens' everyday lives, reducing people to their work. These discourses are even
reproduced by certain migrant workers and taken “back home,” where the informal rules
reinforce class divisions.507 The informal hierarchization and the resulting racialized system
leave certain migrant workers with fewer opportunities to change sectors and positions. Lowskilled migrant workers from South Asia and Southeast Asia are put at a great disadvantage with
lower wages which undermines their supportive capabilities.
In summary, alongside stringent citizenship rules, the kafala system, Emiratization, and
informal hierarchies among migrant communities, significantly undermine migrant workers’
movement and supportive capabilities, particularly “low-skilled” racialized South Asian and
Southeast Asian workers working in the construction sector and other 3-d jobs.

3.6 Kafala: recent changes and persistent challenges
Having discussed the kafala system, it is worth exploring how recent reforms have
attempted to tackle some of its criticisms yet cannot comprehensively transform the system. The
kafala has been unanimously criticized by academics, international media, sending countries,
international and civil society organizations. Human Rights Watch, for instance, has published
several investigative reports on human rights abuses on Abu Dhabi’s New York University
campus and Guggenheim Museum. More recently, it has criticized the kafala system for giving
employers an “inordinate control over migrant workers” which severely limiting workers ability
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to challenge poor working conditions.508 Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the International
Trade Union Confederation has criticized the kafala system for creating a structural dependence
between the employer and migrant workers and the resulting violations of fundamental human
rights.509 According to the International Labour Organization’s independent Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations’ (CEACR) observations with
regard to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), some GCC countries’ kafala system
“may be conducive to the exaction of forced labour.”510 The kafala system is criticized for its
lack of flexibility in switching employers, constricting migrant workers’ choices, and making
them vulnerable to lower wages and harsh working and living conditions and physical abuse and
deportation.511 The discussion below will consider the following changes that claim to address
some of these criticisms: (a) Wage Protection System; (b) Ministerial Decree No. 765 of 2015 on
Rules and Conditions for the Termination of Employment Relations; (c) Ministerial Decree No.
766 of 2015 on Rules and Conditions for Granting a New Work Permit to a Worker whose
Labour Relations with an Employer has Ended; (d) Ministerial Decree No. 764 of 2015 on
Ministry of Labour-Approved Standard of Employment Contracts.
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Although the UAE has periodically introduced series of reforms that it claims to address
some of these issues, the degree of employee-sponsor power imbalance remains untouched. In
2009, the UAE became the first country in the GCC to implement a wage protection system
(WPS) to tackle wage theft and delays in payment of wages in construction, retail and small
businesses.512 Designed to target low-wage migrant workers, the WPS requires wage payments
through bank transfers so that there is an official record that can be monitored. Despite hundreds
of employers being penalized, the penalties are criticized for being insufficient.513 In 2016, the
Ministry of Human Resource and Emiratization introduced new penalties. Employers who fail to
comply are denied the right to have new work permits.514 Companies with over 100 workers that
have a monthly payment delay will be notified for punitive action, including a “complete strike
against other companies owned by employer,” as well as “enabling workers to move to another
company.” After a two-month delay in payment, the companies will be fined Dh5,000 ($1,362)
per worker to a maximum of Dh50,000 ($13,612).515
While the WPS has been well-received by the ILO and Abu Dhabi Dialogue, a state-led
regional consultative process, the new penalties have also been criticized for being mostly
administrative and the fines for being too low. The mechanism does not verify whether the basic
salary and allowances match the workers’ signed labour contract, which is significant
considering the prevalence of contract substitution. Not only is it inapplicable to companies in
the free zones such as Masdar City Free Zone, but it also fails to address miscalculation of
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overtime, end of service gratuity and other sources of wage manipulation. Employers can
withdraw from the Automatic Teller Machines and pay fewer amounts in cash to the worker.516
More importantly, it does not address businesses that have closed down, which has been
increasingly a problem due to the financial crisis in 2009 and is expected to worsen due to covid19.517
This is particularly relevant in the construction sector, which is sensitive to economic
changes, relies on flexible arrangements and often involves principal contractors and
subcontractors. Principal contractors may choose to withhold money to shift the burden to
subcontractors. In fact, withholding payment can be used strategically to go bankrupt, at which
point the companies do not have to pay and can default on their payments to workers; the
procedures to retrieve wages are often long, arduous and expensive. Although workers may be
able to switch employers, this becomes especially difficult during financial crises. While
companies in the UAE must have bank guarantees to cover wages for the life of a project, these
guarantees are still not enough to protect workers against employers’ inability to pay wages as a
result of bankruptcy (as Suleiman’s story in Chapter 1 and detailed further in this Section 3.7
indicates).
Not only is there a lack of enforcement in cases of a breach, but more broadly, the WPS
mechanism does not address the lack of standardizations of wage levels and the minimum wage
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in the UAE’s private sector.518 WPS’s inability to tackle wage-related issues such as wage theft
undermines its ability to ensure migrant workers’ supportive capabilities. Indeed when asked
what has surprised her while working in a civil society organization in the Gulf, one of the
interviewed advocates responded, “the amount of people who are not paid their salaries will floor
you.”519 Whether or not further reforms to the WPS can address these shortcomings is yet to be
determined, but it is clear that this change does not untie migrant workers from their sponsors.
In addition to the WPS, the UAE enacted a number of laws in 2015, which entered into
force on 1 January 2016 to address particularly the inflexibility of the kafala with regards to
changing employers.520 This includes (b) Ministerial Decree No. 765 of 2015 on Rules and
Conditions for the Termination of Employment Relations and (c) Ministerial Decree No. 766 of
2015 on Rules and Conditions for Granting a New Work Permit to a Worker whose Labour
Relations with an Employer has Ended. These two Decrees allow workers to terminate
employment unilaterally and be considered for a new work permit with a notice period of up to
three months or if payment is made in lieu of notice being given. This means that, on paper,
transferring to a new employer is permitted without the explicit permission of current employers
in a number of circumstances (which was traditionally done through no-objection certificates that
previous employers would have to provide). Such transfers can be made when the current
employer has failed to meet their legal or contractual obligations, or when the business closes
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down, or when a worker has made a successful labour complaint against the current employer, or
when the worker settles indemnities with the first employer in line with contractual obligations.
Any worker who has completed their first two-year contract can also transfer to a new employer
without conditions and explicit approval from the current employer.521
However, as Human Rights Watch commented, given that Ministry of Human Resources
and Emiratization (UAE’s Labour Ministry) grants the new work permit and Executive
Regulations of Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners, art. 68(d)
requires the former employer’s approval. It is still unclear how the Ministerial Decrees will be
implemented.522As mentioned in Chapter 2, the UAE failed to report the number of new
approvals made after the Decrees were implemented to the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations.
Furthermore, due to high recruitment costs and the fact that most migrant workers finance
their migration through loans, the risks associated with terminating a contract might not be an
option for migrant workers. Migrant workers who are new to the country may also have fewer
opportunities to secure a new contract, as one of the interviewed migrant workers noted. This
ability to terminate the contract, Halabi argues, “is merely a ruse” because workers have to cover
the cost of their return tickets or may be fined by recruitment agencies, which—given low
wages, wage theft and payment delays—may be impossible to cover.523 A capabilities-based lens
that distinguished between means and ends can further reveal that the flexibility that the Decree
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promises and could potentially enhance migrant workers’ supportive capabilities is not a
substantive opportunity.
Similarly, the Ministerial Decree No. 764 of 2015 on Ministry of Labour-Approved
Standard of Employment Contracts aimed to tackle contract substitution and falls short. The new
legislation requires employers to provide evidence that an offer letter was issued and signed by
the employee in their country of origin. It requires the Standard Employment Contract to be in
three languages: Arabic, English and the native language of the employee. The labour contract
and the offer letter are required to have the same terms. Changes to the Standard Employment
Contract are prohibited unless for the employee's benefit and approved by the employee and the
Ministry of Labor. No additional clauses can be included unless “compliant with the Ministry of
Labor’s legal requirements.”524 This provision in Article 5, therefore, still leaves potential room
for the Ministry of Labor to add new clauses depending on how it interprets “its legal
requirements.”525 Given its duties include drafting an Emiratization policy and one of its two
divisions is dedicated to Emiratization, this exception may be significant.
Furthermore, even if contracts are not substituted, this legislation does not directly tackle
low wages and wage theft which are the very issues arising from contract substitution. More
importantly, like the previously mentioned reforms, it fails to comprehensively transform the
kafala system by untying workers to sponsors. Lastly, these reforms are focused on removing
unjust practices and not necessarily an expansion of movement and supportive capabilities.
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3.7 Persistent challenges: lack of enforcement and access to justice
Lack of enforcement and inadequate access to justice (conversion factors) remain a
problem that renders all recent reforms and even existing legislation that could protect some
migrant workers’ movement and supportive capabilities almost meaningless.526 David Mednicoff
explains that enforcement of such labour reforms remains inconsistent partially because the UAE
is a relatively young federal system with multiple actors and courts that are only beginning to
gain legitimacy. Lack of transparency not only undermines collective capability agency but,
given migrant workers’ perceived connection to national security issues, makes it difficult to
resolve issues.527
Access to justice is significantly limited by passport confiscation, which significantly
inhibits migrants workers from challenging their employers. Although passport confiscation is
prohibited by the Ministry of Interior’s Circular No. 267 2002, this practice is still common.
Access to justice is also undermined because there are no legal provisions that protect the right to
strike528, freedom of association or to join a union.529 The kafeel has the authority to unilaterally
cancel workers’ visas before a worker can even pursue a claim. An employer can dismiss the
worker without notice in a range of circumstances, including being absent “without lawful
excuse for more than twenty intermittent days or more than seven successive days during one
526
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year,” or “if during work hours he is found drunk or under the influence of a drug,” and “if he
divulges any secrets of the establishment where is employment.”530 In comparison, the list of
cases where workers are allowed to leave work without notice only includes: if the employer
fails to fulfill their contractual and legal obligations; and if they have committed an act of assault
against the employee.531
Furthermore, grievances brought by workers are to be resolved by the Ministry of Labour
before going to courts.532 In Masdar City's free zone, labour disputes are to be referred first to the
free zone authority before they go to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. It is the free zone
authority that will issue a letter to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, which may, in turn,
refer the dispute to the Abu Dhabi Courts. The fact that labour disputes cannot directly go to
even the Ministry of Labour, let alone the courts, undermines access to justice.533
Once labour cases go to labour courts where private-sector employees or employers can
bring disputes, there are further limitations. Even if migrant workers file a complaint, they risk
losing their residency status because they can no longer work for the same employer while the
trial is pending. Since dispute settlement procedures tend to be lengthy, workers are often unable
to stay in the country for long enough. Furthermore, there are few compensation mechanisms for
migrant workers to aid them while their wages are unpaid.534 Also, the sponsor may
preemptively accuse the worker of behaviour that may put them at risk for deportation, detention
etc.535 Information on employers being penalized for labour regulation violations is scarce and
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only available for extreme cases of physical assault. While it is more likely to see recruitment
agencies be held accountable, individual sponsors and employers generally face little to no
consequences.536 In addition, cases can only be appealed if the case's value is more than 20,000
AED. Therefore, as one of the interviewed advocates noted, most migrant workers settle out of
court and go home because going through courts may take two years or more, during which they
cannot officially work. She noted that although her civil society organization has lawyers who
work pro-bono, the organization mostly advises people not to go through courts.537
This is further compounded by the fact that, like in the rest of the region, kafala is
administered and regulated through the UAE’s Ministry of Interior (MOI). This institution
decides on residency and work permits as well as naturalization decisions. It also enforces those
decisions without any intervention. While work permits are applied through the Ministry of
Labor, the approval must still come from MOI, which is in charge of issuing these permits and
clearances. MOI must also be informed of any changes in the contract or workers’ status. Given
that MOI also controls the security forces, it does not require cooperation from any other
government body. This results in a highly centralized system that is controlled by the state
security apparatus, which is significant considering migration is tied to perceptions of national
security.538
It is no surprise that scholarship on migrant workers in the Gulf is replete with first-hand
accounts of the human rights abuses that migrant workers experience on a daily basis that reflect
how, in practice, these reforms have had little to no impact, and even the legislation that may
help protect migrant workers is not enforced. Almost all the returning workers interviewed
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complained about late, deducted, or no payments. It is worth exploring Suleiman and
Muzzammil’s stories in further detail to illustrate how issues around wages, inflexibility,
passport confiscation, access to justice and poor living conditions persist:

Suleiman went to Abu Dhabi on a two-year contract to work as a site engineer for
a residential project in Bida Zayd. He found this job through a friend and explained that
he was hired because Pakistani engineers are “cheaper” than those in the UAE. He only
signed the contract when he reached the UAE, where upon arrival, his employer
confiscated his passport and other original academic records to, in his words, “give to the
government.” Suleiman did not see the contract before leaving Pakistan and was only
sent his visa; he had to cover the cost of his ticket.
His contract was terminated because the contractor had “no funds to continue the
construction.” Suleiman had his salary withheld for three months (his entire stay in the
UAE); he was only paid months after he returned to Pakistan. He realized this salary, too,
was only half of what is usually paid to site engineers and the experience offered no
training to make up for the low wages. Suleiman still considered himself to be luckier
than some of his colleagues. He told me about a “labourer” from Bangladesh who had
been working on-site for seven years but had not gotten paid enough to afford to go back
home even once. According to Suleiman, there were at least 25 other workers in a similar
situation. Living in accommodation facilities segregated based on nationality, around
eight construction workers would be sharing a room. Because he did not speak Arabic or
Bengali, he felt isolated as the only Pakistani on the site.
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When Suleiman did try speaking to other colleagues and friends working in the
UAE about not getting paid, there was a sense that this is the norm to expect in the UAE,
and there was no option but to “patiently” wait.539 His kafeel, an Egyptian contractor,
would tell his employees to go back home or work for another employer. However, with
no passports, loans to cover recruitment costs their passports, and few opportunities to
work elsewhere, most workers were left with no choice but to stay. Suleiman did not
even leave the industrial area where his accommodation was and never got a chance to
see Abu Dhabi. “Because I didn’t have the passport,” Suleiman recalled, “it was in my
mind that if I left [the industrial area], the cops would catch us.” Without his passport and
original academic records, he could not consider challenging his employer. He was not
informed of the WPS nor the fact that passport confiscation is illegal. When I asked him
what he did in his free time, he laughed and said, “I would cry.” The only recreation
around him was a mosque and a little park nearby. The most he would do would be to get
groceries at Sonaya, another industrial area. Suleiman had gone to the UAE for the
“salary and the charm.” While he still considered himself in a better situation than some
of his colleagues who had been working for longer, he attributed his experience to “bad
luck” with a kafeel.

Similarly, Muzammil, who had worked in the UAE for four years as a mechanic and in
construction in Abu Dhabi, recounted, “We were just machines and not able to do
anything. We were just machines. There was no social life. There was no time to do
anything else but work. We would get up in fajr (dawn)…it is pure labour, no stealing.
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Obviously, after a whole day of manual labour, we would just fall asleep…the routine
was like a grinding machine” Earning 1400 AED per month, Muzammil recalled how
strenuous it was to work outdoors in extreme heat. Even when the cars were overheating,
and the water would reach boiling temperatures, he and his colleagues would still have to
work outside with little to no breaks. He worked 11 hours a day, despite the legal
standards for a typical work week, which are set to eight hours per day540 and the
prohibition of outdoor work when the temperature exceeds 45 degrees Celsius in the
hottest months from 12:00 pm until 4:00 pm. There were no recreational facilities in or
around his accommodation where around 16 people would share a room. On the Friday’s
off, he would spend the day doing laundry, cleaning and getting ready for the week.
Sometimes he would use public transportation to go to the corniche to meet his sister. But
he avoided doing this often because his employer had confiscated his passport, and he
only had a card that detailed where he worked. While he was paid on time, work visa fees
of around 200 AED were deducted from his salary per month. Any medical fees would
have also been deducted from this salary.

Suleiman and Muzammil’s stories illustrate that even existing legislation at the time was not
enforced, specifically the prohibition of passport confiscation and the WPS. Similarly, a recent
survey by Global Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme of 94 migrant
workers from hospitality and construction sectors found several persisting issues. Delayed wage
payments and salary deductions are frequent as the Wage Protection System is not completely
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implemented. Passport confiscation, contract substitution and inability to change employers are
still common.541 As Andrew Gardner, who has conducted a series of rich ethnographic studies in
the Gulf, remarked, “the problems that migrants encounter today are, essentially, the very same
problems that migrants detailed to me in Saudi Arabia in 1999, in Bahrain in 2002-3, and Qatar
from 2008 to the present.” Despite the many reforms and ambitious claims that they seek to
abolish the kafala system, there is an “experiential stasis that characterizes transnational
migrants’ experience in the Arab Gulf states.”542 While I am cautious of over-generalizing, it is
worth noting that the recent reforms’ inability to untie migrant workers from their sponsors and
lack of enforcement and access to justice remain significant challenges for changes to be
meaningful.
3.8 Subverting the kafala: formal routes versus informal routes
The preceding analysis does not mean that there are no exceptions whatsoever. Some
migrant workers have been able to take advantage of the heterogeneous nature of the system and
become, what Neha Vora calls, UAE’s “impossible citizens.”543 The fact that there is a
significant number of non-citizens who have lived in the UAE for longer than 30 years has been
the result of migrant workers actively finding ways to circumvent the kafala.544 Apart from
multiple renewals of the same contract through the same sponsor, this is done through a myriad
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of both formal and informal ways that will be discussed in the following section that reveal how
movement and supportive capabilities are distributed among migrant workers.
The following discussion will focus on four ways that the kafala system is subverted: free
visas, family sponsorship, golden visas, and long-term residence through investments in free
zones such as Masdar City. It will illustrate how more formal ways of circumventing the kafala
system are opportunities that only migrant workers who can show their potential to contribute to
the country’s economy can pursue. Workers who are considered “low-skilled” without high
incomes and investment potential are left to consider more risky, illegal routes to prolong their
stay. The fact that the more liberal provisions and opportunities are reserved for certain migrant
workers depicts the variegated ways capabilities are distributed among migrant workers.

3.9 Khalli walli545: “Free” Visas?
Migrant workers are able to prolong their stay through free visas, also known as azad546
visas and khalli walli visas. This multi-billion dollar industry allows workers to make unofficial
agreements with sponsors to operate businesses and maintain work permit and residency statuses
in return for rent money.547 While these visas are illegal on paper, a recent study by the
International Organization of Migration reported that there are “at least 180,00 UAE-registered
companies engage in the trading of free visas for as many as 600,000 migrants”. In 2011, these
visas could cost around 2,500 AED (680 USD), varying according to nationality.548Through free
visas, sponsors sell visas to migrants, charging them a significant fee that they often keep to
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themselves and also potentially an additional yearly fee.549 Unlike the kafala system, whereby
the sponsor is both the guarantor and employer, this informal practice allows a separation of the
two roles. The sponsor, in these cases, usually has no intention of employing the migrant worker
and can benefit from the fees charged to the migrant worker. The employer, on the other hand, is
able to employ a migrant worker without administrative and legal responsibilities. The migrant
worker, in turn, is ‘free’ to choose where to work.550
These free visas are common practice and operate in various ways: companies who are
entitled to issue visas and sell visas before going bankrupt – once out of business, both the
companies and the migrant workers know that no sponsor will be responsible if the workers
‘abscond’551 or overstay. Companies operating in free zones may also issue free visas without the
intention of hiring them. Migrant workers entering through visas issued by businesses in free
zones are able to enter the country, but like other workers on free visas, they have to find
employment elsewhere to be able to stay. Some free visas are paid by migrant workers
themselves who fund their work visas and other costs while working in freelance positions.
While these are illegal, as noted by Mahdavi, they are still considered better options for workers
given the flexibility and chances for more lucrative remuneration. Although “free visa” workers
are not tied to specific employers, they are considered to have broken the law if they are working
for someone other than the kafeel.552 While some migrant workers may actively seek out free
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visas as a better alternative, in some instances, migrant workers on free visas do not know they
are entering through the “free visa” system until they arrive in the destination country.553
Free visas are one of the most significant ways migrants can acquire an irregular status.
The risks associated with free visas, therefore, include detention and deportation of both workers
and the visa providers. Furthermore, these workers also risk losing the support of the few civil
society organizations that operate in the region that are reluctant to get involved in such cases.
“As much as it is a sad situation…but if they are knowingly illegally purchasing a visa to work
someone to then just work somewhere else – I can’t get involved in that,” informed one of the
advocates I interviewed, “I can give you good advice, but I can’t take you to an office
anywhere.”554 Her comments mirror the international migration legal regime’s tropes that
differentiate some migrants as deserving and as undeserving. As discussed in Chapter 2,
compared to refugees, economic migrants who are seen as voluntarily making the choice to
move are seen as less deserving of help, just as more liberal provisions are reserved for migrant
workers who are in a regular situation as opposed to workers in an irregular situation. Advocates
on the ground are unable to challenge these tropes and are less able to directly help migrant
workers who are assumed to have “knowingly” bought “free visas.” There is an overwhelming
fear of potentially helping someone who is “breaking the law.”555 These assumptions can be
particularly problematic considering some free-visa workers are unaware they are entering the
country through this system,
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Exceptions such as free-visas are often the result of migrant workers and sponsors
subverting or circumventing the kafala system, rather than a feature it permits. A capabilitiesbased lens that differentiates means from ends and relies on a positive account of freedom is able
to differentiate that although these workers are able to prolong their stay through such informal
practices, this is not an opportunity that is positively provided by the arrangement. These
opportunities are, as the discussion below will show, are reserved for a narrow group of migrant
workers.

3.10 Family sponsorship and restrictions on family reunification
Another way migrant workers can prolong their stay is through family sponsorships.
However, this and the associated supportive capabilities are reserved for a narrow category of
migrant workers despite recent changes. In 2019, the UAE Cabinet changed the residential rules
that changed the criteria to be able to sponsor families.556 While migrant workers no longer have
to be in “managerial” roles, there are restrictions around salaries. For a man, the minimum is a
monthly salary is 3,000 AED if accommodation is provided by the employer or a monthly salary
of 4,000 AED, and for a woman to sponsor her children, she must earn 10,000 AED.557 Only
“unmarried female children” and “male children below the age of eighteen” can be included. The
gendered nature of this rule aside, since the median salary is around 8,400 AED for a “skilled”
worker and only 1,135 AED for an “unskilled” worker (other estimates show that these salaries
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can be as low as 400 AED558), this change does not necessarily relax the rules for most migrant
workers.559 It is important to note, however, such restrictions on family reunification are not
unique to migration policies in the Gulf.560
Even if migrant workers in the UAE are able to bring family members, low wages earned
by “low-skilled” workers make it difficult to support these families, particularly given the
increasing costs of living in the UAE. The cost of living and administrative costs associated with
renewing visas for family members make family sponsorship an expensive option that migrant
workers may not be able to consider. Furthermore, the lack of family reunification options can
have other consequences. For instance, in a case study of Bahrain, Sharon Nagy remarked that
workers without families are “referred to as “bachelors” – whether or not they are single or
married.561” She observes how the distinction between family and bachelor status provides an
axis of differentiation that reinforces economic distinctions, marginalizing and stigmatizing the
“bachelors.” In addition, the lack of family reunification options impacts the family members
who are left behind in home countries. An in-depth study of families conducted in Pakistan
revealed that of a sample of 3000 migrant households, about 70 percent of wives experienced
severe loneliness, and 40 percent had children dropping out of schools or college. Other
complaints included drug addiction of children and difficulties in arranging marriages for the

558

James Reagan McLaurin, “Labor Law in the United Arab Emirates: A Review and Recommendations”
(2008) 12:2 Allied Academies International Conference Academy of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues
Proceedings; Arden 15–19.
559
Mouawiya Al Awad, “The cost of foreign labor in the United Arab Emirates” (2010) 3 Institute for
Social & Economic Research (ISER), Working Paper. (This work has been supported technically and
financially by the UAE Ministry of Labor)
560
See for eg. Pratt, supra note 191.
561
Sharon Nagy, “Making room for migrants, making sense of difference: Spatial and ideological
expressions of social diversity in urban Qatar” (2006) 43:1 Urban Studies 119–137.

164

children.562 When I asked a Pakistani government official what he thought were the biggest
concerns facing migrant workers, he responded, “the family gets ruined back home…You might
have the money but not a family.”563 Since being able to support their families was consistently
one of the top three priorities for interviewed migrant workers, the lack of family reunification
options is significant.

3.11 Golden visas: longer stays for sale
Another decision in 2019 introduced “5 and 10-year golden visas,” which allow a narrow
category of migrant workers to live, work and study without a sponsor and with 100 percent
ownership of their business on the UAE’s mainland.564 This is an exception to the general
requirement that all businesses must be at minimum 51% owned by a citizen with the exception
of free economic zones. However, this change is only a means to attract investors and has no
relevance for the average migrant worker in the UAE, and even though the categories are highly
selective, a valid work contract is still required for all categories. To be eligible for the ten-year
renewable visa, one has to have made public investments of at least 10 million AED or have
“specialized talents.” The latter includes scientists, inventors, specialists, doctors and creative
individuals accredited by the Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development.565
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The 5-year visas are for another group that further indicates the narrowness of the
categories this exception is reserved for. This includes Investors who have invested in a property
in the UAE of a gross value of not less than 5 million AED, entrepreneurs with a minimum
capital of 500,000 AED, or “outstanding students” who have achieved at least 95 percent in
secondary schools or a 3.75 Grade Point Average in university. While these selective changes
pertain only to residency and not citizenship, they are similar to the point-based admission policy
that was initiated in Canada and has spread in other migrant-receiving countries such as the
United Kingdom and Australia, where immigrants with higher skills, more money, and ability to
adapt to receiving countries’ environment are preferred in terms of admission and integration
over others who are deemed less so particularly those who are less wealthy.566 A recent article
notes that similar Immigrant Investor Programs that exchange residency or citizenship rights for
financial capital are proliferating, with 60 different programs operating in 57 countries.567
Like recent rules on family sponsorship, golden visas only enhance movement and
supportive capabilities for a certain group of migrant workers. By using markers such as income
and capital, these formal routes afford more opportunities to migrant workers who are deemed
more likely to contribute to the country’s economic growth.

3.12 Free zones: enclaves for a select few
Similarly, free zones present a limited opportunity for migrant workers to prolong their
stay and employ other migrant workers. Free zones, more formally known as free trade zones,
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are a type of Special Economic Zone that aims to stimulate trade, accelerate regional
development. While the literature on free zones is vast, suffice to say these zones are considered
mechanisms to help promote “economic liberalization” that are often tied to neoliberal
policies.568 These demarcated geographic areas “are enclaves of truly free markets where
entrepreneurs are liberated from restrictive commercial, labour, and manufacturing regimes.”569
In other words, rules governing commerce, tax and employment are different from those that
exist elsewhere in the country. While employment contracts in the free zones must respect
UAE’s labour laws, it is the respective free zone authority that sets employment laws and
regulations governing those working in the free zone. As a result, some free zones can become
avenues through which free visas are sold.
Masdar City free zone is one of the over 30 free trade zones in the UAE.570 A small group
of migrant workers with capital can prolong their own stay in the country through such free
zones and, hence, enhance their movement and supportive capabilities. Migrant workers who are
able to afford to operate a business can do so with 100% foreign ownership (as opposed to
elsewhere in the country where 51% of the business is required to be owned by an Emirati
national), with no import duties and no personal income or corporate taxes.571 License fees in
Masdar City range from 2,500 AED to 31,000 AED. To be able to sponsor a visa, one would
have to pay at least 12,500 AED as license fees. The most expensive “package” of 31,000 AED
allows for four visas. Most migrant workers cannot afford these fees with wages that average
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around 1,135 AED or as low as 400 AED572, even if we assume recruitment costs are low and
issues such as wage theft are not concerns. This illustrates how even when formal exceptions to
the kafala system are made, they prioritize migrant workers who are more likely to contribute to
the economic growth of the country through their investment potential.
While these businesses technically operate outside the kafala system, employment
regulations in Masdar City reflect an equally discretionary system and share a number of other
features with the kafala system. Firstly, through free zones, the state is still able to offload a
number of responsibilities to individuals or corporations. In fact, another layer of complexity is
added to the sponsorship system in free zones. While the free zone authority is officially the
sponsor or kafeel, it is the licensee that is required to fulfill the responsibilities and pay the costs
of migration that would normally be offloaded to the sponsor. Furthermore, the Masdar City
Employment Regulations 2009 (Employment Regulations), which stipulates these rules
explicitly defers to “UAE Labour Law” when discussing, for instance, the terms and conditions
of employment and working conditions such as hours of work and termination of employment.
Furthermore, similar to the kafala system, Masdar City’s Employment Regulations give
significant discretion to the free zone authority to determine where workers work and their
ability to switch employers, limiting supportive and movement capabilities. Masdar City’s
Employment Regulations require employees to work “from Masdar City.” Workers can only be
permitted to work outside the city to perform tasks on behalf of their licensee. This is a decision
that Masdar City may make “in its absolute discretion.” Furthermore, while there are no specific
provisions about transferring to an employer outside the city, workers can only switch employers
if both licensees and the employee give consent in writing. Here, too, the free zone authority can
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“in its absolute discretion” approve a transfer without the written consent.573 If the free zone
authority does not approve switching employers, the employee’s sponsorship is cancelled. To be
able to work for another employer, the worker has to obtain a new entry permit and residence
visa. In other words, while technically free zones operate outside the kafala system, the
exceptions around commerce and tax are not translated to employment regulations which, in
turn, give the free zone authority significant discretion in determining where workers work and
their ability to switch employers.
The free zone authority has a number of other areas where it can exercise “absolute
discretion,” which also limits the capabilities of migrant workers who can afford licenses in the
free zone. The free zone authority can, for instance, ”limit the number of employees which the
zone will be willing to sponsor for a licensee,”574 waive the requirement of a bank guarantee that
is required for the licensee for each anticipated foreign employee. It is the zone’s Government
Services Entity that approves licensees to be able to recruit employees who are not sponsored by
the free zone authority.575 In these ways, even the small group of migrant workers who are able
to afford to operate businesses in free zones are limited by the free zone authority, which can
exercise its “absolute discretion” in a number of areas.
In summary, there are many ways that the kafala system can be circumvented to prolong
migrant workers’ stay. More formal routes such as family sponsorship, golden visas and
operating businesses in free zones are reserved for migrant workers who can demonstrate a
potential to contribute to the country’s economy through investments and income, while the rest
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often have to resort to more informal routes such as free visas. Through changes in rules around
family sponsorship, golden visas and free zones, it is clear that the legal framework that governs
migrant workers is undergoing a substantial change. These changes are driven by forces
facilitating stable markets and foreign investment, property transactions for transnational capital.
While David Mednicoff and Joanna Springer argue some of these “legal reforms might be
associated with more open politics,” the reforms’ more liberal provisions are still reserved for a
narrow category of workers.576 In other words, movement and supportive capabilities’
distribution is articulated selectively, primarily, and increasingly based on capital’s demands.

3.13 Propensity to create irregularity: What does this mean for the majority of migrant workers?
The resulting system is one where migrant workers who cannot demonstrate potential to
contribute to the economy are left with fewer formal routes to prolong their stay and enjoy
movement and supportive capabilities. With fewer opportunities for long-term visas and family
reunification, informal routes such as free visas (as well as visa trading and overstaying) seem
better options for migrant workers. Migrant workers who are caught with free visas are
considered to be in an irregular situation. Therefore, the kafala system has a great propensity to
create irregularity for such migrant workers.
While it is notoriously difficult to obtain numbers of migrant workers in an irregular
situation, one estimate showed there were 224,548 migrant workers in an irregular situation,
2.7% of the non-citizen population.577 Another estimate by Ghulam Mohammad Arif and Tahira
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Ishaq recorded that “over 250,000 illegal Pakistani immigrants have been deported back between
2009 and 2014, according to reports in the media…Three-quarters of these illegal migrants were
deported from the GCC countries, with the highest numbers coming from Saudi Arabia, followed
by UAE and Oman.”578 Yet another estimate suggests that there are currently 2.2 million to 3
million migrant workers in an irregular situation in the country. As Valenta et al. remark in their
recent article, “That the number is high, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall migrant
population in the UAE, is nevertheless beyond doubt.”579
These high numbers can be explained by the many ways migrant workers can acquire an
irregular status. Not only can migrant workers “choose” to take the risk of staying in the country
on an irregular status through routes such as free visas, but some can find themselves in an
irregular situation without any fault of their own.580 When the employment relationship is ended,
and contract581 is not renewed or extended, the worker can no longer stay legally in the country
given the lack of permanent residency status or citizenship routes. A contract can expire, and the
employer may refuse to return their passport, renew their visa or pay for return airfare. An
employer may report workers as “absconded” when they have not. Indeed the numerous news
stories of “absconded” workers that Anh Longva recounts in her book, Walls Built On Sand:
Migration, Exclusion, And Society In Kuwait, are telling. Furthermore, even if a new work
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permit has been agreed to, the employers may fail to follow the procedure, which would put the
worker in breach of their visa requirements.
There are also a number of provisions that allow employers to terminate contracts
without prior notice that can be interpreted liberally. For instance, contracts can be terminated if
the worker “divulges any secret of the establishment where he works” or “convicted by the court
in a crime of honour, honesty or public ethics” or found in a state of “drunkeness or under the
influence of a narcotic during work hours” or be absent without a valid cause for more than
seven consecutive days. While writing about Kuwait, Longva recalls the vagueness of such
norms makes deportability a constant threat for migrants. In addition, as aforementioned,
workers waiting for an outcome of a legal case or who are in shelters can also be considered to
be in an irregular situation.582 These migrant workers in an irregular situation are subject to
arrest, detention, and deportation.583 While in detention centers, these workers accumulate
overstay fines, and with insufficient funds, they can also be prohibited from leaving the
country.584 Therefore the threat of irregularity is ever-present, as a number of my interlocutors
revealed, further preventing migrant workers from challenging their employers.
In summary, the ways that the kafala system is circumvented by migrant workers reveals
that while the more formal routes are reserved for a small group of elite migrant workers with
high incomes and investment potential, the kafala system leaves the majority of the migrant
workers to resort to more informal illegal routes that put them at the risk of irregularity. This
propensity to create irregularity for precarious workers is particularly significant considering the
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international regime’s tendency to guard more liberal provisions and rights from migrant workers
in an irregular situation.

3.14 Conclusion
The kafala system often becomes “black-boxed,”585 and most of the mainstream
discussion relies on binaries such as citizen/non-citizen, inclusive/exclusive,
democratic/autocratic. The discussion above sought to complicate some of these categories and
show how the kafala system is variegated and heterogenous, allowing the state to offload a
number of responsibilities to individual sponsors. Some historical context, namely the role of
British influence in contributing to pluralism, differentiation between migrants and migration
trends in the region, helped contextualize the kafala system today. Kafala system’s highly
discretionary, heterogeneous nature gives non-state actors an expansive role, which coupled with
stringent citizenship rules, Emiratization, and informal hierarchies significantly inhibit migrant
workers’ movement and supportive capabilities, particularly those of “low-skilled” South Asian
migrant workers in 3-d jobs. It is argued that despite reforms and the many ways the kafala
system is circumvented, the system has a propensity to create irregularity and precarity for a
majority of the migrant workers, particularly those who are considered “low-skilled” and
incapable of contributing to the country’s economy. Recent reforms have been unable to tackle
the heterogenous discretionary nature of the kafala system and lack of enforcement and
inadequate access to justice. Taken together kafala system’s basic features, along with other
formal and informal rules as well as various routes that can be circumvented, reflect a propensity
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to create precarity.586 The more formal routes and the associated movement and supportive
capabilities are opportunities only a narrow group of migrant workers can enjoy, while the
majority of migrant workers are left to consider informal routes, which put them at risk of
irregularity, and therefore, deportability.
In other words, the very ways (such as using visa-trading, free visas etc.) that the kafala
system is circumvented for greater flexibility become the source of irregularity. Whether it is a
choice that is preferred or imposed with no fault of their own, this irregularity is a feature of the
kafala system. This is particularly grave given the fact that there are few international law
protections for migrant workers in an irregular situation. The fact that the only time the UAE
Constitution makes reference to “foreigners” it grants “them rights and freedom stipulated in
international charters which are in force or in treaties and agreements to which the Union is
party”587 makes the lack of protection in international law even more significant.
Furthermore, as Mohanty writes, neoliberal states facilitate movement for some
economically privileged communities, at the expense of inhibiting movement and mobility
through “conditionality, criminalization and incarceration”588 of migrants with irregular
statuses.”589 The threat of irregularity places the migrant workers who have lived for generations
by subverting the kafala system in a “permanently deportable” situation. As Nicholas de Genova
forcefully argues, deportation has achieved an unprecedented prominence. While it was seen as
“barbarous and cruel,” at the beginning of the twentieth century, by the end of the century, it has
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“become utterly banal.”590 This constant state of deportability shapes the everyday lives of not
only “undocumented” “illegal” workers who are in an irregular situation, but also migrant
workers who have been able to subvert the kafala system and even certain local minorities in the
UAE.591 Having evaluated the international and Emirati regimes regulating migrant workers in
the UAE, the following chapter will discuss whether UAE’s efforts towards SD through eco-city
projects such as Masdar City can serve as a useful site to seek migrant justice.
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Chapter 4: The Story of Masdar:
“Sustainable Development” for Migrant Justice?
“The UAE Government wants to ensure sustainable development while preserving the
environment, and to achieve a perfect balance between economic and social development.”
- UAE Vision 2021 website592
“Masdar was launched in April 2006, rooted in the principles of resource conservation and
sustainable development practiced by the UAE’s first President and Founding Father, Sheikh
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.”
- Sultan al Jaber, Former CEO of Masdar 2010
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), too, is enchanted by post-Paris enthusiasm593 towards
sustainable development (SD). Indeed Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, former ruler of Abu
Dhabi known as the “Green Sheikh, “is still remembered as a strong advocate for environmental
protection; his vision is said to have “[become] a legacy ensuring the long-term SD of the
UAE.”594 As Majid Al Mansouri, former Secretary-General of the Environment Agency in Abu
Dhabi, stated, “For five decades, Sheikh Zayed advocated and adopted the concept of what is
known today as sustainable development.”595 Building on this “Sheikh Zayed legacy,” the UAE
Vision 2021 set UAE’s ambition towards “an environmentally sustainable world” as “a leader of
the green revolution.”596
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Similarly, UAE’s capital, Abu Dhabi, announced Economic Vision 2030, a long-term
development agenda that aims to diversify its economy and incorporate sustainability.597 Since
then, Abu Dhabi has established several renewable energy and sustainable development
initiatives under Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan598 and Foreign Minister
Sheikh Abdullah, including winning a bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency,
establishing a nuclear energy program and Masdar City. While its ecological footprint599 is one
of the world’s largest, the UAE seeks to position itself as a leader of the “post-oil” future.
Whether or not UAE’s efforts to jump on the sustainable development bandwagon have been
effective so far or merely reflect an “eco-desire,”600 does UAE’s aspiration to be a leader in a
‘post-oil future’ provide an opportunity to reimagine other relationships, tensions and
dependencies?
The preceding chapters have shown how movement and supportive capabilities are
distributed in ways that confine certain migrant workers into sectors, statuses, and routes that
may put them at greater risk of precarity and irregularity. Given these criticisms, do UAE’s
commitments towards SD provide an opportunity to expand migrant workers’ capabilities? What
does Masdar’s story tell us about SD’s ability to accommodate migrant justice? In particular,
should we expect that in building an eco-city, a state would begin to question its reliance on and
poor treatment of migrant workers?
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SD is notoriously difficult to define and can mean “different things to different
people.”601 While scholars and policymakers continue to debate the precise definition of SD, it is
most often defined according to the 1987 Brundtland Report, which defines SD as “development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.”602 SD is understood as consisting of three pillars (economic,
environmental and social) that it claims to balance in a holistic, integrated way. Migrant workers’
concerns can be addressed arguably most directly within the social pillar, which remains most
under-theorized.603
While its latest iteration as SDGs604 has received high-level political support and is
endorsed by the Global Migration Compact, SD remains a contested topic. Literature on the
subject exploded since it was first introduced as a term in 1987, ranging across different
disciplines, including Development Studies, Environmental Law, Ecological Economics,
Environmental Science, Environmental Sociology, Environmental Ethics, Climatology, Geology,
Policy and Planning, and Urban Studies.605 The following account, however, focuses on three
critical strands of literature on SD: capabilities approach, which defines SD in terms of
capabilities and can explicitly re-hierarchize social and environmental dimensions over
economic, Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) which can historicize SD and
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Critical Development Scholarship which is useful for its post-colonial and post-structural
critiques on SD. While CA, TWAIL, and CD accounts on SD vary in their foci, the common
theme is a critique on the development project’s (including its most recent iteration as SD)
relentless commitment to economic growth and the need for plural conceptions of justice and
paths to development.
This chapter will explore whether SD can further migrant workers’ movement and
supportive capabilities in three parts. Part 1 will start with a brief discussion of the instruments
that led to SD and show the potential link between them and migrant workers’ movement and
supportive capabilities. It will then see how SD is practiced in the UAE through Masdar City,
arguing how reliance on ecological modernization discourses hollows SD out of its social
content, allowing Masdar City to expand movement and supportive capabilities for a select few
while retaining the status quo for the majority of migrant workers who are treated as
uninterested, uninformed and unimportant. This dilution of SD’s social aspects and co-option in
practice undermines SD’s ability to accommodate migrant justice. Part 2 proposes one reason
why SD is likely to get co-opted lies within how the concept evolved where economic concerns
consistently eclipsed social and environmental aspects. Part 3 analyzes Agenda 2030 and argues
that while it takes precarity and irregularity into account, persistent tensions and hierarchies
undermine its ability to expand migrant workers’ supportive and movement capabilities.
Ultimately, I argue that as reflected by SD in practice, SD’s evolution and persistent tensions in
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), sustainable development’s eco-modernist logic and
unidimensional view of economic-centered growth, waters down its social content and
undermines its compatibility with migrant justice.
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4.1 SD’s connection to migrant workers’ concerns
A glance at how SD has evolved can highlight the way migrant workers’ concerns and
capabilities have been included, albeit partially, in some key documents that have defined and
elaborated on SD. While these instruments are non-binding and have primarily reiterated existing
human rights norms, the link between SD and migrant workers’ concerns is strongest in SDGs.
SD’s evolution in international environmental law is conventionally narrated as inspired
by “limits to growth” debates of the 1970s and the 1972 Stockholm Conference.606 The
Stockholm Declaration set the foundation for both contemporary international environmental law
and SD.607 In articulating the relationship between environment and development, it linked
environmental protection to human rights norms. This is seen most clearly through Principle 1,
which states that “man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.”608 This was
connected to eliminating “policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation,
discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination.”609 Principle 1,
therefore, may entail expanding some aspects of movement and supportive capabilities.
In contrast, while the World Commission on Environment and Development’s
Brundtland Report takes migration and informal labour into account, it does not mention
improving working conditions or removing policies promoting forms of oppression.610 The UN
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General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development in
1983 to reconcile tensions between economic development with environmental protection. The
WCED published the Brundtland Report (titled “Our common future”) in 1987, which remains a
primary reference point for SD.611 It defined SD as “development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.” In the
Brundtland Report, SD is defined therefore as “fair allocation of resources” between the
“developed” and “developing” countries (intragenerational justice) and between the present and
future generations (intergenerational justice).612 As Section 4.9 will elaborate, the Brundtland
Report has been criticized for inter alia its focus on poverty eradication.
The language of rights in the Stockholm Declaration, as Novitz and Pieraccini note, is
replaced by “needs” in the Brundtland Report. Furthermore, in its section on “Changes in
Mobility,” migration is primarily dealt with as a potential impact on population distribution. It is
posed as one of the “risks and potential disputes” to be monitored alongside environmental
impacts such as soil erosion.613 More significantly, while the Brundtland Report noted that
“informal sector builders represent an important source of urban employment, in particular for
low and unskilled labour,”614 This labour is described as flexible, not “capital-intensive,
technology-intensive, or energy-intensive” and, therefore, able to contribute to development
objectives. In short, while the Brundtland Report explicitly takes migration and labour into
account, this is done only in relation to population distribution or “Self-Reliance and Citizen
Involvement.” Since labour is projected to increase and the “option of migration to new lands is
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virtually closed,”615 increased economic growth becomes integral to increasing job opportunities,
lowering fertility rates, and “managing” population growth. 616
In 1992, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21617 were signed at the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, further connecting the development and environmental agendas.
They elaborated on SD’s components, tools and institutional structure, namely the Commission
on Sustainable Development. SD is composed of substantive components such as “the principle
of integration, inter- and intra-generational equity principle, sustainable use of natural resources
and the right to development.”618 SD’s procedural components include obligations between states
to inform, cooperate, notify, assist during emergencies and negotiate in good faith.619 States also
have procedural obligations towards their citizens, including informing, public participation and
access to remedies. In the context of migrant workers building eco-cities, the procedural
obligations states have to their citizens, such as providing information, public participation and
access to remedies, are relevant. It is interesting to note, however, that these obligations are not
towards non-citizen residents. While the Rio Declaration’s list of vulnerable groups does not
include migrants, the action plan in Agenda 21 not only identified migrants as one of the
vulnerable groups but also called for strengthening the role of trade unions and workers.620 It also
called to “promote the use of labour-intensive construction and maintenance technologies which
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generate employment in the construction sector for the underemployed labour force found in
most large cities, while at the same time promoting the development of skills in the construction
sector.”621
In 1995, the Copenhagen Declaration adopted at the World Summit for Social
Development added social development as the third pillar of SD.622 Here, not only did human
rights reappear, but the Copenhagen Declaration also promoted “full employment and enabling
men and women to attain sustainable livelihoods” while explicitly calling for the “protection of
all human rights and non-discrimination” as well as “full respect of human dignity and to
achieving equality and equity between men and women.”623
It also explicitly included migrant workers in two of its commitments. Internationally, the
Declaration’s signatories including the UAE committed to “ensure that migrant workers benefit
from the protections provided by relevant national and international instruments, take concrete
and effective measures against the exploitation of migrant workers, and encourage all countries
to consider the ratification and full implementation of the relevant international instruments on
migrant workers”.624 It also includes a commitment on the national level to “formulate or
strengthen measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants,
migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in
sectors of many societies, and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies”625 In
other words, while it primarily reinforces existing human rights norms it also commits
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signatories to “take concrete and effective measures against the exploitation of migrant workers.”
The inclusion of full employment (as opposed to income-generating employment)626 as well as
full respect of human dignity is also promising from a capabilities-based perspective.
In 2002, Johannesburg Declaration formally embraced social development as an integral
component of SD and continued the focus on poverty eradication. The Johannesburg Declaration
calls to provide assistance to increase “income-generating” employment opportunities, “taking
into account the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of the International
Labour Organization.”627 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, which is argued to “place
social concerns on an equal footing with more familiar environmental and economic aims.”628
also mentions supporting the ILO’s work on the social dimension of globalization as well as
reducing occupational hazards and protecting workers’ health.
In 2012, Rio+20 and its outcome document titled “The Future We Want” devoted an
entire section to “promoting full and productive employment, decent work for all, and social
protections.”629 Rio+20 underscored the need to include participation from migrants and called
to “promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedom of all migrants
regardless of migration status, especially those of women and children”630 the inclusion of “all
migrants regardless of migration status”631 is contrasted by the Copenhagen Declaration’s
reference to “migrants, migrant workers and their families.”632 However, as Section 4.8 will
discuss in greater detail, this was done through the theme of green economy which narrowed SD
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to the economy-environment nexus and risked a return to a more narrow economic-centric view
of SD while diluting other pillars. Rio+20 also introduced the High-Level Political Forum, which
replaced the Commission on Sustainable Development in 2012, which seeks to enhance the
integration of the three dimensions of SD in a holistic way.633
This brings us to the SDGs, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals in 2015
and have reinvigorated efforts to frame labour standards and migrant workers’ rights in terms of
SD. 634 As several studies on the linkages between SDGs and migration highlight,635 there are
many connections between migration and SDG’s goals, targets and indicators. While SDG 8,
which calls for ‘full and productive employment and decent work for all’ by 2030, is most
directly related to migrant workers, SDG 5, SDG 4, SDG 10, SDG 11, SD12 and SDG 16 are
also relevant to our discussion. Targets under SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth, in
particular, refer to ILO’s fundamental labour standards on non-discrimination, forced labour,
human trafficking and child labour.636 Not only does SDG 8 stress job creation for the
marginalized, but Target 8.7 emphasizes measures to eradicate forced labour and end modern
slavery and human trafficking, and target 8.8 refers to the vulnerability of migrant workers,
especially women and those in precarious employment. Through target 10.7, states commit to
‘[f]acilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including
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through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.’ In other words,
the SDG’s take both precarious employment and irregular migration into account.
Nicola Piper argues that in contrast to migration-development debates that sideline
migrant rights, the SDGs have the potential to address migration from a rights perspective
because their realization goes beyond providing ‘safe and orderly migration’ and they address
the lack of ‘decent work’ and participatory decision making.637 Novitz goes as far as to contend
that SD is already “taken as embracing and incorporating the protection of labour standards.”638
This might encourage a broader a decent work agenda rather than only focusing on “core”
human rights. Similarly, the International Organization on Migration Director General William
Lacy Swing also contends that “with the SDGs, migration is now seen as an issue to act upon to
enhance sustainable development.”639 However, as Section 4.10 will elaborate, there are
significant concerns that may caution celebrating SDG’s embrace of decent work and partial
inclusion of precarious employment and irregular migration. Nevertheless, in summary, while
the link between migration and SD has always been there to a certain extent throughout its
development and this inclusion has not necessarily followed a linear path, it has become more
explicit in SDGs.

4.2 SD’s legal obligations and nature
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Having introduced some of the main instruments contributing to SD’s role as the “new
lingua franca in international policy-making,” it is worthwhile to summarize debates on SD’s
obligations and its legal nature. Despite SD’s vague nature, proponents of SD argue that it “for
the first time it makes state’s management of its domestic environment a matter of international
concern in a systematic way.”640 Atapattu and Puvimanagasinghe, for instance, show how
public-interest litigation in South Asia after the Bhopal disaster of 1984 is using SD and insist
that there are certain concrete obligations it gives rise to.641 They point to the 1992 Rio
Declaration, which elaborated on SD’s components and tools. The Rio Declaration consists of
the following principles: “the principle of integration, inter- and intra-generational equity
principle, sustainable use of natural resources and the right to development.” While the right to
development’s status is unsettled, other procedural components include obligations between
states to inform, cooperate, notify, assist during emergencies and negotiate in good faith. States
also have procedural obligations towards their citizens, including informing, public participation
and access to remedies.
Atapattu notes that The New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law
Relating to Sustainable Development adopted by the International Law Association in 2002 is
also significant in this regard. It further identified principles that formed sustainable development
as: “(a) the duty of states to ensure sustainable use of natural resources; (b) the principle of
equity and the eradication of poverty; (c) the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities; (d) the principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems; (e) the principle of public participation and access to information and
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justice; (f) the principle of good governance; and (g) the principle of integration and
interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and
environmental objectives.”642 Not only did it endorse SD as a common concern for both
developed and developing countries but, in doing so, it recognized SD as an erga omnes
obligation.643 New Delhi Declaration’s principle of integration and interrelationship is
particularly relevant given migrant workers’ rights, and related capabilities are seen to fall within
SD’s social pillar. While the social pillar remains most under-theorized, it does seem to consist
of the “basic needs” of people, expressed in terms of human rights.644
However, despite arguments that SD gives rise to certain concrete substantive and
procedural obligations, sustainable development's legal nature is contentious at best. The seminal
case which dealt with SD is the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case in 1997, where the International
Court of Justice rejected endorsing Judge Weeramantry’s separate opinion recognizing SD as a
customary principle of international law. Therefore, as Barral argues, it has not been granted
formal customary legal status by the courts even though it is used as an interpretive tool and an
objective that can serve as a basis to measure legal provisions.
Proponents such as Atapattu argue that most of the components of SD impose binding
obligations on states such as the principle of integration, inter and intragenerational equity and
procedural components, which have all been incorporated in a number of international treaties
and declarations on not only the environment, human rights but also trade and investment. Also,
the ICJ in the Pulp Mills Case between Argentina and Uruguay held that conducting

642

Atapattu, “From Our Common Future to Sustainable Development Goals”, supra note 619.. at p 230231
643
Atapattu & Puvimanasinghe, “Guidance from the Ground up”, supra note 618.
644
Sumudu Atapattu, “The Paris Agreement and human rights: is sustainable development the ‘new
human right’?” (2018) 9:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 68–88.

188

transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - a tool that allows states to achieve
integration and incorporates public participation - is part of customary international law.645
On the other hand, Lowe argues that SD is not a primary rule but instead an “interstitial
norm” or modifying norm, which is better used as an interpretative tool to serve a hermeneutical
function for judges.646 For Lowe, it is “a meta-principle, acting upon other legal rules and
principles – a legal concept exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, pushing and pulling the
boundaries of true primary norms when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other.”647
While some scholars argue that it is merely a political or philosophical objective, others argue
that regardless of its legal nature its various principles culminate in a “conceptual matrix.”648
More recently, Margherita Pieraccini and Tonia Novitz who rely on critical legal theory argue
that “sustainability [is] a ‘directing’ principle of post-modern law” which is useful for its
flexibility to be able to encompass multiple perspectives and be further refined.649
In summary, while SD’s legal nature is contested, there are some concrete obligations it
gives rise to, and that may have an impact on migrant workers’ capabilities. Both SD’s strengths
and weaknesses are attributed to its flexibility. While it remains a concept difficult to define, its
flexibility has allowed it to serve as an anchor for environmental measures and the international
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development agenda. However, whether it has the potential to address the fragmentation that
features the international regime on migrant workers and tendency to create precarity and
irregularity is to be determined in the following sections.

4.3 Abu Dhabi’s ambitions and anxieties: Masdar City’s Context
An SD-rhetoric is also emerging in the Gulf. In the past two decades, Abu Dhabi has
taken a number of steps that depict at least a perceived ambition towards sustainable
development due to a number of environmental, economic and political pressures. Firstly, the
UAE has been classified as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the Middle
East North Africa region. Climate change impacts such as rising temperatures and sea-levels in
an already hot, water-scarce, low-lying, highly populated coastal zone place the UAE in a unique
position. Accordingly, UAE was the first country in the region to develop a green growth
strategy plan in 2012 (approved by the cabinet in early 2015) and to release a climate action plan
in 2017.650 It also prepared its INDC in line with its Vision 2021, which commits UAE to make
clean energy 24% of its total energy mix by 2021. Between 2007 and 2010, locally based experts
have noted a perceived increase in government interest in climate-change relates issues.
Secondly, anxieties around political legitimacy sparked by the Arab Spring, fluctuating
oil prices, a gas shortage in Abu Dhabi have also contributed to the recent shift towards a “postoil future.”651 While Abu Dhabi owns 95 percent of the UAE’s fossil fuel reserves and the
650
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world’s sixth largest proven oil reserves, other emirates are less energy secure and depend on
Abu Dhabi for both natural resources and infrastructure development. 652 In 2011, chronic power
shortages continued to plague the northern emirates (Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm
al-Quwain), who were growing tired of the unreliability of Abu Dhabi’s supplies. Meanwhile,
due to fear of losing political legitimacy during the Arab Spring, as noted by Mari Luomi, Abu
Dhabi made a series of promises to address these shortages. Inter-emirate politics, therefore, play
a significant role in Abu Dhabi’s ambition towards a post-oil future. Given that energy demand is
expected to increase, this dynamic will continue to play a role. Lastly, since Abu Dhabi is one of
the few emirates today that has been able to able to secure financial resources, it is placed in a
better position to be able to diversify its economy.
These environmental, political and economic pressures have allowed the UAE to make
more ambitious goals towards a “knowledge-based” diversified economy. While former ruler653
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan was more conservative with his approach to development,654
under Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi has marketed itself as a “global city.” It
has done this through multi-billion dollar iconic projects such as a new Louvre, Guggenheim
Museum, Yas Island, which features a Ferrari theme park and Saadiyat Island, which features
New York University Abu Dhabi campus.
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These institutions are part of the knowledge-based economy that Abu Dhabi has laid out
in a number of plans such as Abu Dhabi Vision 2030, Plan Abu Dhabi 2030, Abu Dhabi
Economic Vision 2030, and Abu Dhabi Education Reform: The Road to 2030. Abu Dhabi’s
Economic Vision 2030, in particular, sets to achieve a level of “non-oil GDP growth at a higher
rate than that of the oil sector,” aiming to “reach equilibrium in non-oil trade by 2028.” 655 It
states, “economic growth is currently coupled too closely with oil prices and the key to more
sustainable development lies in simulating non-oil sectors, diversifying the range and depth of
economic activity taking place in the Emirate, and increasing productivity through a focused
approach on Abu Dhabi’s competitive advantages.”
Accordingly, Abu Dhabi has launched a number of initiatives, including partnering with
the International Renewable Energy Agency, investing in a nuclear energy program, and
Estidama, Abu Dhabi’s sustainable development program focusing on sustainable urban
development and the built environment through regulatory building codes.656 Also, in 2006, Abu
Dhabi established Masdar Initiative, a subsidiary of government-owned Mubadala Development
Company. Masdar Initiative currently has two branches: Masdar Energy and Masdar City. Under
Masdar Energy, it has a number of funded, partially funded renewable energy projects in over 20
countries. Masdar City, however, remains its most visible project in the UAE.
It is important to note, however, despite the many pressures discussed above, ambitious
goals and initiatives established, some commentators argue Abu Dhabi has fewer incentives to
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put its words into action.657 Compared to Dubai, which has only 6 percent of its GDP growth tied
to oil and has depleted most of its share of natural resources, Abu Dhabi still continues to use its
natural oil and gas resources for roughly one-third of its GDP growth, with mining and quarrying
as major contributors to their GDP-share. Some estimations predict that Abu Dhabi could rely on
oil for close to a century at current production rates.658
Similarly, the proliferation of sustainable development rhetoric in the region and in Abu
Dhabi has been met with skepticism by a number of Urban Studies and Energy Studies scholars
who argue the lack of democratic practices in “neo-patrimonial autocracies” such as UAE make
it difficult for any sustainable development mega-projects to be meaningful. Ponzini, for
instance, shows how the Urban Planning Council (currently Department of Municipalities and
Transport)659 in Abu Dhabi has limited influence in the absence of legally binding planning tools
and given the major real-estate operators’ connections to the ruling elite.660
Regardless of whether Abu Dhabi’s ambitions are substantiated by action and the
likelihood of meeting its lofty goals, sustainable development and green rhetoric are proliferating
in the region and the emirate. We will now turn our attention to Masdar City, which was
conceived in this context and has had varying degrees of political support from the UAE’s ruling
family since its inception.
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4.4 Masdar City
Masdar661 City is a staple in discussions on sustainable development and has attracted
attention from international media, policymakers, government officials and academics alike.662
Celebrated by some as the “city of possibilities,”663 “city of dreams,”664 it has also been referred
to by some as a “sandcastle”665 or “a spaceship in the desert.”666 While its own ambition,
labels667, and expected completion dates have continuously evolved,668 Masdar City still claims
to be setting Abu Dhabi towards a post-oil future. It joins the growing number of eco-cities being
built in the region and elsewhere, collectively known as the eco-city phenomenon.669
It was launched in 2006 by Masdar Initiative, state-owned renewable energy and clean
technology company.670 The $22-billion project was funded by Crown Prince Muhammad bin
Zayed Al Nahyan’s671 Abu Dhabi-owned Mubadala, an investment company that seeks to
diversify the emirate’s economy. Originally designed by London-based architecture firm Foster
and Partners, this “eco-smart city” is still under construction in a 6 square km area neighbouring
the Abu Dhabi international airport, around 15 km from downtown Abu Dhabi.
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Masdar City had promised to become the world’s first zero-carbon, zero-waste city that
would serve as a testbed for clean technology, renewable energy and smart technologies. Masdar
City’s original award-winning master plan by Foster and Partners used traditional “Islamic
architecture”672 and urban planning to create a pedestrian, car-less city. Narrow streets would
channel the wind in a way that would reduce perceived temperature, and an underground system
using automated electric vehicles would be the only mode of transportation.
However, Masdar City’s master plans have gone through many iterations since then. The
economic crisis in 2008 significantly undermined its development, reducing the original $22billion investment to $18-billion, forcing its developers to consider a more pragmatic approach.
The personal rapid transit system, for instance, never developed beyond the test stage, limited to
only 10 percent of the total area and only some of the buildings are covered with solar panels.
The 2016 deadline was eventually pushed to 2030.673 During my fieldwork in 2016, Masdar
City’s entrance was lined with taxis and featured buildings that Masdar Institute of Science
Technology was using as the institute merged with King Abdullah University of Science and
Technology. It also housed several clean-tech businesses, the International Renewable Energy
Agency and two residential buildings, and a 10MW Solar Photovoltaic Plant. Currently, the
city's population is 1300 and, once completed, it plans to have 50,000 residents and be able to
run on a number of clean technologies built on-site such as solar power and geothermal
stations.674
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In the following section, I show how Masdar City’s construction, articulation of SD and
evolution reflect “eco-desire.” Its reliance on ecological modernization discourses and
hierarchization of economic aspects, while consistently bypassing social aspects of SD, reflect an
inability of SD to accommodate migrant justice in practice. This allows Masdar City to afford
movement and supportive capabilities to a select few, namely “high-skilled” “expats” and
Emiratis who are seen as contributing to Abu Dhabi’s knowledge-based economy, while
retaining the status quo for racialized, poor “low-skilled” migrant workers whose access to the
city is limited and are represented as uninformed and uninterested in its “post-oil future.”

4.5 Masdar City’s Construction and Exclusion
“Man with a brush could perform a feat that extensive technological innovations could
not so far handle, and therefore was fundamental to the emergent renewable energy and
clean technology sector of Abu Dhabi…Masdar City attempted to help humanity fight
climate change…but its understanding of humanity was particular and selective. It did
not include the man with a brush.”675
Gökçe Günel
Masdar City’s construction reflects its reluctance to introduce commitments towards labour
standards that could have expanded migrant workers’ movement and supportive capabilities.
Firstly, Masdar City decided to outsource construction to third-party developers that allowed
Masdar to distance itself from the construction process. This decision was made to diffuse
financial risk and avoid having to implement sustainability principles in the construction process
as was initially targeted.676
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Secondly, Abu Dhabi initially presented Masdar City as having been conceived according
to the principles advocated by ‘One planet living,’ a sustainable planning scheme launched by
the World Wild Foundation (WWF) and Bioregional an environmental consultancy.677 In 2008,
WWF announced that Masdar City planned to exceed the scheme’s ten principles' requirements.
These principles included not only environmental dimensions but also issues such as fair
working conditions. Principle number 9, in particular, called for fair wages and working
conditions for all workers (including construction) as defined by international labour standards.
However, as Crot
informs, Masdar’s framework
included in 2010 was different
from WWF’s initial version; it
changed any reference to labour
standards. Principle 9 had been
changed to “Masdar must
ensure that the community’s
impact on other communities is
positive: Masdar City is
committed to helping the broader Abu Dhabi community, the UAE, the region and the world
(ADFEC, 2010).” Masdar city’s adaptation of the original principles and exclusion of labour
standards reflects its reluctance to challenge the status quo and its limited utopic vision of a postoil future.678
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In addition, Masdar City’s physical location close to Abu Dhabi International Airport
also allows it to distance itself from the majority of the migrant workers who live in Musaffah,
an industrial neighbourhood in the city's outskirts that remains disconnected to the public
transportation system. Even though it had planned to be a car-less city, its connection to Abu
Dhabi’s public transportation system, even to Abu Dhabi’s downtown, is limited at best.

Figure 4.2: Masdar City Masterplans 2015

In addition, while initially, Masdar City had planned to implement a “20 percent policy” which
would reserve a small area of the city for “low-income workers,” this has not yet been
implemented.679 Instead, the newest developments in Masdar City have featured My City Centre
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Masdar, Abu Dhabi’s “most sustainable retail destination” that opened in April 2019 and
Mohammed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, “the world’s first university for
artificial intelligence” where classes are scheduled to begin in September 2020.680
The images that adorn both the walls inside Masdar City’s buildings and feature in its
master plans and promotional materials represent its residents as either “expatriates” or “local,”
while excluding migrant workers from South Asia who account for the majority of the UAE’s
population. Masdar City fits in what Yasser Elshtaway calls a “fractured urbanity,” which shapes
urban development in the Gulf region where “people are confined to certain sections within the
city based on nationality, ethnic background and socio-economic criteria.” 681 As one of the
interviewed returning migrant workers reported, he never left the industrial area where he
worked and lived during his entire stay in the UAE. Like the sites Elshtaway observes, Masdar
City was planned based on binaries such as expatriate/worker and local/non-local. Zoning codes
and regulations attribute residency based on ethnicities. The Urban Planning Council (currently
Department of Municipalities and Transport), which is Abu Dhabi’s strategic planning agency
and the expert authority on Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 Urban Structure Framework Plan, has allocated
specific neighbourhoods to Emiratis, while codes related to “orderly appearance of public
spaces” are used to remove certain migrant workers from public spaces.682
As Luomi writes, “originally the city was…designed to attract wealthy expatriates
interested in [its] unique niche of the high-end real estate market.” Given the cheaper apartments
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are around 500,000 AED to buy and 40,000/ year to rent, the prices exclude “low-skilled,” “lowincome” migrant workers. Of the 750 initial homes, 500 initial homes were leased to
corporations and educational institutions affiliated with Masdar. Similarly, as Jensen and
Yigtincanlar show, most of the city’s residents in 2016 were MIST faculty members, students
and researchers associated with Masdar-affiliated projects.683 During my fieldwork in 2018, 80
percent of the residential units were assigned to MIST students, faculty, researchers and
professionals working in Masdar-affiliated projects.
One of the only times construction workers are explicitly featured in Masdar city’s
materials is in the context of awareness campaigns. Masdar Initiative voluntarily published
Sustainability Reports through 2012-2019 using the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability
Standards, which include reporting on labour practices and decent work performance. The
Global Reporting Initiative is a partner in the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development
Data, which is one of the coordination mechanisms included in the operation of SDGs (which
will be discussed later on).684 According to Masdar Initiative’s 2012 sustainability report, Masdar
City participated in a heat stress preventive campaign to “Educate construction workers about
heat stress and how to avoid it” and issued “safety bulleting outlining mandatory requirements
such as providing [water] and supplements to workers before they arrive on site” and posting
educational posters in different languages. Similar “heat safety awareness campaigns” were

683

Jensen, B, (2016) “Masdar City: A Critical Retrospection” in Steffen Wippel et al, Under
Construction: Logics of Urbanism in the Gulf Region (Routledge, 2016). pp.45-54.; Tan Yigitcanlar,
Technology and the City: Systems, applications and implications (Routledge, 2016) Google-Books-ID:
XNwRDAAAQBAJ.
684
“The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) - United Nations Partnerships for SDGs platform”, online:
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/partners/?id=96>.

200

launched in 2013, 2014685 and 2015.686 These campaigns were designed to provide “advice and
awareness” to contractors and the construction workers employed on Masdar City’s projects.
They were given training on how to avoid heat-related health problems, including heat
exhaustion, heatstroke. The fact that this intervention is an awareness campaign687 paints these
workers as uninformed and makes preventing heat-related health problems their responsibility.
This presentation of workers as uninformed or uninterested in SD was also reproduced by
one of my interlocutors, Mohammad, a Pakistani Research Engineer working for a Masdar
project and a former student-resident of the city. “Do you think they know where they are
working? I’ve asked a few times…they don’t really know…” said Mohammad pointing to a
worker cleaning in a brightly-lit air-conditioned room in one of Masdar Institute’s academic
buildings. This perception is contrasted by accounts shared by interviewed returning migrant
workers that reflect not only an awareness of the various projects they were working for but also
how environmental factors’ impacted their working and living conditions. Muzammil’s account
is particularly relevant in this regard:
“I liked the UAE…in terms of cleanliness and things like that….but the climate there is
very tough…and for our job, it is very tough. Now imagine walking a few kilometres in
48 degrees Celsius…this I am sure you know too…I mean I got used to it…but in our job
you know there a lot of small tasks that require going back and forth…like when we have
to maintain the car’s temperature because the customer has to leave…the water would be
at boiling temperature, but we would keep working…”
In comparison, when I asked one of the interviewed student-residents Mohammed to elaborate
on why he thought the migrant workers did not know where they were working, he went on
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further to explain that this lack of interest was because “if you want to be sustainable, you have
to be rich.” He noted how sustainability was a concept “for rich people like those who own
Tesla” and described the dorms in Masdar City as “5-star hotels.”688
Masdar City was failing, for Mohamed and other interviewed student-residents, because
it was constructed and planned in a “top-down” way, without considering the majority of Abu
Dhabi’s population’s needs. For Mohmmad, it would have been a better decision to invest in
Abu Dhabi’s existing transportation system. Mohammed and Layla, both former studentresidents, lamented how the city and MIST failed because the development was “too fast” and “a
lot of money was spent on a small group of people.” Layla recounted how the Masdar hosted
many “lavish dinners” for “Western” professors and academics. Masdar City’s website continues
to reflect this by its self-description “a living, working community where residents, academics
and business professionals live, learn, work and play in an environment that pushes the
boundaries of sustainable design, construction and operation.”689 Through actively attracting and
limiting its access to this “small group” of people in contrast to its representation of migrant
workers constructing and maintaining it, Masdar city is able to only expand movement and
supportive capabilities to a select few.
4.6 Masdar City’s Articulation of SD
“Whoever runs this [Masdar] doesn’t care about sustainability.”
Masdar City resident
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Masdar City’s articulation of SD reflects an eco-modernist approach and has been
progressively watered down to a narrow focus on the built environment and commercial
viability. In its earlier days, Masdar City aimed to be a “pioneer in sustainable development,”
and the way it articulated SD included three pillars: economic, environmental and social. More
recent articulations have, however, replaced sustainable development with sustainability or
sustainable urban development. The latter is also allegedly based on the three pillars of
economic, social and environmental sustainability.690
As Cugurullo argues, however, Masdar’s sustainable development's social aspect can
more accurately be defined as “socially acceptable.” The aforementioned One Planet Living
Principles were ultimately replaced by nine Key Performance indicators that are also used to
measure the city's social aspects. Indicators such as occupancy, post-occupancy, and turnover are
used to discern the city's attractiveness and customer satisfaction.691 Social aspects of sustainable
development, in other words, were reduced to customer satisfaction, reflecting Masdar City’s
reliance on ecological modernization.
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Masdar City’s most updated master plan articulates its aims to be “a commercially viable
city offering the highest quality of life within the lowest environmental footprint.” Its goals to be
“commercially viable” lends itself to promoting the city as a business first. Indeed the oft-cited
quote by one of Masdar’s developers is telling: “We want Masdar city to be profitable, not just
sunk cost. If it is not profitable as a real-estate development, it is not sustainable”.692 This way,
sustainability or sustainable development becomes synonymous with commercial viability or
profitability.
Similarly, Masdar Initiative, the company that established Masdar City uses sustainable
development in a way that reflects an eco-modernist approach. It states its vision as, “To make
Abu Dhabi the world’s reference for knowledge and collaboration in the advancement of
renewable energy, clean technologies and sustainable development.” The coupling of sustainable
development with the advancement of renewable energy and clean technologies depicts its
reliance on an eco-modernist approach where the prevailing logic equates environmental
protection with technological fixes. This, along with Masdar City’s aims to be “commercially
viable,” reflects a broader trend that is apparent in eco-cities that consistently prioritize economic
concerns over environmental and social ones.693
Furthermore, Masdar City’s master plan articulates sustainable development as one that
does not compromise on “quality of life.” In other words, it does not tackle consumption
patterns, nor does it differentiate luxury emissions from subsistence emissions.694 All the
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interviewed Masdar residents noted how electricity and water subsidies in the UAE “make
energy so cheap that people start using more and more” and how the “rich” Emiratis who have
“bigger houses” use these subsidies more. This is particularly relevant given the UAE ranks
among the world’s top three per capita consumers of energy, and the residential sector makes up
40 percent of all electricity consumption in Abu Dhabi.695 In 2010, Emiratis paid 3-5 fils/kWH,
and non-Emiratis paid 15 fils/kWh (the US¢4.0), while it cost Abu Dhabi on average 27.6 fils
(US¢7.5) to produce a kWh of electricity.696 While since 2017, the rates for both Emirati and
non-Emiratis have changed to include a quota, the Arab Spring has had a significant impact on
subsidy reform. Emiratis continue to pay around a quarter of the price compared non-Emiratis.697
Masdar City’s master plan states its focus on sustainable development is through “the
reduction of demand for energy and water, and recycling and reuse of waste material particularly
during the construction activities.” When further articulating this reduction of demand Masdar
City’s master plan claims to be doing so through a focus on the built environment through
sustainable buildings that rely on Abu Dhabi’s Estidama Pearl Building Rating System (which
also focuses on the built environment) and projects such as a prototype for “Eco-villas” and the
“Saint-Gobain Multi-Comfort home.” In other words, Masdar City’s sustainable buildings do not
tackle consumption patterns, and the focus is on how the buildings are built in terms of design
and use of materials.
Absent in both the Estidama Pearl Building Rating System, which is in accordance with
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) (an international green building
rating system) and Masdar City’s master plan is any mention of social aspects of sustainable
695
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development for either its residents or those involved in the construction of its sustainable
buildings. As Omair Awadh argues, the weighting of social-related credits in both Estidama and
LEED does not exceed 10%.698 Writing for the Journal of Building Engineering and himself a
consultant in Dubai, Awadh recommends that more attention be given to the social aspect.699
Therefore, Masdar City’s understanding of sustainable development is tied to the built
environment and increasingly more overtly on commercial viability. This dilution of SD allows
Masdar City to engage with SD in a way that does not challenge the status quo for the “man with
a brush” or the “low-skilled” migrant workers building and maintaining it; questions of
environmental and migrant justice are tactfully excluded. While due to ethical and security
reasons involving interviewing migrant workers in the UAE, I was unable to formally interview
migrant workers, one of the interviewed returning migrant workers who lived in the Gulf for
more than 30 years recalled this dynamic that resonates with Yasser Elshtaway’s notion of
fractured urbanity:
“When I first left Pakistan…the goray (white people) selected me from here as a
supervisor…so when I went there the accommodation I got was in tents….the heat there
is so extreme…at that time when I was in Muscat…at the time when the palace for Sultan
Qaboos was being built…the name of that place was Beit Al-Baraka…the special thing
about that place was that you could go directly from water and from the helipad…
That palace…was my first project as a foreman…
The company was called Drak and Skull, which was in charge of pipe-fitting and steamfitting and putting in a chiller water plant…
I was working in this palace, and my accommodation was in a tent because it was all a
desert back then…there was nothing around us…so we lived in the tents…everyone
did…only the goray (white people) lived in the city.”
This account highlights how the environment is urgently experienced by migrant workers,
countering the notion that migrant workers are uninterested in environmental issues, including
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SD projects such as Masdar City. It also emphasizes how even after decades, “labour
containerization” and spatial segregation according to race and ethnicity have been maintained.

4.7 Masdar City: Its evolution and fixation on economic growth
“It’s all about who you know here. If you are like a low-income worker, you walk into the
bottom of the building…”
Civil Society Organization advocate
Masdar City is characterized as a demand-responsive development that evolves based on
its business partners’ demands. Masdar Initiative intended Masdar City to be flexible to attract
businesses and accommodate future business partners' interests. Masdar City does this through
its function as a “living urban laboratory” where businesses can test their clean technologies
before introducing them to the market. Masdar Initiative collaborates with the company upon its
project proposal. When the project is designed and manufactured, it is tested in Masdar City,
where it becomes a permanent feature of the city. Thus, the city offers both expertise,
collaboration, infrastructure, and a place to showcase businesses’ products and the opportunity to
collect data.700 Once sold, the government-owned Masdar Initiative gets revenue that can be up
to 60%.701 In other words, capital circulates through green technology developed in the city and
eventually flows back into the government. This type of public-private partnership is not unique
to Masdar City. Like other eco-cities, Masdar’s intention is to establish a model of development
where developers can extract value from being an infrastructure provider through internalizing
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costs and commodifying resource flow. The ultimate objective is to turn the whole process into a
replicable financial product.702 Masdar City is thus conceived as a commodity that could be
exported and replicated around the world. This kind of trial-and-error approach is similar to, as
Orit Halpern shows in her work, the construction of Songdo, a smart city in South Korea.703
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Masdar City is one of seven free economic zones in Abu
Dhabi that seek to attract foreign direct investments through favourable business conditions.
Unlike the rest of the UAE, where at least 51 percent UAE national ownership is required704,
Masdar City free zone allows 100 percent foreign ownership. It also advertises 0% import tariffs
and corporate and personal income tax exemptions.705 The Limited Liability Company share
capital requirements at Masdar City are also comparably lower than other free zones in the
emirate.706 Free zones such as Masdar City are part of a more significant trend that has emerged
since 2005 in Abu Dhabi, where long-term leases are used to extend land ownership rights to
non-nationals to attract foreign capital.707 Taken together, while interest from foreign businesses
has slowly deteriorated, these features have attracted multinational corporations such as Siemens,
Mitsubishi and Schneider to forge partnerships with Masdar Initiative.
However, while free economic zones can make their own civil and commercial laws and
regulations, as Chapter 3 argued, the Masdar City free zone’s employment regulations mirror the
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kafala system in many ways. The employer-sponsor relationship, discretionary nature and
restrictions on switching employers, are kept intact. This dynamic reflects how even when
exceptions are made, they are done so selectively and can serve to exclude migrant workers.
While free zones are potential avenues for migrant workers to prolong their stay, this is reserved
for only those who can afford to use them. However, for even those who can afford to use this
avenue, the licensing authority may have significant discretion, as discussed in
Section 3.2.
Nevertheless, Masdar City’s function to help build Abu Dhabi’s knowledge-based
economy in line with UAE’s Emiratization policy has allowed it to expand supportive
capabilities to a select few. In particular, Masdar City was expected to create over 70,000 jobs.708
Not only are 45% of Masdar Initiative’s employees are Emirati, but its training and leadership
program target Emirati employees.709 For instance, between 2012 and 2015, the average training
hours for Emiratis were consistently higher than “expats,” and internship salaries were reserved
for Emirati employees. Here the use of “expats” further highlights the kinds of workers that
Masdar City caters.
Furthermore, according to one of the interviewed residents, while Emirati Ph.D. students
in Masdar Institute were paid 42,000 AED/month, their non-Emirati counterparts were paid
7,000 AED. Layla, an Egyptian engineer, noted how Emirati students also had exceptions for
Graduate Record Examinations, Test of English as a Foreign Language and Grade requirements.
Instead of fulfilling specific requirements to be admitted in the program, a foundation program
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allowed Emirati students to enroll in the programs. These benefits and scholarships, however,
make it difficult for student-residents to criticize the project openly.710 As another interviewed
Emirati student-resident noted, this was detrimental because “what’s missing here is the
advocacy push.”711
Furthermore, as Günel writes in her ethnography on Abu Dhabi, the way imagery is
deployed in framing Masdar city allows it to prolong the socio-political conditions within it is
situated. This imagery consistently presents the city as located in a distant future while the
present is a “vacated category.” She writes about how the description of a Masdar Institute
building as a “spaceship in the middle of the desert” that came from a blog post by an American
student living in the city at the time captured the attention of media and officials alike. Similar
images that invoke ideas of utopia and science fiction are still used to frame the city. Their focus
on the future presents the status-quo as already the “best-case scenario,” which allows the city to
“prolong the existing social and political conditions through technical adjustments.”712
In summary, Masdar City’s construction, articulation of SD and evolution reflect “ecodesire”; its reliance on ecological modernization discourses and hierarchization of economic
aspects, while consistently bypassing social aspects of SD reflect an inability of SD to
accommodate migrant justice in practice. This dilution of social aspects of SD allows Masdar
City to expand movement and supportive capabilities for a select few, albeit partially, while
foreclosing itself from changing the status quo for the majority of migrant workers.
Many reasons may help explain Masdar City’s reliance on ecological modernization
discourses that allow it to consistently hierarchize economic dimensions over the social and
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environment of SD. Drawing on Third World Approaches to International and Critical
Development Scholarship, I propose a partial explanation is how SD evolved, which
demonstrates consistent prioritizing of economic dimensions while glossing over social and,
therefore, migrant justice dimensions.

4.8 Historicizing SD: TWAIL accounts of SD
TWAIL offers a critical account of how SD evolved while recognizing some of its
substantive and procedural obligations. This section briefly introduces TWAIL, then describes
TWAIL’s historical accounts of SD. TWAIL emerged in the 1990s as one of the most significant
discourses that have challenged mainstream international law. While it offers both theories and
methodologies, it can be better understood more broadly as “a school of thought”713 that signifies
an intellectual community grounded in common ideas or as a “banner”714 that brings together
scholars who share a political orientation and engagement towards challenging international
law’s purported neutrality and universality. It seeks to both resist and reform international law.715
Within this scholarship, the “Third World” does not only refer to the traditional “less-developed”
countries or even the “global South,” but it is more broadly understood as a “counter-hegemonic
term”716 that rejects simplistic characterizations and challenges the perceived stability and fixed
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nature of boundaries between binaries such as the North/South, Third World/First World,
colonized/colonizers, victim/victor, developed/developing, modern/primitive.717
Borrowing from post-colonial approaches, it bridges, as Eve Darian-Smith writes,
“historical colonial injustices to contemporary global asymmetries of economic, political and
social power between a Global North and Global South.” 718 Not only does TWAIL challenge
international law’s claims towards neutrality and universality through decentering coloniality,
hegemony and Eurocentricity, but it also seeks to “promote and inject an ethical dimension into
international law that will ensure a fair playing field for all actors.”719 TWAIL, like other critical
legal scholarship, sees international law as not only a site of struggle but also seeks to unpack
how international law can be complicit in reproducing the unequal power dynamics that it
purports to counter.720
While mainstream accounts present the South as begrudging participants in international
negotiations on the environment, TWAIL literature shows how the Third World states and
peoples have contributed to international environmental law principles such as the common
heritage of humankind, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the right to
development and sustainable development. It presents counternarratives that disprove the very
myth that environmental protection is a luxury for the South and challenges the notion that the
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poor are “too busy surviving”721 to care about environmental protection and the South often
referred to as “emerging emitters” prioritizes development over environmental protection.
One such narrative is on SD, which TWAIL’s historical account of SD challenges.
Section 4.1 presented SD’s evolution in international environmental law as conventionally
narrated as a compromise between global North and global South, where the former is seen as
advocating for environmental protection and the latter development. This dynamic often referred
to as the North-South divide, remains a prominent feature in international negotiations on climate
change and the environment. TWAIL’s historical accounts of SD complicate this story and argue
that this North-South dynamic is overemphasized. The following section will discuss SD's
journey from Stockholm Conference to SDGs, emphasizing selected points where SD was
negotiated to illustrate how uni-dimensional view of development as economic growth eclipsed
broader understandings of development and social and environmental concerns.
The road to SD started before the Stockholm Conference. Karin Mickelson’s account of
the negotiations preceding and following the Stockholm Conference is particularly significant.
She illustrates how the negotiations before the Stockholm Conference reflect a focus not simply
on environmental protection versus development but rather alternative views of development and
its relationship to the environment. These processes included what is known as the Founex
meeting, more formally the Meeting of Expert on Environment and Development, which was
held in 1971 and attended by mainly developing country’s officials such as Mahbub ul Haq from
Pakistan, Gamani Corea from Sri Lanka. Haq, a Pakistani economist who acted as a rapporteur
for the meeting. Haq was a well-known critic of the traditional development paradigm and

Carmen Gonzalez, “Racial Capitalism, Climate Justice, and Climate Displacement” (2020) OSLS,
online: <https://onatifirstonline.wordpress.com/2020/06/11/racial-capitalism-climate-justice-and-climatedisplacement-carmen-g-gonzalez/>.
721

213

worked closely with Amartya Sen, and was a proponent of capabilities-inspired human
development approaches. His participation and other developing country officials’ participation
in the Founex meeting and the resulting Founex report illustrate that the North-South debates
were around different kinds of environmental problems. 722 The report’s fundamental premise
could be summarized as articulating developing countries’ environmental problems as primarily
related to poverty. While development was, therefore, seen as an imperative for the South, the
report also criticized development’s narrow focus on economic growth as measured by growth in
Gross National Product (GNP),723 which it proclaimed did not guarantee the “easing of urgent
social and human problems.” Both environmental problems and development were, therefore,
defined more broadly by the Founex report.
Developing country officials’ participation during the Stockholm Conference also reflects
a focus on alternative views on development.724 The roots of SD are found in the outcome
document of this Conference – the 1972 Declaration of Principles for the Preservation and
Enhancement of the Human Environment, which connected environment and development
concerns. Mickelson notes how Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, insisted poverty
itself has environmental impacts: “Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?” While
Gandhi insisted that development ought not to be abandoned, she called for the need to prioritize
away from the mainstream model of development, which prioritized a unidimensional view of
development as growth. She asserted that the conflict was not “between conservation and
development, but between environment and the reckless exploitation of man and earth in the
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name of efficiency.” The root causes of ecological destruction were “the isms of the modern
age…which assume that man’s cardinal interest is acquisitions.” Mickelson notes how Gandhi
insisted pollution was not a “technical problem but a problem of values.” She argues that
Gandhi’s statement may be more representative of the South’s stance at the Stockholm
Conference as: “guarded and somewhat skeptical, but at least willing to enter into dialogue.” In
other words, the South's portrayal as begrudging participants is simplistic. Throughout the
process of getting towards SD, there were alternative visions of development and environment
that representatives of the South reiterated.725 Nevertheless, the resulting Stockholm Declaration,
despite attempts to challenge the broader project of development, offers “rational planning” as a
tool to reconcile conflicts between development and environment, reinforcing a modernist view
of progress.
Mickelson further argues how the New International Economic Order proposals and the
Cocoyoc Declaration that followed the Stockholm Conference and preceded the Brundtland
report also illustrate “nuanced and multi-faceted” accounts of environmental protection and
development emerging from the South and its “intellectual allies.”726 The NIEO proposals that
the South put forward attempted to reform the international economic system, demanding more
equitable distribution of industrial production, more significant financial support, and changes in
international markets and governance structures. The Cocoyoc Declaration, which had linkages
with the NIEO, in particular, highlighted a change in perspective that called for a new system
and a redefinition of the “whole purpose of development.” It demanded the need to recognize
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multiple paths to development and “self-reliance” while recognizing both “‘inner limits’ of
satisfying fundamental human needs…[and] ‘outer limits’ of the planet’s physical integrity.”
In other words, both NIEO proposals and the Cocoyoc Declaration radically criticized
and denounced the international system's injustices.727 They highlighted the need to change
exploitative trade patterns and offered alternative views on the environment and development.
While some governments, including the US, ultimately rejected the Cocoyoc Declaration, it
illustrates, once again, that what was at stake in the conversations preceding the Brundtland
Report was not environmental protection versus development, but rather alternative views of
development and its relationship to the environment.728 The South’s stance in these negotiations
was much more multi-faceted and nuanced than what is implied by emphasizing the North-South
dynamic.729 Furthermore, as Critical Development scholar Erik Gómez-Baggethun notes, SD is
criticized for settling the limits to growth debates which peaked in Cocoyoc that rejected the idea
of “growth first, justice in the distribution of benefits later.” It is this watering down of the limits
to growth debates that led to eco-modernist ideas of a green economy.730
Against this backdrop and during the economic recession in the North and debt crisis in
the South, the UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and
Development in 1983, whose mandate included reconciling economic development with
environmental protection. Comprised of representatives from each of the UN regional groups
and under the chairmanship of the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland,
the WCED published the landmark report “Our Common Future” in 1987, Also known as the
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Brundtland Report, it first popularized the term SD and defined it as aforementioned
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs.” Partly due to its “brilliant ambiguity,” this seemed to appease
both the Global North and the South and has played a symbolic role ever since and continues to
serve as one of the primary documents that defined SD.
TWAIL scholarship relies on critical development scholars such as Wolfgang Sachs,
Arturo Escobar to show how the Brundtland report rebranded the problem of ecological
destruction as one linked to poverty. While deliberately excluding more radical views that
challenged development centred on economic growth and techno-managerial fixes for ecological
destruction, poverty reduction was accepted to be the basis for reconciling the different positions.
The final Brundtland report insisted that “Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their
immediate environment in order to survive.” Recasting poverty and the poor as the problem
shifted the responsibility of tackling environmental issues to the very people suffering from the
impacts.
Without challenging the consumption patterns of the industrialized affluent global North
that caused the ecological destruction, the solution to both poverty and ecological destruction
was increased production, consumption and economic growth. In other words, it equated
economic development with environmental protection and further reinforced economic-growthcentred development.731 As Ruth Gordon writes, “indeed, more, not less, growth and
industrialization were needed if the environment was to be protected and saved.”732
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In addition, the Brundtland report’s conception of SD did not seriously challenge the role
of the global economy and institutions to play in the plight of the South and the “rampant
poverty.” Gordon notes, for instance, how the World Bank and the IMF’s interventions in the
South have had “devastating effects locally and have also furthered urbanization.” The resulting
international debt obligations have, for example, forced countries to produce cash crops for
export which have led to overexploitation of natural resources and other damaging
environmental impacts.733 This has significant implications for unemployment in the global
South, which, in turn, may act as a “push factor” for prospective migrant workers. By
subscribing more of the same and reinforcing economic growth, SD failed to challenge the major
contributors of both poverty and ecological destruction.
Speaking of the UNCED process, also known as the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio that
followed the Brundtland Report, Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger further noted:
old thinking about economic growth prevails, old institutions promoting such growth
persist, and the old development establishment that had made a living out of such
economic growth has repackaged itself in green and miraculously represented itself as the
new global environmental leaders734
While the resulting Rio Declaration reinforced the connection between environment and
development, there was little discussion of the consumption patterns of the North. The fixation
on simply greening economic growth is further illustrated by the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration
on Sustainable Development which sought to be more pragmatic than its predecessors through
focusing on implementation. It emphasized market-based solutions to environmental problems
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such as public-private partnerships and engagement of the business sector and transparencybased accountability and improved reporting.
Ten years later, Rio+20 was intended to renew the commitment for SD. The two themes
identified by the UNGA were the green economy and the institutional framework for SD. This
focus on a green economy, once again, sparked North-South tensions. The South was concerned
that this focus may be used towards trade restrictions, represented a departure from the
consensus achieved in earlier articulations of SD and imposing a single neoliberal development
model.735 In General Ban Ki-Moon's words, Rio+20 became a “free market revolution for global
sustainability.” Rio+20 rejected any green economy policies that could be disguised as a
restriction on international trade and insisted urban infrastructure projects would improve a
country’s social welfare.736 The green economy’s emergence in 2012 became, as Aaron Wu
writes, the “new one-size-fits-all model to achieving sustainable development.”737 The resulting
2012 UN Resolution and the idea of the green economy it promoted is criticized for, as
Goodman and Salleh write, “[reflecting] the rise of neoliberal ecologism, with “ecological”
sustainability translated first into “economic” sustainability, and then into “free markets.”
The 2012 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as the Rio+20)
process laid the foundations for the SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda to succeed the
MDGs. Echoing the Brundtland report, the MDGs that preceded the SDGs focused on poverty
eradication. However, they were criticized for only addressing the symptoms of poverty rather
than underlying causes. There were issues regarding measuring progress towards targets due to
inadequate data collection and the overall objectives were limited in scope. As Sakiko Fukuda-
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Parr, a prominent development economist who has also done work on the capabilities approach,
argues, the use of tangible, measurable targets relied on a reductionist quantification logic.
Furthermore, MDGs were also seen as side-stepping rather than aligning with existing human
rights obligations such as those pertaining to equality and non-discrimination.
Against the backdrop of the 2008 economic crisis, Arab Spring and the Occupy
Movement, inequality became a central topic at Rio+20. In addition, one of the attempts was to
rectify the silo-ed approach that characterized SD in the past with the three pillars (social,
environmental, economic) treated separately. Furthermore, the SDGs were negotiated alongside
climate change negotiation that resulted in the Paris Agreement 2015, which both concluded with
a preference on universality.738 Accordingly, the 2015 Paris Agreement stated its objective to
“strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”739 As Felix Dodds, Ambassador David Donoghue
and Jimena Leiva Roesch took part in the process note, both UAE and Pakistani officials played
a significant role in promoting SDGs in their earlier days during the Rio+20 process.
The Open Working Group of the SDGs was established in September 2012, chaired by
Ambassadors Csaba Körösi and Macharia Kamau, from Hungary and Kenya. It also included
membership from Pakistan and the UAE once one seat could be shared by more than one
country, increasing the group from 30 to 70 countries. The format was changed to avoid
“traditional North-South tensions.” While the first session relied heavily on experts, particularly
the EU’s use of promoting scientific expert-led approaches to design SDGs, the second half
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widened its consultative scope. Throughout the process, several actors intervened from the
outside. Pogge and Sengupta famously labelled the draft as a “nice idea, poor execution.”740
While the UNGA began the negotiation process for Agenda 2030 in January 2015 relied
on input from a wide range of sectors, corporate involvement has been criticized. Pingeot, for
instance, notes how the resulting document’s focus on economic growth could be attributed to
the fact that most of the corporate involvement was from Europe and the US and featured
extractive industries.741 As Tonia Novitz, an expert on labour standards and SD, argues, while
SDGs’ emphasis on participation offers a possible avenue to underrepresented voices, “it seems
more likely that there could be deregulatory effects, familiar from the ILO experience, given an
international context responsive to corporate power dynamics.”742
Nevertheless, Agenda 2030 lays out an ambitious agenda that sets to pursue economic
growth, social development and ecological sustainability that ought to be pursued
simultaneously. With their 17 goals and 169 targets, the SDGs are more far-reaching than their
predecessor, the MDGs. Several SDGs are relevant to our discussion, including SDG 7 on
affordable and clean energy, SDG 8 on Decent work and economic growth, SDG 10 on reduced
inequalities, SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities, and SDG 12 on responsible
consumption and production. SD remains the anchor for environmental measures and the
international development agenda.
In summary, the historical accounts presented above illustrate how economic growth
concerns continued to loom large at the expense of social and environmental issues despite
efforts to present alternative views on development. Echoing climate justice dimensions, TWAIL
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scholars note how SD and its focus on poverty reduction shifted the burden of solving
environmental problems to the South while downplaying the role of production and consumption
patterns of the affluent in the global North and global South. The solution presented is the same
unidimensional economic-centred growth path towards development altered only by technomanagerial fixes designed to sustain economic growth.
4.9 Masdar City Mirroring SD’s Hierarchies

Having elaborated on how SD evolved, this section will argue that SD is likely to be practiced as
reflected by Masdar City’s story (through reliance on ecological modernization while diluting
social dimensions of SD) given SD’s connection to the development project, the Brundtland
Report’s optimism around technological changes, and the way inter- and intragenerational justice
are articulated.
Masdar City’s consistent hierarchizing of economic dimensions is a feature inherent to
SD, which is unable to sufficiently balance competing norms and the different objectives through
tradeoffs and synergies or a focus on justice. Upendra Baxi, in his account on Anthropocene
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justice, criticizes environmental justice theorists who advocate for “just sustainability” and
connect SD to justice.743 He writes, “whether sustainable development is an oxymoron (or Baximoron) remains to be decided – but I have always maintained that to achieve sustainable
development one must dare to articulate unsustainable thought!” In other words, Baxi is critical
of SD’s ability to resolve the competing norms it was conceived to do and its potential to create
more just arrangements. For Baxi sustainability is “more a matter of policies and governance
rather than an agendum of justice.” The central notion behind SD is development and regardless
of how it is defined, development “always signifies a degree of destruction.”744
The modern idea of development is often traced back to European Enlightenment and the
Western concept of a modern state.745 European Enlightenment understood non-European
societies as being trapped in a state of nature, placing them within an evolutionary spectrum that
understood state control over nature as the basis for modernity and progress. The modern nationstate and its legal system, thus, was tied to this understanding of development which equated
development with the degree of state control over nature, from nomadic ways of life to
eventually post-industrial systems which would efficiently exploit natural resources. This control
over the environment also became equated with inner freedom. Conquest of nature became tied
to humanity’s spiritual freedom and the basis of the myth of modernity. TWAIL scholars
Natarajan and Kishan Khoday rely on Critical Development Scholar Gilbert Rist’s argument that
this idea of development is uniquely Western, where societal growth and economic, scientific
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and cultural progress were seen as limitless.746 Rist and Esteva see SD as another iteration of the
concept of development, which given its inability to tackle ecological and economic limits,
results in sustaining economic-centred growth and development.
For CD scholars such as Esteva, Former US President Harry Truman’s speech at the end
of WW2 played a significant role in launching the idea of development. As “old wine in a new
bottle,”747 SD is then another version of the 1990s’ redevelopment in the South that took the
shape of economic colonization of the “informal” sector in the name of modernization and under
the banner of the war on poverty. As Esteva writes, “sustainable development has been explicitly
conceived as a strategy for sustaining ‘development,’ not for supporting the flourishing and
enduring of an infinitely diverse natural and social life.”748
SD, therefore, essentially greenwashes mainstream development and growth policies.
Building on post-colonial scholarship on development, critical development scholars view
development as an extension of Western domination that has constructed the “Southern other” as
one with problems and needs rather than the ability to make its own decisions or have alternative
solutions.749 Masdar City’s reliance on techno-managerial fixes and narrow focus on the built
environment reflects how the predominant view of nature as a resource for generating wealth and
environmental degradation as an economic externality that can be managed through technology
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and finance has retained. Masdar city’s attempts to invent “ergos,” a currency based on energy
unit expenditure and Masdar Initiative’s use of clean development mechanisms are further
examples of this eco-modernist approach.
Masdar City’s reliance on ecological modernization discourses also mirrors the
Brundtland report’s optimism around technological changes and fixation on economic growth.
The only limits that the Brundtland report alluded to were those “imposed by the present state of
technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities.”750 However, as the report continues,
“technological and social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a
new era of economic growth.”751 This fixation on economic growth and optimism around
technological changes make SD more likely to be practiced in a way that reduces solutions to all
three ‘problems’ to merely techno-managerial fixes. It allowed Masdar City to relegate questions
of inequality, environmental destruction and associated power relations to “effective technoscientific eco-management.”752
Similarly, Escobar argues the Brundtland report emphasized management, and the SD it
conceived allows for the capitalization of nature. Nature is “reduced to stasis” with no agency of
its own. SD resignifies nature, resources, the Earth and human life through the gaze of the
“Western scientist” in a way that deems poverty as the problem and managers as “arbiters
between people and nature.”753 SD, as reflected by the Brundtland Report, is criticized for
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making poverty eradication and environmental protection possible in “one single feat of Western
rationality.” It reproduces the central tenets of “economism” and “developmentalism” while
reconciling growth and the environment. Because poverty is deemed to be the problem of
ecological significance and growth is needed to eliminate poverty, it is growth that needs to be
sustained, not the environment. Thus, for TWAIL scholar James Gaathi, SD is unable to account
for the historical and structural foundations of poverty. Echoing these sentiments, Elise Klein
and Carlos Eduardo Morreo provocatively write, “the problem is that this mantra of
sustainability was swallowed up by capitalism early on, and then emptied of ecological
content.”754
Just as “dark and poor peasant masses”755 were painted as responsible for responses to
environmental destruction, Masdar City’s representation of migrant workers as uninformed is
able to reinforce the idea that protection from environmental impacts such as heat-related health
problems is the migrant workers’ responsibility. Similarly, the utopic, science-fiction-inspired
imagery deployed by Masdar City, which allows it to prolong the status-quo, does not conflict
with the way SD’s tendency to gloss over social differences. While SD is composed of both inter
and intragenerational justice, these are articulated and treated separately as fundamentally
different problems. Dominant articulation of intergenerational justice is ahistorical and apolitical,
wherein generations are treated as monoliths with aggregable, identifiable interests. This
conception flattens the social differences that exist within each generation.756 This further
absolves the affluent of the global North and South from adequate responsibility for ameliorating
any environmental harms that their production and consumption patterns have caused.
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Not only is the ahistorical conception of generations as aggregable monoliths in SD
problematic, but so is the way Anthropos, itself, is constructed in both Anthropocene757 discourse
and law. According to critical environmental law scholar Anna Grear, the Anthropos assumed in
both the Anthropocene discourse and law relies on a paradigmatic “rational human subject.’ It
presents a straightforward species-being that has the responsibility to address the climate change
crisis without recognizing the hierarchies that are imposed not only on non-human species such
as animals and ecosystems but also other human beings. Such references to humanity as a
monolithic category of species are problematic when we are trying to attribute responsibility to
climate change. This particularistic human subject is considered the center through which others
struggle for full legal recognition. Instead, there is a need, Grear insists, to expose the different
hierarchies and understand the climate crisis as one of a “crisis of human hierarchies of being.”
SD’s insufficient attention to historical and structural foundations of poverty is unable to expose
these hierarchies.
Philippe Cullet and Sujith Koonan add that the unevenness of climate change is not only
along the level of countries. Economic growth and the “rise of the Rest” over the past couple of
decades has strengthened an economic and intellectual elite in the South who are more like their
affluent counterparts in the North than they are with the majority of the poor in their countries. In
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addition, the poor and marginalized in the North are similarly disadvantaged as their counterparts
in the South, even though the intensity may be drastically different.758
Both Northern and Southern elites, as Gonzales quotes Davis, “will undoubtedly abandon
their compatriots and seek refuge in “green and gated oases of permanent affluence on an
otherwise stricken planet”759 Similarly, as Malm and Hornborg observe, “For the foreseeable
future—indeed, as long as there are human societies on Earth—there will be lifeboats for the rich
and privileged. If climate change represents a form of apocalypse, it is not universal, but uneven
and combined: the species is as much an abstraction at the end of the line as at the source.”760
Masdar city is an example of such a “lifeboat,” a “green and gated oasis” where racialized, poor
“low-skilled” South Asian migrant workers are treated as “expendable.”761

4.10 Agenda 2030 – partial inclusion of migration and related movement and supportive
capabilities yet persistent tensions

Agenda 2030 and its SDGs, unlike the MDGs, are universal and explicitly include
migrants in its plan of action for “people, planet and prosperity,” pledging to “leave no one
behind.” In contrast to the MDGs, the SDG’s have been applauded for relying on an
“unprecedented” participatory process which included a host of non-state actors, including civil
society organization, the IOM and the ILO, who were able to frame migration as a development
758

Philippe Cullet & Sujith Koonan, “Introduction to the Research Handbook on Law, Environment and
the Global South” in Research Handbook on Law, Environment and the Global South (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2019) xvi..
759
Mike Davis, “Who Will Build the Ark?” (2010) 61 New Left Review, online:
<https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii61/articles/mike-davis-who-will-build-the-ark>. 29. ; Carmen G
Gonzalez, “Climate Change, Race, and Migration” Climate Change 39.
760
Anna Grear, “Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on ‘Anthropocentric’ Law and
Anthropocene ‘Humanity’” (2015) 26:3 Law Critique 225–249.
761
Gonzalez, supra note 759.

228

issue and advocate for the inclusions of migration.762 As Section 4.2 noted, not only are women
migrants, migrant workers, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrant workers in
precarious employment explicitly mentioned, but the SDGs also seek to promote “decent work
for all” and “safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration.” While the SDGs still use MDGs’
goal-target-indicator approach763, proponents argue the SDGs seem to incorporate more complex
and qualitative aspects such as inclusion rather than only tangible and measurable outcomes.764
However, a closer look at the content of the SDGs and the indicators being used reveals that
persistent tensions have not been resolved and migrant workers’ movement and supportive
capabilities are not sufficiently protected.
Firstly, Agenda 2030 is criticized for maintaining a traditional take on economic-centred
growth. For post-development scholars such as Demaria and Kothari, SDGs fail to recognize the
historical and structural roots underlying poverty and inequities; they fail to recognize the
economic growth’s biophysical limits; continue to treat modern science and technology as a
panacea while marginalizing other forms of knowledge.765 Furthermore, as Esquivel writes, not
only do SDGs see industrialization as growth’s main driver (target 9.2), but “[e]conomic growth
is the ‘first and foremost’ generator of domestic resources needed to achieve the SDGs (para.
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66), tying social protection and other redistributive policies (Targets 1.3, 5.4, and 10.4) to this
‘grow first, redistribute later’ proviso.”766 This, Esquivel concludes, implicitly conflates
economic growth with societal progress. Adelman argues, “The SDGs reproduce growth
fetishism by promoting an intrinsically anthropocentric approach to sustainability that reinforces
the long-standing criticism that sustainable development is an oxymoron.”767
This conflation is made explicitly clear in SDG 8, which calls for promoting decent work
for all but is coupled with “sustained inclusive and sustainable economic growth.” Together with
its indicators, SDG8 reflects a substantial “growth-employment nexus.” SDG 8’s indicators
maintain a focus on GDP and per capita growth. (8.11, 8.2.1. and 8.4.2, for instance, all rely on
GDP per capita). As Rai et al. observe, this is problematic because GDP excludes social
reproductive work.768
A closer look at Goal 8 on decent work also reveals that it fails to protect supportive
capabilities for migrant workers. Goal 8’s focus on “full and productive employment” is
monitored through average hourly earnings and unemployment rate. Neither does this indicator
disaggregate based on migrant status, nor does it take meaningful labour and precarious work
into consideration. Moreover, target 8.8 (on labour rights and safe and secure working
environments) is monitored through “fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000
workers, by sex and migrant status.” This reflects a narrow understanding of safe and secure
working environments and fails to acknowledge the difficulties in reporting occupational
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injuries, which is particularly relevant in UAE’s case. Indicator 8.8.2’s inclusion of “freedom of
associate and collective bargaining” is promising but is weakened by the inclusion of national
compliance with national legislation. As discussed in chapter 3, national legislation may be
designed itself to reproduce irregularity and precarity. A better alternative would have been an
indicator that included the number of receiving-state countries that have signed ILO instruments
and the ICRMW.769
Similar to indicators 8.8, 10.7 (on facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible
migration and mobility of people), it is monitored through indicators such as “number of people
who died or disappeared in the process of migration,” which reflects indicators’ reductionist
nature. While the inclusion of recruitment costs is promising, 10.7.1 (the number of countries
with well-managed migration policies) could have been more robust and improved if it
disaggregated based on the number of receiving-states and sending-states. In addition, without
the inclusion of family reunification, SDG 10 and its indicators are unable to ensure migrant
workers’ supportive capabilities. 10.7.1.
Furthermore, “well-managed migration” is not clearly defined.770 As Suliman suggests,
based on migration-development literature, however, this may be predicated on the assumption
that there is an “optimal migration policy” which can configure migrant labour and remittances
in a “win-win-win” scenario.771 SDG’s reference to the migration-management approach is met
with skepticism since it has been criticized for overshadowing a focus on migrants’ human rights
(piper) and for depoliticizing migration. The inclusion of “responsible” migration, which made
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its way to the GCM, is also criticized for its narrow conception of responsibility and construction
of the “responsible migrant” who is a rights-bearer because they contribute to development.772
Furthermore, SDGs’ template of goals-targets-indicators gives the impression that
progress is possible on all fronts without tensions between targets and that they are measurable
through quantitative indicators in most cases.773 Moreover, SDG targets are silent about the
interlinkages among goals. While these goals seek to be “universal, indivisible and interlinked”
(clause 71) without being able to take adequately deal with tradeoffs, they are likely to get coopted.774 As Preibisch et al. write, mobility in SDG 10.7 is connected to migration control from
the perspective of the receiving-state and upheld as a human right; there is little consideration of
whether the two can be compatible or valued equally.775
In addition, while two of the 247 indicators disaggregate based on migrant status, none of
them consider race or ethnicity. They note that while target 10.3 focuses both on “equal
opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome,” the indicators used do not adequately capture
these elements. 10.3.1 only uses “perception data” (proportion of the population reporting having
personally felt discriminated against or harassed within the last 12 months). From a capabilitiesbased perspective, the use of perception data is more likely to fall within the trap of adaptive
preferences.776 Similarly, the indicators used to monitor life-long learning opportunities also do
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not disaggregate based on migrant status, which has implications for expanding migrant workers’
supportive capabilities.777
More generally, SDG’s approach to global governance through goal-setting also raises
concerns. While SDGs are grounded in international law, they are non-binding.778 Unlike other
goals or targets on SD, such as the protection of the ozone layer, governments are under no legal
obligation to incorporate the goals into their legal systems. While the SDGs aspire to universally
applicable, governments are able to exercise their freedom in interpreting and implementing
them and are expected to adapt them to national and local contexts. In addition, goal-setting
governance functions through weak institutional oversight; implementation of the SDGs is being
fulfilled by the high-level political forum on sd, which is relatively new.779 Furthermore, while
using quantitive indicators attempts to communicate development objectives with a “sense of
scientific certitude and serious intent with potential for accountability,” this quantification
reduces complex and intangible visions into measurable objectives and can have a distorting
effect. There is a risk that most transformative SDGs will be neglected in favour of other simpler
ones that do not involve complex, structural issues.780
Lastly, Agenda 2030’s narrow understanding of migration-as-development risks
reproducing unequal hierarchies. As Suliman argues, SDG’s reliance on migration-as-
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development indexes migrants in accordance with their contribution to development. In other
words, migration is seen as development’s function, and migrants’ contributions are
predominantly in terms of economic costs and contributions.781 SDG’s indicators, as discussed
above, are also concerned with migrants as a category of labour and progress is indexed to the
presence of well-managed migration policies. Furthermore, while Addis Ababa Action Agenda,
which sets out the concrete policies and actions for Agenda 2030, has a comprehensive way of
global financing for development, it conceives concerted effort on migration as liberalization of
financial remittances. Both the aforementioned “well-managed migration” and AAA’s
representation of migration through the lens of remittances depoliticize migration as it is
represented as a technocratic and financial issue, further reinforcing the ideological justifications
for economic-centred development and growth. Suliman concludes in so doing, SDG’s inclusion
of migration is marginal and fails to address “the conditions by which migration has been
integrated into the global economy through its exclusions from the politics of development.”782
The SDGs, therefore, serve as the basis for market-oriented migration governance initiatives to
be endorsed, which may have harmful outcomes. These can include temporary labour migration
regimes (such as the kafala system), which are seen as an effective method of migration
management that produce positive developmental benefits and provides greater flexibility.
However, this reinforces the production of desirable and undesirable migrants.783
SDG’s migration-as-development perspective, therefore, perpetuates the system where
migrants who are considered to contribute to a country’s economy are preferred. This
calculation, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is based on informal hierarchies and legitimizes
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Masdar city’s role to attract only those considered as contributing towards sustainable
development. As Raghuram writes, migrants whose “offerings may not be easily aligned with an
imaginary conception of the needs” as developmental are not considered.784
Also related to this is the logic that underpins this view of migrants as endowed with
human, economic and social capital. Olgemooler and Allinson add that in this context, migrants
are seen as “new agents of change,” which rests on a “sedentary bias,” fixing migrants into place
and seeing them as an essentialized ethnic identity. In assuming that migrants will either not
want to move and, if they do naturally, will want to return to their respective countries of origin,
they are considered willing to cooperate in development practices.785
This perspective and its optimism on remittances also have implications for migrant
workers’ supportive capabilities, as it individualizes the responsibility to care for others who are
territorially located elsewhere and does not take into consideration the importance of routes
towards family reunification and citizenship. Moreover, in continuously forging links with
distant others through sending money to their families, migrant workers are left with fewer
resources available to secure the connections locally and or to those “back home,” which can
undermine migrant workers’ everyday well-being.786 Many of the interviewed retuning migrant
workers shared concerns of feeling disconnected from their homes in Pakistan. “Na idhar kay
rahay na udhar kay,”787 one of the returning migrant workers who had spent more than 30 years
in the Gulf recalled how he felt he was left “neither there nor here.” Indeed returning migrant
workers are colloquially referred to as “bahar kay log.”788 An over-reliance on remittances as an
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indicator and its inability to take family reunification and citizenship routes into account fails to
capture supportive capabilities.
Lastly, from a capabilities-based perspective, movement and supportive capabilities
ought to be seen as ends. These must be expanded not because they are instrumental towards
other goals but because they are significant ends in and of themselves. As Novitz argues (in
support for engaging with sustainability), there are two conditions that would diminish the threat
posed by using SD to justifying labour standards: (a) if labour standards are seen as having a
“distinct merit of social sustainability,” i.e. not merely instrumental or subsidiary to other aspects
of SD (b) SD ought to be a result of a “full, inclusive, participatory process” and not treated as a
“technical science.”789 Not only is there skepticism if either of these has been met so far, but as a
2019 ILO on SDG 8 report notes, insufficient institutional and financial capacity remain major
roadblocks for this to become a reality790.
In summary, there are a number of shortfalls that Agenda 2030 suffers from despite its
inclusion of migration-related issues. Not only does it maintain a traditional take on economiccentred growth, but its indicators also reflect a narrow understanding and only two of the
indicators disaggregate based on migrant status and none based on race and ethnicity. There are
significant tensions between them. The reductionist nature of some of these indicators (absence
of family reunification and meaningful labour) fails to capture the full breadth of supportive and
movement capabilities. Their use of goal-setting also raises concerns. Furthermore, in SDG’s
narrow understanding of migration-as-development, migrants are indexed according to their
contribution to development which is predominantly measured in terms of economic costs and
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contributions. In serving as a basis for market-oriented migration governance initiatives that seek
to “win-win-win,” there is a risk that this will reinforce temporary labour migration regimes
which produce “desirable” and “undesirable” migrants, potentially perpetuating unequal
hierarchies. Migration-as-development also risks the pitfalls of treating movement and
supportive capabilities or other migration-related capabilities as instrumental towards
development and significant ends with distinct merit. This narrative justifies eco-city projects
such as Masdar City to use their given role in SD to limit access to a select few who are
considered “desirable,” while the worse-off are rendered expendable.
4.11 Conclusion:
The same fixation on a unidimensional view of economic-centred growth development
that riddled international negotiations on sustainable development occupies Masdar City and
other eco-cities seeking to hide their profit-driven goals under the cloak of SD. However, this
may not be a surprise given how sustainable development itself was conceived as an overarching
policy imperative. Such a concept, in practice, as shown through the example of Masdar, is
unlikely to offer an opportunity to expand migrant workers’ supportive and movement
capabilities while removing the unequal hierarchies that characterize the international and
domestic legal regimes regulating migrant workers as discussed, respectively in Chapter 2 and 3.
While Masdar City’s role in Abu Dhabi’s “fractured urbanity” is still in the process of being
determined as it is still under construction, its construction, conception of SD and development
so far has been one that relies on eco-modernist logic and seeks to attract “high-skilled,’ highly
educated clean technology and renewable energy researchers and professionals that will work
towards building Abu Dhabi’s diversified knowledge-based economy. It is not for the “low-
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skilled” or “unskilled” migrant workers who are instead treated as passive, temporary,
uninformed and made invisible in the city’s promotion and some of its residents’ accounts.
While Agenda 2030 takes migration into account and references precarious employment and
regular migration, it also suffers from significant shortfalls, including an inability to resolve
persistent tensions between economic-centred growth and SD’s so-called social pillar. While the
SD’s breadth which allows it to be applied in the context of labour standards, migration and trade
law, may bode well for its ability to counter the IML’s fragmentation, its inability to counter
developmentalism and economic-centred growth makes it likely to get co-opted. Masdar city’s
story, therefore, is able to crystallize SD’s inherent tensions that work to reinforce the
expendability of racialized, poor “low-skilled” South Asian migrant workers who are erased and
left behind in this post-oil future.791
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CHAPTER 5:
Working Towards Sustaining Justice
“Earlier this year, I was in Mandi Bahauddin, and I was speaking to someone whose son was
killed in the Greek border, and he was telling me how he was recruited by a local agent…and he
had paid 1.3 million rupees to get him to Europe and all. Then I asked him if he was pursuing a
case against that person. Because he was a local guy, and he was still around. He said no. I
haven’t been to the police and… I said why. Do you not care for your son who has died? He said
no. Because…he has now promised that he will take my second son without a charge.”
Migrant Rights Center Employee
When asked what had struck him the most, one Pakistani government official working in
Islamabad recounted this harrowing story quoted above of a father who lost his son on the Greek
border and yet was sending one of his other sons through the same “local agent.” Sitting next to
the giant yellow letters that read “Happiness” in Masdar City, I was reminded of the many such
accounts I heard throughout my fieldwork in contrast to the many “moons” that were promised
to migrant workers such as Suleiman. Chapter 1 opened with the question: does Masdar city,
dubbed “spaceship in the desert,” have space for migrant justice? This eco-city served as an entry
point to investigate the intersections between migration, labour and environment. A multi-scalar
analysis sketched several striations and patterns that produce the unequal regimes governing
migrant workers and unequal futures of Sustainable Development (SD). I looked at how labour
migration regimes distribute movement and supportive capabilities and what Masdar’s story tells
us about SD’s compatibility with migrant justice.
Chapter 2 discussed the main features of international migration law: a plurality in
sources (and resulting fragmentation); an across-the-board differentiation; a trend towards softer
mechanisms. International migration law’s “giant unassembled juridical jigsaw puzzle”792
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consists of multiple regimes, resulting in an overlapping that reinforces the exclusion of migrants
in an irregular situation. For both international human rights and International Labor
Organization-promulgated labour law, there is a tendency to hinge more liberal provisions on
migrant workers’ status, allowing states to determine the protection of migrant workers’
capabilities. In contrast to instruments on trafficking and smuggling, even when a growing
number of softer mechanisms such as the ICRMW793 are adopted for migrant workers, a lack of
political will, existing norms, and weak enforcement mechanisms limit the potential of those
mechanisms to enhance movement and supportive capabilities for all migrant workers. Together
these features result in fragmentation which confines migrant workers to certain sectors and
creating a precarious, ‘ultra-flexible’ workforce. This fractures the application of domestic
labour law yet helps states further their prerogative to determine rules on labour migration, even
in an allegedly post-Westphalian community.794
Chapter 3 discussed how United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) regime that regulates migrant
workers, in turn, allows the state to offload several responsibilities to protect migrant workers’
movement and supportive capabilities to individual sponsors. The expansive role was given to
non-state actors such as the kafeel,795 arbab, 796 recruiters, contractors, subcontractors -- and the
power imbalances embedded in these relationships -- significantly inhibit migrant workers’
substantive freedoms such as movement and supportive capabilities. Alongside informal
hierarchies determined by race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, class etc., stringent citizenship
rules, Emiratization and the availability of routes to circumvent the kafala system enhance
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movement and supportive capabilities for a narrow group of “hyper-rich,” hyper-mobile migrant
workers. In contrast, the majority of racialized “low-skilled,” “low-income” migrant workers
have limited opportunities that keep them under conditions of precarity, irregularity, and
deportability. Given the lack of protection of migrant workers in an irregular situation in
international law, this becomes all the more significant. With the kafala system’s basic features
left intact and inadequate enforcement and access to justice, recent reforms have little potential
to expand migrant workers’ real freedoms.
Chapter 4 turned to see whether SD can be a site through which to pursue migrant justice.
Can SD drive attention to migrant workers’ capabilities in a way that favours the worse-off
agents? This is examined through Masdar City's case in light of the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).797 However, I found that Masdar City’s embrace of ecological
modernization hollows SD of its social content and allows it to prolong the status quo for
migrant workers while enhancing movement and supportive capabilities for a select few. In
contrast to its efforts to attract “wealthy expatriates” who are seen as contributing to UAE’s
knowledge-based economy, “low-skilled” migrant workers maintaining and building the city are
still regarded as uninterested and uninformed. Scholarship in the Third World Approaches to
International Law and critical development traditions provide explanatory accounts, noting how
the eco-modernist approach is a thread that runs across SD’s evolution. While the SDGs in
Agenda 2030798 take precarious employment and irregular migration into account, they do so
only partially. Persistent tensions and hierarchies dilute SD’s social pillar and render the concept
unlikely to ameliorate the shortfalls of the regimes governing migrant workers in the UAE.
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Agenda 2030’s use of migration-as-development further justifies states to use projects such as
Masdar City to selectively choose “desirable” migrants and view them as merely economic
agents.
The foregoing analysis sought to use movement and supportive capabilities as the
evaluative space. It supplemented this critical capabilities-based approach with theoretical
insights from environmental justice, critical development theory, TWAIL, an account of
collective capability agency, and a principle favouring worse-off agents. It is time to take stock.
This chapter aims to reflect on the project and determine what insights were gained from
applying this lens. What tools do capabilities-based approaches and theories offer critical
scholars? What, if anything, does a critical capabilities-based environmental justice lens offer?
What are some of its most significant limitations, and how can it be furthered?

5.1 A critical capabilities-based approach: insights and tools
“I liked the UAE…in terms of cleanliness and things like that….but the climate there is very
tough…and for our job, it is very tough. Now imagine walking a few kilometres in 48 degrees
Celsius…this I am sure you know too…I mean I got used to it…but in our job you know there a
lot of small tasks that require going back and forth…like when we have to maintain the car’s
temperature because the customer has to leave…the water would be at boiling temperature, but
we would keep working happily…because we had a means of living.”
- Muzammil, returning migrant worker
The quote above reflects one way a focus on capabilities and opportunities as an
evaluative lens can help provide more sophistication and nuance than its competing approaches.
Muzammil’s account above highlights the potential pitfall of relying on subjective accounts of
well-being such as happiness. As detailed in Chapter 1, metrics such as happiness suffer from the
problem of adaptive preferences; capabilities are better able to account for precarity-adjusted
aspirations. While both are utilitarian and the Capabilities Approach (CA) is consequentialist,
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proponents of the CA emphasize that it can provide an objective analysis of peoples’ real
opportunities.799 While it can integrate happiness as one of the components of a person’s overall
value-preferences, this is not essentialized. In evaluative exercises, the CA looks at whether the
range of opportunities is being expanded.800
Furthermore, using capabilities as the evaluative space also offers advantages over
primary goods approaches and other resourcist metrics that are less able to take account of
people’s different abilities to convert resources into valuable ends. As one of the interviewed
civil society organization (CSO) members noted:
“It is just very easy and probably too lazy of me to say economic reasons, but...if it’s
economic reasons, then you should have ideally options within your own country to
manage that. But because of these reasons, like climate change, domestic violence, for
political reasons, that [migrant workers] feel they don’t have that option…that they have
to go.”801
This excerpt highlights how a focus on capabilities understood as substantive options or
opportunity freedoms is also understood by migrant workers rights’ advocates in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) region. While this particular framing reinforces a sedentary bias,802
an expansion of capabilities avoids paternalistic attitudes towards migrant workers. Here,
however, over-emphasizing the benefits of being able to stay in one’s country of origin may also
have the unintentional consequence of presenting migration as a problem to be solved.
Nevertheless, as an alternative to resourcist and preference-centred metrics, capabilities can
better grasp a broader informational basis that includes peoples’ different abilities to convert
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resources into valuable functionings and counters the malleability of subjective accounts of wellbeing.
Furthermore, in Chapter 2 on international migration law, a focus on capabilities was
particularly helpful in highlighting how migrant workers’ choices are constrained and
international migration law’s fragmentation, differentiation and softness shape opportunities.
Employing a critical CA as the evaluative lens required me to look at arrangements
comprehensively. Although this is a demanding exercise, it allowed me to see the range and
kinds of opportunities available to workers while also being attentive to how some opportunities
depend on others. This quality of the CA has been useful for feminist scholars researching care
work. Consider the following example by Ingrid Robeyns:
Take the following functionings: (1) to hold a job, which will require you to spend many
hours on working and commuting, but will generate the income needed to properly feed
yourself and your family; (2) to care for your children at home and give them all the
attention, care and supervision they need. In a piecemeal analysis, both (1) and (2) are
opportunities open to that parent, but they are not both together open to her. The point
about the capability approach is precisely that it is comprehensive; we must ask which sets
of capabilities are open to us, that is: can you simultaneously provide for your family and
properly care for and supervise your children? Or are you rather forced to make some hard,
perhaps even tragic, choices?803
This comprehensive nature of CA is also relevant for feminists and disability scholars for
looking at inequality “side-ways,” i.e. where people with the same amount of resources have
different abilities to turn their resources into valuable ends. This aspect helped me counter the
dominant argument that migrant workers in the UAE experience better well-being because they
are earning higher salaries than they would have been in Pakistan (or any other country of
origin). Even if we agree that migrant workers are able to earn more, the prevalence of wage
theft and other wage-related issues as documented in Chapter 4 notwithstanding, opportunities to
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pursue support ones’ family are limited for some migrants than for nationals “back home” who
have the same resources.
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 on UAE’s kafala system, a focus on capabilities and
functionings provided insight into how workers are seen as willfully opting for illegal routes. A
predominantly outcome-focused view would celebrate migrant workers’ ability to carve out
ways to prolong their stay without seeing how available routes and opportunities may place
migrant workers at more risk of irregularity. This perception of migrants as willfully choosing
irregular routes was also represented in accounts of civil society member working in Pakistan.
One official noted how “irregular migration is as natural as brushing teeth”804 for some seeking
to migrate. A capabilities-based perspective is, therefore, a useful corrective because looking at
the distribution of the range of opportunities can highlight how these choices are constrained. A
focus on the range of opportunities and whether they are effective and real may help inform CSO
officials’ perception of migrant workers as deliberately choosing illegal routes and, therefore,
less deserving of assistance.
In Chapter 4’s discussion of SD, a capabilities-based approach explicitly re-hierarchized
social and environmental objectives over economic dimensions. Capabilities-based
environmental justice scholar David Schlosberg’s suggestion to further differentiate luxury and
subsistence emissions is also promising.805 Here, however, critical development and TWAIL
scholarship were more suited to explain why Masdar City’s reliance on eco-modernist
approaches allows it to apply a veneer of SD without meaningfully addressing the social pillar at
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all, let alone the underlying power imbalances and structures that render migrant workers
expendable.
The informational gains wrought through applying the CA lens may help lawyers and
policy-makers design tools to better evaluate precarity and vulnerability. Looking at the different
kinds of constraints migrants may face allows us to see what conditions make it more likely for
precarious forms of work to emerge – and therefore, what conditions future eco-cities would
have to put in place to tackle precarity. While environmental lawyers may continue to find it
helpful as an alternative for cost-benefit-analyses, 806 labour lawyers can best use it as one of the
justificatory bases for labour rights as not only instrumental towards other goals such as SD but
as significant ends on their own.807 These rights can advocate for more complex capabilities such
as meaningful labour and being able to support oneself and one’s family, as my suggestion to
focus on movement and supportive capabilities could be used towards.
Following some proponents discussed in Chapter 1 who have used CA to invert the
orientation of regimes,808 I found the critical CA approach helpful to re-hierarchize social
dimensions of SD over other economic dimensions which have continued to loom large;
movement and supportive capabilities are then seen as ends on their own. However, unlike some
proponents such as Langille809 and Routh,810 I do not argue that the CA can serve as the
normative foundation for labour law or migration law as a whole. In addition, while most of
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these scholars worked in the context of democracies, this project sought to apply it in the context
of the UAE.
Rather than using Anderson’s version of democratic equality like Fudge811 and Routh812
do, I coupled capabilities as a metric of justice with a potentially more radical distributive rule:
Lea Ypi’s rule that favours worse-off agents to balance emigration and migration demands.813
This, one may argue, goes beyond Sen’s more pragmatic view of focusing on comparing feasible
alternatives. However, I hoped that in coupling CA with a more radical distribution rule, as well
as critical insights from environmental justice, critical development and TWAIL scholarship, I
could address the most potent critique of CA - that without a robust structural account, it
implicitly accepts neoliberalism and is not transformative.
While I agree with Sen’s criticisms of transcendental institutional approaches to justice
and their focus on ‘getting the institutions right’ and diagnosing justice by simply imagining a
perfectly just society, I find his incremental approach to removing injustices less convincing.814
Nevertheless, as Robeyns’ modular view of CA has shown, this aspect is not a core element of
all capabilities-based applications. This argument may also help environmental justice scholars
who have recently questioned how “transformative capabilities-based approaches to justice
actually are.”815 This position also compliments Robeyns’ contention that it is possible to
construct capability theories that are less liberal by not prioritizing agency and autonomy.816 For

811

Labour as a ‘Fictive Commodity’: Radically Reconceptualizing Labour Law, SSRN Scholarly Paper,
by Judy Fudge, papers.ssrn.com, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1721265 (Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, 2011).
812
Supriya Routh, Enhancing Capabilities through Labour Law: Informal Workers in India (Routledge,
2014) Google-Books-ID: V0gsAwAAQBAJ.
813
Ypi, “Justice in Migration”, supra note 183.
814
Sen, supra note 102.
815
Martin, Adrian et al, “Environmental Justice and Transformations to Sustainability” (2020) 62:6
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 19–30.
816
Robeyns, supra note 108.

247

example, some work on care ethics which prioritizes protecting the vulnerable over enhancing
agency.817
Lastly, while the CA is firmly within the liberal theory, its critiques of resourcism,
utilitarianism, social contract theory, and transcendental institutionalism may help critical
scholars. Its pluralism, in terms of the different values it can encompass, and additional
principles it can rely on, and view of human beings as multidimensional (able to value multiple
things) has the potential to open the space to include different worldviews, including the many
pluriverses critical development scholars advocate for. Here, Sen’s work on rationality is useful
for its critiques of mainstream economics, exposing how rationality is viewed narrowly as
maximizing self-interest.818 While this project was not able to fully take advantage of this aspect
of Sen’s work, recent CA literature on the role of empathy is also promising.819 Also, Sen’s work
on social choice theory and the plurality of reasons ranked in partial ordering without the need
for consensus is important for constitutional reasoning and deliberative democracy.820

5.2 Limitations and Major Critiques of CA
However, there remain significant limitations of applying capabilities-based approaches
and several major critiques assessed below. Firstly, while Sen has consistently defended his
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contribution as intentionally incomplete821 and its proponents insist it is not an explanatory theory,
CA suffers from the absence of an account on structural constraints. CA is then likely to take the
shape of weaker forms such as human development that fail to address historical and structural
foundations of injustice or the power imbalances and patterns of uneven development.
This under-specified nature of CA is both its appeal and its drawback. One may ask if so
many other aspects (an explicit account of structural constraints, agency, focus on capabilities
versus functionings, other relevant principles etc.) have to be specified and supplemented, then
what is the value of starting with CA in the first place? The value, as I have argued, is primarily
its means-ends distinction which is able to divert attention from other metrics and its ability to
capture and treat complex beings and doings -- such as meaningful labour and being able to
support oneself and one’s family -- as valuable ends on their own. However, as Hill and many
others have argued, it is not concerned with “why or how socio-economic and political
institutional conversion factors impinge on labour.”822 The concept of conversion factors only
deals with one’s ability to convert resources into valuable ends but does not consider why certain
resources are not there, to begin with.
This is why the foregoing analysis that relied on a CA was better at evaluating legal
regimes and instruments but did not offer tools to assist when migrants were erased altogether.
Critical Development (CD) and TWAIL accounts were used instead to partially explain how
Masdar City practiced SD erased migrant workers (let alone enhance their opportunities). Those
supplementary frameworks were also necessary as Agenda 2030 and SD are equally silent on
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structural and historical foundations of injustices. While interviewing migrant workers in Masdar
City could have allowed a more nuanced capabilities-based analysis, the weight still would have
been pulled by the chosen supplementary accounts of structural constraints. Nevertheless if
accounts from migrant workers building and maintaining Masdar City were accessible, this
analysis, particularly Chapter 4, would have applied a more thick critical capabilities approach
that foregrounded migrant workers’ lived experiences.
CA’s lack of structural account is criticized by many critical scholars. B.S. Chimni, while
limiting his argument to Sen’s ‘development as freedom,’ provocatively criticizes Sen’s
conceptualization of development for mirroring mainstream discourses of international law in its
inability to appreciate the role of structural constraints that impede the realization of his goals.823
Yet Chimni concludes, “this does not take anything away from the enormous merit of Sen’s
conceptualization of development as freedom, it only points to how the dominant classes and
state can co-opt the most radical of discourses to its ends.”824 Nevertheless, the underspecified
nature of CA, according to Ingrid Robeyns, allows for the possibility of ‘Marxist
capabilitarians’825 in addition to ‘libertarian capabilitarians.’ But overall, I agree with Chimni
that, without explicit structural accounts, it is more likely to get co-opted as Sen’s development
as freedom and as SD. As Chapter 4 shows, CA’s means-ends distinction is able to re-hierarchize
SD’s dimensions, but only critical accounts such as CD and TWAIL can help explain the
obstacles that prevent this.
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Secondly, some capabilities-based approaches are criticized for their inability to take
power, inequalities, and political economy into account. In her recent book, Robeyns provides
possible responses to these critiques and argues that it is possible to supplement a capabilitiesbased application with an account that pays more attention to social and cultural constraints on
peoples’ choices, as she does in her work on care work. In response to Thomas Pogge,826 who
argues that Sen’s work overemphasizes the role of the governments while underemphasizing that
of the global economic system, Robeyns responds that such critiques are less about the CA and
more about CA scholars’ research agendas.827 Where urgent issues of justice exist, a political
economy analysis of unjust structures is required. There is nothing in CA’s ‘core modules’ that
would not allow this. Lastly, in response to the contention that CA implicitly accepts and/or
reinforces neoliberal economic policies that prioritize free markets and privatize public goods,
she argues that CA does not support an unfettered market as the institution that enhances
capabilities. Rutgers Claasen, in fact, argues CA endorses regulating markets and constraining
property rights. In other words, the question of what institutions can expand capabilities cannot
rest with CA alone and must be done through the political economy. Similarly, I found that the
critical CA lens that TWAIL and CD supplemented could have been more robust if it could fully
account for the political economy of labour migration.
Thirdly, another significant critique of capabilities-based approaches is that they are too
individualistic, and this focus on the individual reinforces neoliberalism. Robeyns’ view,
however, is that CA relies on ‘ethical individualism,’ which differs from methodological and
ontological individualism. In other words, it claims that what should count in our evaluative

826
827

Thomas Pogge, “A Critique of the Capability Approach” in Brighouse & Robeyns, supra note 105.
Robeyns, supra note 108.

251

exercises is individuals as units of ultimate moral concern. This differs from a commitment that
all social phenomena are to be explained wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals, their
properties, and individual gains or well-being. Therefore, Robeyns argues that this makes CA
compatible with other ontologies that recognize the importance of connecting people and their
broader social relations. Several others have contributed towards notions of collective
capabilities and collective agency, arguing that many capabilities can only be achieved through
collective actions.828
In line with Schlosberg who uses this as a basis for collective capabilities in the context
of indigenous environmental justice, I also tried to find an account on agency that focused on
community ties. My attempt to use Razia Shariff’s work on collective capability agency was
intended to highlight how individual agency goals ought to be transformed. For Sharif,
capabilities depend on collectivities and relations. Relying on critical theory and her case study,
she argues that a shift must occur for each of Sen’s instrumental freedoms to one with collective
agency capability. For instance, social network capital develops from having an “alienated
society” to a highly networked with “organic solidarity.”829 Chapter 2 showed how the
segmentation in international migration law breaks the links that could condense to allow for this
shift towards collective agency capability. The multiple statuses undermine resistance from
crystallizing around a shared identity. Similarly, the individualized, discretionary nature of the
kafala system discussed in Chapter 3 also undermines this shift. Migrant workers’ accounts are
replete with the notion that their working and living conditions depend entirely on your recruiter,
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kafeel, immediate boss and the many “middlemen.” This heterogeneous system, the “racial
wage”830, as well as segregated urban development831 undermine resistance from crystallizing
around a shared identity.
In addition, supportive capabilities were used as one of the foci to counter the
individualist focus of CA and highlight relational aspects. As aforementioned given interviews
and results of using Alkire’s method of partial ranking, I focused on movement and supportive
capabilities. While the former could be described as being able to move freely inside and outside
the receiving state (UAE), supportive capabilities were described as being able to support oneself
and one’s family (understood broadly to include community). I found using supportive
capabilities helpful because of their breadth and ability to couple traditional resourcist metrics
such as wages with a host of other aspects such as lifelong learning opportunities, which
compelled me to think of each scenario more holistically. As Chapter 3 revealed, they were able
to emphasize the lack of family reunification opportunities and stringent citizenship rules. I
suspected this would help highlight the interconnections and interdependencies between migrants
and their familial and community ties. This is particularly relevant considering the practice of
taking loans from families and other community members to pay for recruitment costs. I
wondered if highlighting this relationship would be able to counter the individualist focus of the
CA. While the breadth required me to think of each arrangement holistically, it also allowed me
to go beyond thinking of each migrant worker as a “bounded autonomous liberal individual.”832
Fourthly, some critics point to the lack of clarity between the role of preferences that can
shape people’s capabilities and how “reason to value” is defined. Sen clarifies that he uses the
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word ‘preferences’ differently from its use in moral philosophy or a psychological sense. Sen
uses ‘preferences’ borrowing from Arrow and social choice theory which reflects not tastes;
rather, it reflects all the values, i.e. “persons entire system of values, includes values about
values.”833 However, even with this clarification of preferences’ relationship with capabilities,
the additional requirement that opportunities ought to be those “one has reason to value” (that
would survive reasoned scrutiny) is still unclear. As Robeyns contends, “reason to value” has
remained under-theorized. In fact, Fibieger Byskov argues that this aspect of the capability
definition ought to be removed altogether.834 Sen is also criticized for putting “too great a faith in
traditional philosophical and economic processes of a logical reason to get us to good policies”835
and for having such a demanding conception of deliberative democracy. While he is referred to
as a “feminist economist and philosopher,” Sen’s view of reasoning and the role of deliberative
democracy may be problematic for some feminists. As Iris Marion Young has argued, such a
version of deliberative democracy and its potential for long political meetings may exclude
people with child-care responsibilities.836
In addition, another significant critique of CA is directed towards Sen’s view of human
rights. While Nussbaum equates human rights with capabilities, Sen draws on Bentham’s
skepticism over natural rights and sees them as playing a similar normative role as utility where
they are given fundamental ethical importance. He parts ways with both Bentham and Hart,
claiming that normal rights can inspire legislation, but formal law is only one way of realizing
them. Therefore, human rights are essential ethical claims but not legally secured moral
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demands. In fact, he does not consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a legal
instrument. Law is understood as the “command of the sovereign under threat of sanction”;
municipal laws may help enforce laws, but treaty laws simply list pre-existing laws. Benhabib
criticizes this narrow understanding of human rights and law and argues that not all essential
moral claims amount to human rights claims, and in fact, it is a legal process that allows them to
take that shape.837 Similarly, Baxi finds Sen’s conceptualization of law as problematic and
argues that when enacted legislation is absent, the process of recognizing claims as human rights
claims amounts to customary law or treaty law.838
Furthermore, for Sen, anyone who is able to can help promote human rights; duties are
dispersed across the society accordingly. However, this individualization of a Senian version of
human rights may help justify systems such as UAE’s kafala system, where responsibility and
obligations are offloaded to different actors. It may also help justify the GCM’s construction of a
“responsible migrant.” In short, without an explicit structural account emphasizing how
concentrated state and economic power may be organized to undermine them, this “peoplecentred” view of human rights may be harmful.
While Sen’s particular account of human rights remains significantly weakened by
treating law as secondary, a move away from human rights-centred approaches may serve
fruitful in the context of authoritarian regimes such as the UAE. As one of the interviewed CSO
members recounted, “The foreign expats can’t accept the reality here. You can’t argue about
human rights in an office. You have to be so respectful and choose your battles.”839 The more
neutral language of capabilities and opportunities can be a more pragmatic choice even though it
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may encompass more demanding claims such as those including meaningful labour.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to note Sen’s skepticism of human rights and law’s hegemony stems
from a critical approach to formal justice, formal legal principles and procedures.
Lastly, a potential critique of this specific application of a capabilities-based approach in
the context of migrant workers in the UAE and eco-cities poses the question: why frame
environmental justice in terms of capabilities when migrant workers do not even have basic
rights? Here, I find environmental justice scholars’ conviction to dispel the myth that “the poor
are too busy surviving” helpful. Masdar City’s story shows how migrant workers such as the
“man with a brush” are at the forefront of the green economy yet are either erased or represented
as uninterested and uninformed. As reflected in returning migrant workers’ interviews, the
environment (particularly working outside) is not an abstract concept, polluted and decreasing in
beauty or scenic value. For many, it is experienced in their everyday lives, which have already
exposed them to hazards.840
Environmental justice scholarship highlights that temporary labour migration and
environmental justice are fundamentally linked, considering in most industries, it is often
migrant workers, ethnic minorities and women of colour who are willing to take high-risk,
lower-paid jobs that put them at greater risk of exposure to environmental harms.841 It is the
workplace where exposure is the most intense and where people are first exposed. And while this
was not found in the case of Masdar City given the context of the UAE, it is the workplace where
people begin to resist environmental injustices. Recent scholarship on just transitions notes how
arguments both in favour and opposed to some efforts towards a post-carbon economy such as
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solar energy farms and Green New Deals may erase work and labour.842 In the context of Covid19, it is all the more significant to centre justice concerns of the most marginalized who continue
to be disproportionately burdened by public good issues such as climate change and public
health.
Similarly, CA’s ability to counter the usual sequencing of economic objectives over
social and environmental dimensions is also helpful. While it may be challenging to do
environmental justice-inspired research in contexts such as the UAE and outside the country, it is
worth pursuing such projects. Given the political climate, it was difficult to talk about migrant
workers explicitly. Finding interviewees and building long, meaningful relationships with
interviewees based on a few in-person interactions proved difficult to maintain by
communicating online alone, especially considering peoples’ anxieties over surveillance in the
context of crackdowns and arrests of critics who have been vocal on social media. Given the
transient nature of the migrant population, particularly in the UAE, it was also difficult to
maintain connections with interviewees over the years.
In the context of climate change, it will be increasingly important to highlight these
dynamics and work on intersections such as migration, environment and labour while centring
the concerns and voices of racialized, marginalized communities who are disproportionately and
routinely made expendable by fossil-fuel industries, post-oil futures and climate change itself. A
focus on the UAE is able to highlight the importance of a holistic approach towards a just
transition that can only be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable if the
underlying power structures that have created environmental problems such as climate change
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are countered. Post-oil futures must center justice issues faced by the most vulnerable and just
transitions must foreground, rather than erase, workers.843
In summary, using capabilities as an evaluative lens has advantages over other preference
or resource-centred metrics. It is most helpful for evaluating legal regimes and instruments
comprehensively to see how the distribution of opportunities constrain certain migrant workers.
While it can be used for multiple purposes, it serves as only one of the normative bases for
certain labour rights and can go beyond them to include more complex beings and doings such as
meaningful labour, supporting oneself and one’s family and being able to move freely. As I have
tried to demonstrate through this work, its biggest strength may be its means-ends distinction and
its ability to counter the usual sequencing of economic concerns over social and environmental
ones, as reflected by my analysis of how SD applies in Masdar City. However, significant
critiques and limitations include CA’s incompleteness and lack of an explicit structural analysis,
and focus on individuals, Sen’s unwavering faith in reason and conceptualization of human
rights. This dissertation aimed to see whether pairing CA with critical strands of scholarship in
EJ, TWAIL, and Critical Development studies would help make it more robust and address some
of these shortfalls. Nevertheless, as Robeyns writes, “it is clear that the capability approach will
not solve all the world’s problems, and that we should regard it as a tool to help us in analyzing
cases that need our attention, rather than an intellectual project that has become an end in itself
for academics.”844

5.3 Future Research
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In light of the critiques raised in the previous section, future research agenda for CAbased environmental justice scholars should include using political economic analyses and
centring the role of racism. This may help further a theory of justice with a more coherent,
explicit account of structural constraints. In addition, drawing on Carmen Gonzalez’s recent
work on racial capitalism, climate change and migration, there ought to be more race-conscious
approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation, whether they are inspired by CA or
other normative bases. This includes CD and post-development scholarship criticized for
romanticizing and essentializing the ‘local’ and ‘traditional.’ with an “overly moralizing
rhetoric.” As Pailey further argues, while post-development is able to center class and gender, it
“suffers from a ‘white gaze’ problem in that it remains conspicuously silent on race, racism and
racialized forms of Northern hegemony.”845 It also disregards the role of the state while leaving
its claims that the global South is generally anti-mainstream development, for the most part
unsupported.846
While CA is also being applied in the context of non-human animals, more needs to be
done to connect CA-inspired approaches to degrowth.847 Although CA’s means-ends distinction
can critique an economic-centred growth view of development, its focus on capabilities or
substantive opportunity freedoms cannot tell us how to get there. Critical development scholars
who advocate for transitions towards degrowth argue that the ways SD and green economy are
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approached have worsened planetary health and failed to reduce poverty and inequality.848 For
Escobar, degrowth and pluriverses such as Buen Vivir could be “fellow travelers” where the
former can take the latter in more urban contexts or are in the global North.849 Both share a focus
on a complete reorganization of society that “recenters harmony” among humans and the morethan-human world.850 Vandenhole, on the other hand, argues for no-growth to replace economic
growth so that environmental and social aspects are prioritized over economic growth, as strong
definitions of sustainable development suggest.
Meanwhile, Richard Douthwaite relies on leading ecological economist and proponent of
steady-state economics, Herman Daly, for his argument that a sustainable society does not use
renewable resources faster than they can regenerate, use nonrenewable resources faster than
renewable substitutes are developed, and release pollutants faster than natural systems can break
down.851 Daly, who defined SD as “development without growth,” argues, “[t]he term
sustainable growth should be rejected as a bad oxymoron’” Here, again, environmental justice
concerns of the most vulnerable and marginalized ought to be centred. Echoing Chimni’s
remarks, therefore, future research should also focus on emancipation to, not only emancipation
from. This would include visioning and futurities that include plural paths, including degrowth
and pluriverses, but by centring environmental justice concerns. While degrowth tackles material
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throughput and over-consumption in rich countries, it may insufficiently take equity into
account, particularly the impacts of reducing GDP on particular people and geographic areas. As
Ellie Perkins warns, “it seems dangerous to advocate degrowth without very clear and specific
corollary measures to negate the tendency of the powerful to come out better-off .”852
In addition, there is much to add to research on migrant workers’ perceptions of
receiving-countries in the North, including Canada. A number of the interviewed returning
migrant workers viewed receiving countries in the North as their preferred destination, where
everyone is treated equally, and there are more opportunities. One interviewee noted how
someone “told [him] that you have spoiled your entire life…If you were in America, or Canada,
you would have been doing all types of jobs.”853 While there is comparative work on temporary
labour migration regimes, there may be value in including how migrant workers’ own
subjectivities inform or unsettle dominant understanding of North-South migration and SouthSouth migrations.
In addition, in their re-telling of their experiences, migrant workers often also reproduced
subjectivities of who is a “desirable” as opposed to an “undesirable” migrant. For instance,
interviewed returning migrant workers often reproduced the informal hierarchies that associate
certain professions with certain nationalities, ethnicities, races, gender etc. One interviewed
returning migrant worker noted how there were no children camel jockeys anymore in Abu
Dhabi but then later added that there were Sudanese children – this was okay because “that’s
what they do.” Some also associate their poor working and living conditions to lack of education
or experience and vice versa. For instance, one of the interviewed returning migrant workers
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recalled, “They kept the good technicians in good conditions…because I was an all-rounder
technician.”854 While there is already a growing body of anthropological work in this area, it
would be fruitful to situate these findings in relation to how migrants are constructed in both
international migration and environmental legal regimes.

5.4 Concluding Remarks
“There is no freedom…you can’t do any job on another site.”855
-Pakistani returning migrant worker
“This city will also die.”856
Masdar city student-resident
On my flight from Dubai to Karachi, I sat next to Jamshaid, a Pakistani camel driver in
his 20’s who worked in Abu Dhabi. He was going back to Rahim Yar Khan after what he called
were “grueling”857 two years. He had been earning 200 USD and worked 7-days a week. His
arbab constantly blamed him for sick livestock and his kafeel did not pay for his return ticket.
Though his kafeel had “given [him] permission” to work elsewhere, he could not find
employment in time. Having lived on a remote farm with only a handful of other employees, he
did not have a network to reach to and know where to look. “There is no freedom,” he concluded
with a sigh. When asked if he would go back to the UAE, he said in one breath, “Of course, I
will go wherever there is work.”858
Migration is the norm, not an aberration. There may be many roads towards sustaining
justice for migrants, and while it may be dangerous to speculate, migration will remain prevalent.

Returning migrant worker interview
Returning migrant worker interview
856
Masdar student-resident interview
857
Returning migrant worker interview
858
Returning migrant worker interview
854
855
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Covid-19 has not only exacerbated pre-existing inequalities and expedited the “future of work”
but has also had a profound impact on migrants, who have been left in limbo once again. It has
complicated return and repatriation processes for migrants who have lost jobs.859 It has increased
the risk of contracting Covid-19 for migrants working on the “frontlines” and migrants held in
immigration detention facilities for longer periods. While Masdar City became one of the centers
for Covid-19 action,860 the UAE banned visas for Pakistanis due to “security reasons.” Although
stories detailing migrants stranded and mass exoduses are plenty, the extent of the impact on
migrants is still unfolding. Meanwhile, the UAE launched its space program, which includes
building a human settlement on Mars by 2117.861 All this is to say that although Masdar’s
“spaceship in the desert” remains incomplete, the question of whether there will space for
migrant justice on the many moons promised to migrants remains just as pressing.
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